THE CONTINUITY OF IMAGES FROM THE DEPENDENT OF THE ENEMY TO

THE ROGUE STATE: IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA'S ACQUISITION

OF DETERRENCE CAPABILITIES

By

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The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation of JOCELYN MARY PARKHURST find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

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Abstract

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International relations theories often focus on the relationship between power and states' interests. The capabilities of a state reflect its level of power. When a state seeks to achieve a policy goal based on its security interests, the state considers the power relationship between itself and the other state, often in terms of military and economic capability. Power may take on different forms in the twenty-first century, and the motivation behind any action becomes meaningful at the individual or group level. This study seeks to enter into the mind of the policy maker, determine whether the rogue state image is held by policy makers, and their responses to rogues in a crisis situation. It is an attempt to determine why policy makers promote the policy preferences they do. How policy makers perceive the transition of a state from that of a dependent of the enemy to that of a rogue, and the best policy preferences given the situation, holds more importance than what an objective observer may view as the "true" situation and the "right" policy. What policy makers perceive is their truth, and their policies reflect this perception. By considering the similarities and differences in the perceptions and policy preferences of policy makers towards Iraq and North Korea over time, an understanding develops

of how perceptions influence policy making, providing points of access for increasing successful policy outcomes. This study uncovers the perceived images of Iraq and North Korea during the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s, and once again near the end of the '90s, and the subsequent policy preferences held by policy makers for these two states. The dependent of the enemy image pervaded policy makers' perceptions of both Iraq and North Korea during the Cold War, the rogue state image emerged in the 1990s, while a difference in degree of image existed in the minds of some policy makers between Iraq and North Korea, all of which appeared to influence policy makers' policy preferences.

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to all our children of the world

to whom we give the future; it is our choice as to what will be that future.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: POWER, DETERRENCE AND IMAGES

For the first time since the dawn of humanity, we gaze
into the abyss of total annihilation. In his memoirs, J. Robert Oppenheimer,
once scientific director of the Manhattan Project, said that as he witnessed
the first atomic explosion he recalled a passage from the Bhagavad Gita:
"If the radiance of a thousand suns were to burst at once into the sky, that would be
like the splendor of the Mighty One.... I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds."
--Daisaku Ikeda[1]

The Puzzle and Its Pieces

Nuclear weapons stand at the dawning of the New Century as the only man-made force capable of annihilating all of humanity and most life on Earth in a matter of moments. While nuclear deterrence worked throughout the Cold War, new nuclear nations threaten to disrupt this peace brought about through fear. Policy makers believe that new nuclear states may not adhere to the same cultural standards, create the same political and bureaucratic structures, and hold the same intents as did Cold Warrior states. In addition, nuclear seeking or capable states failing to adhere to international norms and standards—rogues—may pass this technology on to terrorists. Thus, rogue states stand as one of the highest threats to U.S. security in the post Cold War era.

The three main questions for policy makers view how and why the problem occurred, and what to do about it. How did rogue states develop? Why do they seek nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? What policy solutions offer the best possible outcome when dealing with rogue states? In an effort to answer these questions, this study considers the development of rogue states, often from a dependent of the enemy to that of a rogue state. It is suggested that rogue states seek to secure deterrent capabilities no longer provide by the enemy.

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[1] In *Choose Hope: Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age.* 2002. David Krieger and Daisaku Ikeda. Originally quoted in Wayne Saslow, "Letters," *APS News* June 1999.

This build up of deterrent capability threatens regional and international actors. A consideration of past policy preferences towards rogue states may provide new ideas on how to address this security issue.

Rather than looking at decisions and their outcomes, this study seeks to enter into the mind of the policy maker, determine whether the rogue state image is held by policy makers, and their responses to rogues in a crisis situation. It is an attempt to determine why policy makers promote the policy preferences they do. Hopefully, the outcome of the study suggests points of access where further research can direct change and overcome misperception, often a core function of less than perfect policy making. How policy makers perceive the transition of a state from that of a dependent of the enemy to that of a rogue and the best policy preferences given the situation holds more importance than what an objective observer may view as the "true" situation and the "right" policy. What policy makers perceive is their truth, and their policies reflect this perception. The first step is to uncover their perceived understanding of rogue states, whether flexibility in their perceptions exists, and the policies they consider when dealing with rogues in a crisis situation. Through this understanding, opportunities may appear for creating increased understanding on how to deal with rogue states. As each individual is different, not all policy makers perceive rogue states exactly the same, nor do they promote similar policy preferences, and policy preferences appear to vary from rogue to rogue. Deterrence fails in some cases, but is successful in others. By considering the similarities and differences in the perceptions and policy preferences of policy makers towards Iraq and North Korea over time, an understanding develops of how perceptions influence policy making, providing points of access for increasing successful policy outcomes.

Power

International relations theories often focus on the relationship between power and states' interests. Power is the ability to get others to do what they may not normally have done. Individuals, groups, and states invoke power everyday when dealing with other people and other states. Power becomes the instrument used to achieve desired ends. Pursuing goals through the use of power involves politics. Politics is "an unending struggle for interests and power" (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1952: 33). States seek to fulfill desires for power and use political force to do so. States' interests include political objectives and are achieved through the use of power. The desire for power reaches fruition by using political power. In other words, it takes power to get power.

The capabilities of a state reflect its level of power. When a state seeks to achieve a policy goal based on its security interests, the state considers the power relationship between itself and the other state. The total accumulation of capabilities within the state produces power but cancels out when two states' capabilities are equal (Stoessinger, 1973). States of equal ability lack superiority over each other, producing an equality of power. Conflict occurs when one state believes it retains a higher level of capability than another state and when interests collide. Specifically, military capability helps decide the outcome of conflicting perspectives in the international system (Rothgeb, 1993). Conflicts often occur based on differing views of state interests and the use of power to achieve political goals. The power politics of war based on military capabilities often determines the outcome of contention between states.

On the other hand, power may take on different forms in the twenty-first century. Military power may be limited in the current international system as non-military states have gained power through their economic strength (Rothgeb, 1993). States like Japan and Germany

strengthen their political power through their economic abilities to contribute to and control certain markets. Equality between states' economic power often supersedes military power between states. States' use of power, observed through policy makers' actions, furthers national interests, but it takes on new forms. While in Eastern Europe and the Balkans divisions of nations takes place, the unification of states creates greater economic power. The European Union exemplifies the growth of economic power through unification. In addition, Joseph Nye (2002) relates the increasing importance of soft power, those aspects of a state's "image" other than economic and military capability. How much another state desires to "be like Mike" develops out of its perception of "goodness" within the state viewed. Cultural level, intent, and domestic policy all reflect aspects of soft power. Even the geography of a state contains power (Spykman, 1952). The United States gains power due to its sharing of borders only with Mexico and Canada and thousands of miles dividing it from the states of Europe, while the power of the states united within the European Union increases due to decreases in border conflicts. Power is contextually bound (Lamborn, 1997) and takes many forms, from the ability to control the minds and actions of others to the influence the president has over subordinates (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985). The internal power of a state—made up of hard and soft power, and geographical location—influences the power used towards other states in achieving political goals.

Furthermore, international relations occur under the banner of power, and states interact based on power politics. "Political interest" defines power and is observed through the balance of power between states (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985), as it is the nation-state that holds the power (Modelski, 1972). States exercise power by furthering their interests in the international arena. International politics develop through the struggle for power (Morgenthau

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and Thompson, 1985), and the ability to make other states act according to one's desires (Rothgeb, 1993). Power politics between states depends on how states' interests interact with capabilities. States use power to further their national interests, achieving desired ends if their exercise of power brings success.

Traditional realist theorists state that as capabilities equate with power, the ability to reach wanted ends depends on the capabilities of the state, or hard power. The study of power between states has been a hot topic for thousands of years. Thucydides[2] explores the power relationship between the Athenians, Spartans, and other small city-states during the Peloponnesian war. Thucydides describes how military leaders and government officials use military strength to coerce, deceive, defeat, or deter their enemies. Both Athens and Sparta used military force to gain land and position, through which political power was obtained. Specifically, Thucydides describes the exchange between the Melians and the Athenians, when the latter sought to subjugate the former, as the use of power politics: "[T]he standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept" (Thucydides, 402). It was rational for the Athenians to slaughter the Melians when they irrationally chose to fight against the odds. Similarly, Clausewitz[3] promotes a very rational argument for waging war. As a policy tool of the state, war is a "rational instrument." The objective of the state is to increase its power at the expense of other states through rational decision making. Sun Tzu[4] also calls for the rational analysis of power relationships in offensive actions. A state should only seek more power (attack) when the odds support such action. After all, war legitimizes a nation-state's power

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[2] In *Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War.* Translated by Rex Warner with an Introduction and Notes by M.I. Finley, 1972.
[3] In *Carl von Clausewitz: On War.* Edited with an Introduction by Anatol Rapoport, 1982.

(Modelski, 1972). Therefore, the rational use of power in furthering states' interests influences decision making.

States' interests vary, but include the national security of the country and those issues that affect this security. Power enables states to secure their interests. National interests develop at the state level, vary from state to state, and are consistent over time (Krasner, 1978). In this way, the issues important to the United Nations and the world community often lack support at the individual state level. The national interests of the U.S. may include environmental issues while such interests hold less meaning in another state. Longevity of interests supports the position that the whims of policy makers fail to become national interests. Furthermore, the state has the responsibility to maintain itself, and its interests include both power and peace (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985). Maintaining the state includes keeping borders secure. More specifically, a state's interests include society's mutual benefits and international bargaining chips (Clinton, 1986). Benefits suggest interests that support the lifestyle of those living in the state and its ability to participate in the international relations game. By viewing the general goals of society that last over time and are arranged in an ordered preference, the interests of the state are apparent (Krasner, 1978). In this way, the state's interests involve more than the interests of individual politicians. Nevertheless, individual actions of policy makers construct national interests at the state level (Krasner, 1978). While the short term desires of policy makers do not usually create national interests, the individual makes policy choices that evolve into and support national interests.

Still, there are a variety of ways realists look at what develops as states' interests. While Morgenthau and Thompson (1985) see national interests as a state level concern, Krasner (1978)

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[4] In *Sun Tzu: The Art of War (History and Warfare)*. Translated by Ralph D. Sawyer.

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observes state interests at lower levels (domestically)—but these interests become state level interests over time. Some concerns that originate at the grassroots level slowly develop into state level concerns. More recently, national interests may advance beyond the borders of a state's territory and take on the interests of the United States "Empire" (Strange, 1989). Here, corporations and political entities produce interstate influences that support the political and economic interests of the U.S. Still, international interaction, the realists state, must be understood through international political theories (Waltz, 1979). Influences developing from inside the state are "reductionist" and should not concern the international theorist. What is inside the box doesn't matter—only the outcomes have meaning (Hollis and Smith, 1990). Realists view the structures of power and states' interests at the international level of analysis. Capability or power reflects structures that suggest actions the state may take, say the realists. Changes in the international system do not necessarily mean changes of the international structure (Waltz, 1979). Although a state may change its placement within the system, the structure of the system, based on power, remains.

Yet, the motivation behind any action becomes meaningful at the individual or group level. The "reductionist" view operationalizes characteristics that make the measuring of power easier (Hollis and Smith, 1990). Even though all states react to an international crisis, how they act may differ (Jervis, 1976). The question being asked determines the level of analysis used. Answering the questions about motivation behind the use of power, observed through the decisions of the policy makers, must occur through the analysis of individuals and groups of individuals. Decision making unfolds through the personality of the individual, the general perceptions of clusters of people, and the behavior of groups. Power may be shared between individual leaders of bureaucracies (Destler, 1974), groups of policy makers, or held by a single

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leader. In addition, the actions of one state influence the decision making of another state (Buzan et al., 1997). Patterns indiscernible at the system level take shape when viewed in individual action.

Furthermore, the anarchic system depicted by the realist perspective contends with the idealist view of Woodrow Wilson after WWI (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1952). Although power still reigns supreme in international politics, the changing structure of power may limit nationalistic tendencies, allowing for the development of a world community. Just as the confederated states of the colonies found it necessary to unite in order to limit inter-state power struggles,[5] so too can states in the international system unite in order to limit international conflict. The coming together of states in the European Union exemplifies the ability of countries to contain nationalistic calls for sovereignty in order to gain mutual benefits of a larger structure. Supporting the United Nations' role in international relations and the judicial supremacy of a world court would create a new system of state interaction that limits the influence of a superpower and allows for stronger smaller states. A united effort from states in a world community removes the need for power politics from one state acting alone in making another state bend to its will. While power and national interests still hold importance in international relations, the world community needs supersede those of any one state and create a structure through which inter-state conflict is resolved. Thus, the barbaric form of power politics called war would be limited to a united police force enforcing international laws.

Deterrence

Yet, power relationships continue in the international arena, including the ability to create

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[5] This desired unity is described in The Federatist, No. VI by Alexander Hamilton, read in Morgenthau and Thompson (1952).

deterrence between states. A balance of power between states includes the ability of policy makers to further the interests of the state without harming deterrent positions. A main goal of a state includes the deterrent ability to other states from taking its power (Gergorin, 1993). Deterrence fails when war occurs. The power and peace sought by a state reflect in part its deterrent capabilities. A state's interests include keeping its place in the international arena. The ability to retain its international placement depends on creating a solid deterrent position thereby protecting the interests of the state (Jervis, 1993).

The realist view suggests that deterrence develops through a cost/benefit analysis of the balance of power between states, resulting in a perceived high that the state must maintain in order to limit any threat against its national interests (Schelling, 1966). Conventional weapons create deterrence based on the wealth of a state and its ability to direct funding to military capabilities. Weapons of mass destruction are less costly and can balance power inequalities. Nuclear weapons produce the ultimate deterrent capability as a state will not willingly subject itself to total destruction as a result of nuclear retaliation (Jervis, 1993). The cost of nuclear use outweighs the benefit of using such weapons in an offensive move against another state, if the opposing state also has nuclear weapons (Bundy, 1982). Thus, it is in a nuclear state's best interests to limit those states seeking or acquiring nuclear weapons, while smaller states will likely seek nuclear capabilities.

As a part of the influence they had over smaller states in their spheres of influence during the Cold War, superpowers extended their nuclear deterrent capabilities over client, or dependent, states (Huth and Russett, 1988 & 1993). Therefore, any state challenging the balance of power of an ally or dependent of a larger power must consider the possibility that the larger power will involve itself in the altercation. Once the Cold War ended, those states under the

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influence of the Soviet Union could no longer count on the extended deterrent capabilities of the Soviets, forcing the dependent states to look elsewhere for deterrence, often through the development and acquisition of WMD. Preston (1997) argues that new nuclear states change power relations in the international system. Since nuclear weapons produce parity between states of different sizes and capabilities, superpowers lose their position as the controllers of military might (Preston, 1997). Thus, viewing the development of nuclear and other WMD capability in smaller or developing states becomes important.

Yet, some states successfully keep their borders in tact without the use of nuclear weapons or a large military. In addition, some states known to be seeking nuclear weapons fail to feel the bombs of war while others are bombed indiscriminately. The realist view of deterrence from a strictly international system level fails to explain why such variances occur. In every instance where a smaller state seeks nuclear weapons, the nuclear state would act to stop such capability with force. Anything less that the use of force suggests a value within a state to consider, making an analysis within the state important. Furthermore, rather than "the state" making decisions, it is the policy makers perceiving the situation and the relative placement of the perceived state within the system that affects international policy making. How much a perceived state is a threat reflects the perceptions of the policy makers. Therefore, a theory considering the perceived threat or opportunity of a state better addresses the ability for states to repel an attack and secure its national interests than a strict systems level theory of international relations.

Images

On October 10, 2002 I sat watching the debate on the House Resolution on the Use of Force Against Iraq. The debate and arguments lacked ingenuity and innovation. As will be

shown, speeches and remarks duplicated those spoken from 1989 to 1998. The focus centered on Saddam Hussein and his roles as a terror machine who kills his own people, supports terrorist activities, and seeks WMD, specifically, nuclear weapons, and as an outlaw leader who retains the will to use WMD on the civilized world. According to the speakers, if he obtains a nuclear weapon, he will use it in the Middle East. These words produce a picture or image of a state acting against the world community, a state lacking the same level of common decency as the great powers of the world—a rogue state with a short fuse. These images developed over years, starting in the late 1960s with Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr,[6] through the 1980s and 1990s with Saddam Hussein's[7] rise to power, and during the crisis leading to the bombing of Iraq in the Desert Fox campaign of 1998.

A short eight days after the debates on Iraq, another state contributing to the "axis of evil," North Korea, acknowledged that it supported a secret nuclear weapons program. Observations on North Korea also produce an image placing it in the rogue state category. It stands as the hermit kingdom with an eccentric leader who may start a war on South Korea at anytime if provoked. North Korea lacks the development of other states that would keep it from using nuclear weapons on other countries. As the last Stalinist regime in the world, North Korea strictly enforces its nationalistic policies and its cult of personality surrounding Kim Il Sung and his son, Kim Jong Il.

Realists consider the internal workings of the state unimportant to the interactions between states at the system level. Yet, the images perceived by policy makers of another state directly influence decision making. Not only do the military and economic capabilities of a state

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[6] President of Iraq from 1968-1979.
[7] President of Iraq since 1979.

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influence policy makers policy preferences, but also the cultural level, observed intent and domestic policy actions of the state's leaders and citizens. Image theory considers all aspects of power, both hard and soft, as perceived by the policy makers. It is this perception that influences the direction a state takes in a crisis situation, not what an objective observer deems the "truth." Thus, as an alternative to the realist analysis of international interaction, viewing policy makers' perceived images of other states, including rogues, provides insight into the making of international relations.

Images develop in response to information about a state and frame how new information influences responsive actions. People form schemas, or preconceived groupings, to simplify information processing (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Schemas, like stereotypes, are preconceived images of other people, groups, or states based on prior information of the person, group, or state. Information processed through schemas in turn elicits behavior based on these groupings. In international relations, policy makers first create images of states, then process new information based on these images. In other words, the world view that policy makers develop structures how they take action (Cottam, 1994; Fisk and Taylor, 1991). Responses to the actions of a state pass through an image held of that state. For Iraq and North Korea, an image of a rogue state structures the policy choices of policy makers.

Where do these images come from, and why do they exist? What made these two states seek nuclear and other WMD in the first place, and why do we list them as rogue states? It is proposed that these images come from policy makers' reactions to the perceived development of deterrent capabilities of states that were once dependent upon the military power of the U.S. enemy, the Soviet Union. Prior to 1989, and the eventual disintegration of the U.S.S.R., Iraq and North Korea were dependent allies of the Soviet Union. In the fifties, sixties and seventies, Iraq

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and North Korea were dependent upon the extended deterrent capabilities of the Soviet Union and were able to keep other states from invading through their relationship with the U.S.S.R. It will be shown that, despite the taking of U.S. property and people by North Korea and the military involvement of Iraq in the Arab-Israeli conflict and subsequent oil embargo, the U.S. failed to take action against either state.

Once Iraq and North Korea lost the support of the U.S.S.R. and the deterrent capabilities of its military might, Iraq and North Korea sought their own capabilities to deter states from threatening their national interests. While these measures began before the end of the Soviet Union, they were taken in response to an observed need to create a deterrent capability. The image held by U.S. policy makers of these two states evolved from that of a state that cannot act on its own accord to that of a rogue state that acts against the desires of the world community. The seeking of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction is one indicator of a rogue state.[8] As nuclear weapons promote deterrence, new nuclear states also seek to deter would be challengers and maintain the balance of power in their regions. The fortitude of Iraq and North Korea in seeking the power to create a deterrent capability produces images of a rogue state that threatens the security of the United States and its allies.

Image theory develops through the observation of power politics between states. The military capabilities, culture, economic strength and observed threat of a state produce images (Cottam, 1992; Cottam, 1994; Cottam and Cottam, 2001). These capabilities focus on the power relationships between states, but also include aspects other than system level considerations. Culture, domestic policy and intent rise in importance to the perceiver. While the threat and

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[8] The rogue state image is further explained in Chapter 2.

capabilities perceived by one state influence the actions taken towards another, the perception of the ability and likelihood of another state taking action, as perceived by policy makers, also is important. The schema created by the various aspects of the hard and soft power of another state structures the behavior of the policy makers within the perceiver state. Thus, power, hard and soft, becomes the main focus in the relationship between states. A perceived rogue state seeking nuclear weapons represents a threat and capability undesirable to the perceiver state. While the rogue state seeks to create a deterrent position available through the attainment of nuclear weapons, such a grab for power threatens the security of other states. Actions must be taken to reduce the threat and limit the power capability of the rogue state. Yet, though some similar actions are taken towards both Iraq and North Korea, differences occur as well. Only by viewing within the state and at the varying aspects of the perceived image can an understanding develop for why these variances occur.

Dissertation Outline

Cognitive theories are important to the study of international relations as these theories attempt to provide structure to our thinking about the cognition of political actors, their use of power, and how their interests frame behavior. Due to the importance of power and interest in international relations theories, cognition is an important variable to consider (George, 1979; Young & Schafer, 1998). Herrmann (1988) suggests that knowledge about international relations benefits from cognitive theories: "In the past twenty years the interest in decision-making, perceptions, cognitive processes and artificial intelligence has played an important part in the development of our theories about world politics" (175). More recently, Herrmann et al. (1997) underline the growing importance of cognitive theories and their use by academics to explain

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interstate interactions: "Many scholars have developed arguments for using cognitive concepts to help explain foreign policy decision making and international relations" (403). Even those who argue against considering the motivations of individual actors end up proceeding at the individual level of analysis in policy formation (Herrman and Fischerkeller, 1995: 415). The decision making literature that considers individuals and groups is large and offers much to the study of international relations (Cottam, 1986: 5). Determining why policy makers act the way they do shines light onto darkened areas of international interaction.

Determining the images held by policy makers clarifies and explains policy making behavior, and offers predictions for policy action in the future. While some researchers may use cognitive theories that look at leaders or group dynamics in answering policy questions, image theory is unique in that it uses "like-minded" individuals to obtain positions on policy choices. The study I propose adds to the literature by probing the dependent of the enemy and rogue state image categories to determine if policy makers use these images in making foreign policy and to determine if there is some consistency from one image to the other. Specifically, how does the change from the of the dependent of the enemy image to that of the rogue state image affect policy makers' decisions.

The second chapter explores cognitive and image theories and their development over time. While this literature is rich in theory, there are few studies that look deeply into the dependent of the enemy and rogue state images and what they mean for policy makers. By creating a connection between the dependent of the enemy image and the rogue state image, I create a consistency between the past, present and future of image theory.

The third chapter of the dissertation first presents a discussion on the benefits of the qualitative method and its place in scientific research. The method of research employed

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depends on the question asked and the cases available. Next, the research problem is explained, as well as the approach and methodology of the study, including the development of indicators, and the operationalization of variables.

The fourth chapter goes over the history of Iraq and North Korea, setting up the later discussion on policy makers' images held of these states. Iraq begins as the center of civilization in the Middle East, the cultural leader, Mesopotamia. In the modern era, Iraq was formed out of the red lines drawn by French and British diplomats after the end of the Ottoman Empire. Once oil was discovered in the Middle East, states vied for the right to pump that oil and receive the benefits of cheap fuel. The nationalization of oil companies brought new international dilemmas as Iraq sought the support of the Soviet Union. Conflict is the key word for the Iraqi situation in the Middle East since the sixties, with Iraq supporting the Six Day War with Israel, its war with Iran, the Gulf War, and the continuous crises that followed. North Korea is a state also embroiled in conflict. Before and during WWII, Japan sought to "free" Korea from the bonds of the Western world. After WWII, Korea was split at the 38th parallel with the influence of the Soviet Union in the north and of the U.S. in the south. The Korean war furthered this divide despite the military actions of the United States and the United Nations. Several crises followed, including the taking of the *USS Pueblo* by North Korea, North Korean withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its continued disruption of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors.

Chapters five (Iraq) and six (North Korea) present the results and analysis of the data. I find a connection between the dependent of the enemy image and the rogue state image. In addition, it is apparent that the dependent of the enemy and rogue state images are salient to policy makers. Policy makers do use images in their making of foreign policy. Furthermore,

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there is a change in how the deterrent capabilities of Iraq and North Korea are viewed through the change from dependent of the enemy image to that of the rogue state image.

In chapter seven, I review the hypotheses, discussing their outcome based on the data. While in most cases the hypotheses are supported, some discussion reflects possible reasons for policy makers' policy preferences that do not appear to support the rogue state image category with North Korea. It is possible that rehabilitative measures provide a more idealistic or "enlightened" response to "bad" behavior, or that some policy makers seek to reward good behavior. In addition, support for placing Iraq and North Korea in the rogue state categories rather than some other category is presented.

Finally, chapter eight summarizes the results and discusses the implications of the data, including a discussion on the changing view of power and how this is reflected in international relations, how the results suggest research for the future, and a note on the normative perspective of nuclear abolition.

CHAPTER TWO

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY: PERSONALITY, BELIEFS, AND IMAGES

The Development of Cognitive Research

Early work on foreign policy decision making focused on organizational roles, communication and information, and the motivation behind policy choices (Snyder, 1962). Snyder (1962) set out a framework for viewing the perceptions of the decision maker, the context of decision making, how policy decisions reflect the interaction between "structure and process," and the use of both the individual and group levels of analysis. In the same volume, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962) discuss the need to develop a typology of states on the basis of political organization, decision making systems and their strengths and weaknesses, and the forms of strategy that policy makers use in determining policy. Policy makers become the "state," with international politics viewed as the interaction between state processes. State action develops out of policy makers' perceived images of desired outcomes.

When considering the decision making process, Snyder Bruck and Sapin (1962) state that decision making brings about one state or condition conceptualized by the decision maker and chosen from a variety of possible outcomes (90). Those decision makers worth studying are those who are part of the decision making process (93). Yet, decision makers' information processing is often faulty, and this may affect policy choices (102). Decision makers act on what they perceive (103), and we understand their motivations through inferring from their actions (139). Additionally, decision makers utilize stereotypes based on prior knowledge to classify actions (164).

Thus, what develops is the importance of viewing the policy maker and his/her choices. Through the analysis of policy makers' behavior, including the words they use, the researcher

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uncovers the processes used to make decisions. Additionally, the motivation behind policy decisions underscores why a decision maker takes certain action. Not only must one view outside the box, but one must observe inside the box.   Several approaches to the study of cognition and behavior underscore the importance of viewing the mental processes of the individual policy maker. Personality, operational codes (belief systems), and images all provide insight into the workings of the mind and uncover the mental mystery by viewing inside the box. These three approaches overlap and complement each other, producing an interesting look into the methods of cognitive research.

Personality

Originally, researchers often believed that the structures of bureaucracies constrained individual action, limiting the effect of personality on policy making (Greenstein, 1969). An individual acted based on the role he or she held rather than through his or her specific characteristics. The standard operating procedures of the bureaucracy structured political action. Hermann (1976, 1977) suggests that the environment and personality interact to produce political action. Behavior develops from the structures of the bureaucracy and the characteristics of the individual. Meaningful research asks why decision makers in similar situations act differently (Hermann, 1976; Hermann, 1977). Furthermore, the higher the office held by the individual, the more likely that the individual will feel he or she affects decision making. Personality will have a greater effect on decision making when there are fewer limits based on the position held (Hermann, 1976, 1977). In other words, SOPs are less effective as restrictions when the policy maker holds a high office in a hierarchical system.

Hermann (1976) produces eight instances when personality affects policy making. First, the greater the decision maker's interest towards the policy making process the more likely that

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his or her personality will affect policy making. Second, personality affects behavior more when there is a strong affective response in the leader when he or she obtains of power, as in a coup or revolution. Third, a charismatic leader will affect foreign policy making more than will an uncharismatic leader. Fourth, closed or monolithic systems where there is a high degree of control over the foreign policy making process will be open to the effects of the leader's personality. Fifth, new states or those with weaker structures of foreign policy making create instances where personality affects policy making. Sixth, personality affects foreign policy making more in times of crisis. Seventh, cognitive styles will affect policy making more when the decision maker has less training, while an experienced decision maker's beliefs will more likely affect foreign policy making. Eighth, in ambiguous situations the policy maker's information processing style will affect foreign policy making. These eight instances, which show how and when personality affects policy making and likely times for observing this influence, structure the way personality is researched. Through an understanding of the circumstances surrounding personality and environment, the specific characteristics of individual actors becomes important.

Hermann (1977) believes there are specific types of policy makers that are more likely to influence international policy making: those who are optimistic about the future, those who hold cognitively complex world views, and those who show a humanitarian ideology or concern for others. Those who are optimistic about the future are likely to feel that they have more control over their environment, that they have the ability to control events. Such a policy maker may show more interest in the international world and become more involved in the policy making process. In this way, the personality of the individual may stand out and affect how and what policies are made. Decision makers who hold more complex views of the world limit their use

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of stereotyping and see other states in more varied ways. These decision makers likely collect more information than do cognitively simple individuals and apply information based on specific circumstances rather than lump all events into one category. Cognitively complex decision makers may also take more time to produce a policy outcome in their search for more information. These actions allow the individual personality of the policy maker to manifest and affect the policy making process. Additionally, decision makers who show concern for others are also more likely to affect policy making. An empathetic leader attempts to understand the position of other states and people in the international arena. This understanding may lead to putting oneself in the shoes of another. In this way, the individual characteristics of the policy maker influence the policy making process. Thus, the personality of the individual policy maker is more likely to influence the decision making process when he or she is optimistic, complex, and empathetic.

Hermann (1984) develops her personality profiling further through her analysis of heads of state. She states that two personality characteristics affect policy making—sensitivity to the environment and interest in foreign affairs (Hermann, 1984). Those who are sensitive to the environment will be more likely to seek out more information on a situation and to change behavior based on this information. On the other hand, those who are less sensitive to the environment limit the amount of information gleaned on a situation and may structure information to support their beliefs. In the first instance, behavior is modified to fit to the information, while in the latter behavior is based on personality, and information is used to support that behavior. Thus, when individuals are less sensitive to the environment their personality is more likely to affect policy making. These two characteristics filter how personality traits affect behavior.

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There are four traits that affect political action: beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style (Hermann, 1984). Beliefs are general conceptions of the world. Specifically, political beliefs structure how information about the political world is processed. Beliefs will be discussed further in the operational code section. Motives, on the other hand, consist of why an action occurs. Motives are difficult to observe, as they are based on the reasoning behind behavior. Decision style reflects the structure and process used to develop conclusions about a situation. How a leader structures decision making may include how a policy maker seeks and interprets information, whether stereotypes are used, and to what degree history is used as an example. Interpersonal style suggests different ways decision makers relate to those around him or her. Some decision makers may want to rely only on the advice of one or two people, or decision makers may like to participate in a give and take session where opposing perspectives battle for preference.

The above traits produce seven characteristics that influence how individuals act in social groups (Hermann, 1984). The first is nationalism or the ethnocentric perspective that one's government deserves dominance and can answer the problems of the world. Second is the belief that one can control events. Third is the individual's need for power while fourth is the need for affiliation. Fifth, is the level of confidence, sixth is the amount of distrust of others, and seventh is the orientation to tasks.

These four traits and seven characteristics relay two orientations towards policy making, the independent and the participatory (Hermann, 1980b). The independent leader has a high need for power, low conceptual complexity, a distrust of others, is nationalistic and believes that she or he has control over events. On the other hand, a participatory leader has a high need for affiliation, high conceptual complexity, trusts others, has a low level of nationalism and only

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slightly believes that he or she can control events. While Hermann hypothesized that high interest in foreign affairs would increase the effect of personality on foreign policy, her research uncovered the point that low interest in foreign affairs indicated greater personality effects on foreign policy. Apparently, personality becomes more of a factor when the decision maker limits the degree of interest involved in decision making. If there is an interest in foreign affairs, the decision maker may seek more information and allow multiple views to emerge, while low interest suggests that the leader has more influence. Training in foreign affairs also decreases the degree to which personality affects the policy process. The more experienced the decision maker the less personality determines policy behavior. Viewing decision making under these two orientations, interest and training in foreign affairs, provides insight into the instances where personality affects policy making.

Hermann (1980b) believes that five foreign policy behaviors emerge that reflect the degree to which policy makers commit to action. First, decision makers believe at varying levels that there should be a change in the international would. Such change is expressed through the comments of policy makers suggesting that the international world needs a new policy goal. Second, policy makers make statements on the degree to which international action is independent or interdependent. A policy maker believes that action should either be taken unilaterally or multilaterally. Third, policy makers may have different views on how resources are used, making crisis situations a priority at the expense of later possible needs, or limiting the spending of resources in order to possess needed ability for future circumstances. Fourth, policy makers act based on the affect felt towards others. Different actions emerge based on whether the "other" is seen as a friend or an enemy. Fifth, policy makers take into consideration other states' responses to their actions. If the international community strongly objects to the unilateral

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actions of a state, it is likely that the policy makers will change their behavior, limiting future negative feedback. Thus, in foreign policy, personality affects behavior, resulting in a variety of policy actions.

Hermann (1984b) furthers her consideration of personality by suggesting that there are times when the situation itself makes personality more important. First, when the policy maker is the head of state, then his or her personality is more likely to influence policy making. Those who hold lower offices may be more constrained by their organizational or elected roles, while the head of state is less constrained. Second, in times of crisis the personality of policy makers may influence policy making more so than in a normal policy making situation. A crisis situation suggests limited information, less time to make decisions, more pressure to make the "right" decision, and less ability to gain differentiated views. Third, an individual policy maker's personality affects policy making more when a situation is ambiguous and lacks clear definition. In ambiguous situations policy makers may not have reliable information, specific roles or historical reference through which decisions can be made. In these three instances, the personality of decision makers may affect the policy making process more than in normal policy making situations.

Hermann and Preston (1999) consider head of states' leadership styles and their advisory system structures. The advisory system of a leader becomes important as decision making includes more than just the leader. Thus, how policy is made, the form of the advisory system, and how the characteristics of the president influence this process provide insight into how leaders make decisions. Hermann and Preston (1999) look at leadership style and its effect on the advisory system. In viewing leadership style and the advisory system, Hermann and Preston (1999) consider how involved the leader is in the policy process, suggesting that past experience

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creates an ability to better understand and accomplish policy objectives. Also, the belief that the leader can control political events relates a view that the leader seeks greater control over the advisory process while keeping conflict between members to a minimum. In addition, a leader is often either more sensitive or less sensitive to the political context of a policy. Those who are less sensitive to the political environment tend to force through their own agendas, possibly making personality a greater factor in the policy process. On the other hand, those who are more sensitive to the political environment seek more information on the issue and are open to different perspectives. These three factors result in three orientations: specialization (increased involvement of the leader), centralization (high need for control of the leader), and coordination (a leader who is sensitive to the environment). Viewing these characteristics develops our understanding of how the leader affects the policy process and increases our ability to anticipate future policy actions.

In an earlier piece, Hermann (1987) concludes that the structure of the decision making group affects the process through which decisions are made. The personality characteristics of the individual leader affect how the leader perceives his or her role in the policy process, which, in turn, affects how information is processed. Hermann proposes six types of leaders based on personality characteristics. First, the expansionist limits conflict between advisory members, seeks information that will support policy objectives and desires to increase the power of the state. Second, active-independents allow their behavior to be reflective of their basic principles, seek various avenues for obtaining information, have an open advisory system, and use a rational decision making process in moving towards political goals. Third, an influential leader's greatest desire is to keep him-/herself in power, thus supporting a consensus building advisory system and seeking information that sheds light on the decisions of those in support of the leader. Fourth, a

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mediator-integrator is a problem solver who seeks compromise rather than confrontation and works to resolve conflict and disagreement between advisory system members. Fifth, an opportunist takes small steps towards his/her goals while garnering public support. Finally, sixth, a developmental leader holds office in order to better the nation, seeks the support of those who also have the same goals while taking steps to achieve those goals. These different types of leaders create schemas, images used to process information and develop possible predictions of policy outcomes.

Research has developed interesting perspectives on personality. For instance, Suedfeld et al. (1977) relate how speeches by U.N. ambassadors apparently decrease in conceptual complexity just prior to conflicts in the Middle East. In other words, how a policy maker views other states and enunciates this perspective becomes more black and white, less differentiated, and less unified as Middle East conflict looms. The authors suggest that viewing the conceptual complexity of U.N. speeches can flag when conflict is eminent. Along this same line, Tetlock and Tyler (1996) compare integratively complex and integratively simple reasoning by examining Churchill's debates on German behavior and self-rule in India. Integratively complex individuals see more than one side of an issue, are open to different perspectives, and see that there are many ways to view the world. On the other hand, integratively simple reasoning structures decision making through a black and white view of the world—that there is only one correct world view. Suedfeld et al. (1977) and Tetlock and Tyler (1996) both seek to understand how policy makers' personality complexity affects policy making.

George (1980) provides insight into how personality affects decision making. A leader uses a variety of cognitive tools to determine policy choices. First, rather than optimizing, a rational policy makers satisfices, or chooses the policy outcome that first satisfies the desired

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goals. Second, decision makers take small steps or use incrementalism to achieve policy goals rather than try to obtain policy objectives in one giant step. Third, sequential decision making takes large decisions and separates them into smaller pieces. Fourth, decision makers often must seek a consensus in order to further policy objective rather than force through their own decision. Fifth, the use of analogies often clarifies and provides information on policy history, creating a better understanding of the policy environment. Sixth, policy makers are ideologically goal oriented rather than making decisions based on situational needs. Seventh, policy makers may hold specific beliefs about the strategies and tactics they use to further their political goals. These seven cognitive aids help policy makers in the decision making process. In his work, George (1980) combines aspects of personality, operational code and image theory to explain foreign policy decision making.

There are some limitations to studying personality as a way to understand foreign policy making. Personality research works well when viewing leaders and heads of state. Yet, the foreign policy behavior of the state may be more than just the behavior of the leader. Viewing a group of like-minded individuals may produce a better understanding of foreign policy behavior, especially in those instances when a crisis situation is eminent. Furthermore, while a study of personality considers the motivating factors behind foreign policy behavior, viewing the perceptions of individuals may better explain why individuals take action (Starr, 1984). Cognitive research that provides a structure of the beliefs of an individual extends personality firmly into the political arena and develops a framework for understanding policy behavior.

Operational Code

One of the first research programs to use operational code was the seminal work by Leites (1951, 1953) which viewed the beliefs of Bolsheviks and how these beliefs affected political

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action. The context of historical events produces political situations, but policy makers act and affect these events. Leites (1951) reports that Bolsheviks believe the "effectiveness" of a policy action is the main rationale for determining decisions. Events that produce obstacles will be opportunities for growth if the obstacles are overcome, and each situation incurs its own response. Ultimately, Leites (1951) seeks to answer what is the nature of political relationships based on the Bolshevik structure of political decision making. In this way, predictions about foreign policy behavior develop (Leites, 1953). However, the "rules" must be known in order to predict behavior. Developing out of psychoanalytic theory, Leites (1953) observes the policy makers' basic beliefs about politics and how policy makers achieve their political goals.

George (1969) furthers the operational code research program in his discussion on how states' political views and conflict between actors form the basis for international relations. Political perception and action are bound by an individual's operational code, a way a policy maker simplifies the world in order to define the problem, situate it in the actor's experience, and create answers. George relays eight factors that help in developing a study of cognitive psychology: 1) the mind is an information processing mechanism; 2) in order to make sense of their world and organize information, people make a framework of their beliefs; 3) beliefs simplify and structure the world; 4) individual behavior is affected by the environment; 5) the processing of information is a biased operation; 6) individuals process information differently; 7) beliefs tend to be stable over time; and 8) with an abundance of information, beliefs can change (Starr, 1984). These cognitive psychology considerations provides for research consistency that supports theory building.

George (1969) produces a set of philosophical and instrumental beliefs that unpack how decision makers view the nature of politics and how political goals are achieved (201-216):

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I. Philosophical Beliefs

1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other.

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

4. How much "control" or "mastering" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?

5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?

II. Instrumental Beliefs

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

2. How are the goals for action pursued most effectively?

3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?

5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

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While the philosophical beliefs identify the political problem, the instrumental beliefs determine how to go about solving the problem (Walker, 1990). George (1969) believes that operational code can uncover the basis for policy behavior by both individuals and elite groups.

Holsti (1977) furthers the research on operational code by suggesting that an individual's perceptions of the world do not equal reality. People structure their worlds through the use of beliefs and filter perceptions through cognitive maps. Holsti (1977) believes there are certain times when observing beliefs are a better indicator of policy behavior than are others: in times of crisis or instances where routines have been abandoned, when influence of organizational structures on leaders is limited, in long-range planning, in ambiguous situations when there could be a variety of interpretations, in instances when there is an abundance of information, during unforeseen situations, and in times of stress. During these times researchers can better understand how individuals structure their world or use schema to process information. The operational code consists of general principles about political life held by an individual. This belief system is interconnected, meaning that a change in one area of beliefs changes in the entire system. There exists a set of master beliefs that are few in number, salient for decision makers, individually apparent and developed, and last over time. Two master beliefs identified by Holsti (1977) are beliefs about the basic nature of politics—is it conflictual or harmonious—and the locus of conflict—human nature, nations, or the international system.

Walker (1983) takes these two beliefs and creates a typology that further explains the operational code belief system. Six belief types emerge (182):

Fig. 1 Operational Code: Beliefs on Conflict and its Sources

What is the fundamental nature of the political universe?

What are the fundamental sources of conflict?	*Harmonious* (conflict temporary)	*Conflictual* (conflict permanent)
Human nature	A	D
Attributes of nations	B	E
International System	C	F

Type A is an individual who believes that the fundamental nature of the political universe is harmonious and that conflict stems from human nature. Type B individuals also believe the nature of the political universe is harmonious but that conflict comes from the nation/state. Type C continues to consider the political universe to be harmonious but sees the locus of conflict stemming from the international system. On the other hand, types D, E, and F all believe that the fundamental nature of the political universe is one of conflict.

Walker (1983) believes that there is a commonality between types D, E, and F that allows them to be combined into one type. Walker (1983; Walker and Falkowski, 1984) combines personality and operational code through his suggestion that belief systems develop out of personality, meaning that the experiences of one's youth affect the development of political beliefs. The personality characteristics that are most important to operational code are those that seek to explain motivation: need for power, affiliation, and achievement. Walker (1983) contends that an individual's childhood produces personality, which creates a specific political belief system, which, when prodded by external environmental causes, produces decision making behavior.

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Yet, Walker (1983) also admits that there are some problems with using operational code and a belief system framework. First, the interaction among and influence between motivations based on an individual's personality, political beliefs, and policy action is simplified through the operational code structure. While a simple interrelationship is parsimonious, feedback, the environment, and other external events, as well as the possibility that a change in beliefs may support a change in personality, suggest complex interactions of external and internal causes and effects. Second, all the possible policy actions highlighted through an analysis of motives, beliefs and behavior may be limited by organizational structures. The actual options available to the policy maker may be limited by the constraints imposed through the role held by the decision maker. Third, there are few empirical studies that explore the relationship between operational code and decision maker behavior. Thus, a concrete relationship still needs research in order to be substantiated.

Changing one's belief system is difficult (George, 1969; Walker and Falkowski, 1984). Information countering held beliefs often creates cognitive dissonance, or uncertainty about one's beliefs (Walker and Falkowski, 1984). Usually, cognitive dissonance is resolved by making the new information conform to the held beliefs of the individual, or by changing one's beliefs. Manipulating new information that counters held beliefs so that it easily fits into one's cognitive structure appears as the usual way to resolve cognitive dissonance. On the other hand, being open to changing one's beliefs based on new information occurs in some instances. Often, policy makers will choose options least likely to conflict with held beliefs in order to limit cognitive dissonance.

Some types of personalities may be more open to changing their beliefs than others, making personality an important aspect of changes in operational code. Walker (1990) suggests

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that personality and motivation theories are part of operational code. Once the researcher seeks to determine the motivating factors behind policy behavior, personality emerges as the main consideration (need for power, achievement and affiliation). Cognitive schema and motivation act together to produce decision maker behavior (Walker, 1990). Within the philosophical beliefs, the held images of other states, as either opponents or allies, develops as most important to political behavior (Johnson, 1977). Indeed, research suggests that images of opponents are an aspect of an individual's belief system, even a "master belief" (Starr, 1984). Viewing the images that are held by groups of individuals may shed light on their belief systems and their personalities. Images of other states emerge as a focal point for foreign policy making research.

Image Theory

Image theory seeks to uncover the motivation behind policy behavior. While realist theory considered the quest for power to be the main emphasis behind state action, nuances emerged that suggest states act based on reasons not apparent at the state level. Viewing motivational factors at the individual and group levels may provide a greater understanding of state behavior. Knowing why a state acts results in better planning of a policy response (Herrmann, 1985a).

Images emerge through the use of language, written or verbal, and relay mental "pictures" of other countries (Herrmann, 1985a). While images may shed light on individual perceptions, the two are not the same. Perceptions occur from structures other than language and form the basis for decision making (Herrmann, 1985a). Images are "indirect indicators of perceptions" (Herrmann, 1985a:31) and represent underlying factors that cause foreign policy behavior. Perceptions become apparent through images created by words (Herrmann, 1985a, 1985b).

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Images of the world do not always exactly represent reality. Individuals experience the world in different ways, creating different frames of reference for further interaction with the world. The experiences of the individual, in the form of beliefs, motives and attitudes, produce images that then spark foreign policy behavior (Eldridge, 1979). Images develop out of individual experience and personality while these images structure how information is obtained and processed (Eldridge, 1979). Personality and beliefs affect the creation and use of images in foreign policy making. Facts are images of past experiences and certain future actions while values are images of what ought to be (Holsti, 1962). Both facts and values are based on one's perceptions of reality. Interestingly, states often create mirror images of each other, each seeing the other as the enemy (Eldridge, 1979). The image of self is good, just and courageous, while the image of the enemy is evil, hostile and aggressive. Each side sees the other as the enemy and the self as just. Reality may show that the leader takes action that disrupts the security of the other state and harms those people that leader seeks to protect.

Connections exist between aspects of an individual's personality and the images they hold. Eldridge (1979) suggests that ten specific personality characteristics affect image creation: level of acceptance of high risk, ability to deal with ambiguity, level of intelligence, degree of creativity, amount of self esteem, submissivness, need for power, willingness to use force, psychological flexibility or rigidness, and cognitive complexity. The various ways these characteristics interact produce unique images about the world. In addition, the combination of personality traits, the environment, and domestic politics influence how images emerge (Rosati, 1984).

Some researchers also suggest that individual beliefs form a world view, which presents an image of the international world (Rosati, 1984). The way one believes the political world to

be and how one acts to achieve political goals influence the creation of images of other states. When beliefs combine with attitudes (values, opinions), images result that present a "set of ideas and thoughts concerning the environment that are held relatively constant" (Rosati, 1984:16). Normative views about the world along with perspectives on how states act politically create images of states in the minds of policy makers. Beliefs about how "the other" will act when subjected to different environmental effects create an image of that actor (Jervis, 1970). Possible responses to the environment by policy makers of another state reflect beliefs about that state in the form of an image.

Yet, policy makers often share images of the world and of other states (Holsti, 1976). Image theory provides an understanding of the beliefs of groups of people who think similarly (Cottam, 1986). The observed behavior of other states produces similar interpretation and processing in different individuals allowing policy makers to hold similar images of states. In addition, the socialization process of a country works to create a common image of other states (Rosati, 1984). In the same way, the process and institutionalization individuals go through when becoming part of the decision making process also produce similarly held images of the international environment (Rosati, 1984). A "collective image" presents itself as a product of individual images (Rosati, 1984). Furthermore, when a common image emerges in the minds of policy makers, the "aggregate image" affects policy behavior to a greater extent than when policy makers do not share an image (Rosati, 1984). Decision makers respond more strongly to another state's actions when the image of that state coalesced through common beliefs about the state and its possible future behavior. When policy makers' images of another state contradict each other, images have less impact on policy behavior (Rosati, 1984). Viewing images held by a group of policy makers may improve research on decision making behavior.

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The Development of Image Theory

Much of the early work on images focused on the enemy image (Herrmann, 1988). Originally, the enemy was any opponent who acted in a threatening manner (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). Behavior observed as acting against the perceiver's security suggests the actions of an enemy. More so, the enemy presents a hostile profile militarily and opposes the perceiver politically (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). Socially, the enemy represents those who are trying to hurt the perceiver (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). In all aspects of state structures the enemy stands in opposition to the perceiver state. More recently, the enemy suggests a state that exudes evil, promotes a "monolithic" political system, appears rational and ingenious, and is perceived in a context of threat (Herrmann, 1988:184). Yet, both threat and opportunity exist in international relations, not just threat (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995:416). The enemy may take action when an opening occurs in the power relationship between states. On the other hand, the enemy may react to actions taken against it or when it considers the stand of another state as threatening its security and act based on this perceived threat. Interactions between states involve aspects of both threat and opportunity. In addition, the enemy image does not explain all military interactions. Not all threatening states fit the enemy image, and an expansive enemy image fails to explain nuances observed by threatening states.

Much of the enemy image emerged from the analysis and understanding of in-groups and out-groups. The out-group (enemy) fulfills the necessity of having an entity that calls forth the actions of the perceiver state (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). The perceiver state's actions are not unilateral actions meant to further their own desires but are the result of actions taken by the enemy. The in-group (perceiver state) imagines itself as "superior" and "righteous" as the perceived state's actions require a response by the perceiver state (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen,

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1967). The enemy presents behavior negative in nature while the perceiver only acts in response. The enemy personifies all that is bad while the perceiver state contains the good (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). Thus, the image of the enemy supports the desire to act against another state—a justification for state action (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). Often, the in-group, through its actions, desires a change in the balance of power and the enemy image becomes the excuse. Additionally, the high status of the perceiver state's moral standards are upheld through the countering of enemy actions (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). The "just" actions of the in-group or perceiver state reflect the "superiority" of that state's values.

In addition, having an out-group or enemy creates unity within the in-group (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). Individuals unite when a common enemy presents itself. If no strong enemy exists, a mobilized group has "low morale and a loss of credibility for the leadership" (Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967:11). Leaders must designate an enemy that threatens the security of the state thereby promoting a unifying factor for state longevity. Thus, under this view, as a necessary component to international relations, the existence of an enemy invokes retributive action and creates a unified front within individual states.

Richard Cottam (1977) discusses how actors within a state perceive the motivations of actors within other states, as well as their own motivation for foreign policy action. This motivation behind foreign policy action becomes observable through an individual's world view. Examining the threat and/or opportunity perceived by a policy maker enables us to ascertain his/her specific world view and policy preference. The world view of a policy maker takes on an image of another country by translating threat and opportunity into a cognitive structure. Images represent cognitive constructs that filter incoming information (Schafer, 1997). An image of other states emerges that colors information processing and suggests policy behavior.

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Cottam (1977) uses images of the enemy, allied, imperialist and colonial states to show why states make foreign policy decisions. The enemy supports a political structure based on a central government with a monopoly of power, that exudes evil, acts aggressively, and is motivated by power (65). The allied state takes defensive action only, sustains a political system pluralistic in nature and keeps itself ready to act when necessary (66). The imperialist image contains two parts: 1) the imperial state and 2) that of the state towards which the imperialist acts. This complex interaction involves a relationship between superior and inferior states. The imperialist state views the inferior state as child-like with capabilities lower than those of the perceiver state (69). The imperialist state makes policy decisions on the basis of perceived opportunity. The colonial image emerges "when the view prevails among its people that the government and people of the imperial power are so deeply involved in the decision-making process of the colony as to deny it real sovereignty" (70). The imperial state limits the power of the colonial state and dictates much of its policy. The colonial state considers this an intrusion on its ability to perform politically and make its own policy decisions.

Cottam (1977) defines complex states as those states that do not fit the prototypical images held by policy makers. He explains that states fitting the prototypical images allow policy makers to engage in less information processing to determine their policy preferences. Images create a cognitive structure of a state that promotes a specific way of viewing that state. When new information comes in, policy makers reflect on the images and consider the new information based on their cognitive frameworks. The images themselves suggest policy options without the policy maker having to consider all information available. Cottam (1977) also suggests that complex states need more information processing as they do not conform easily to prototypical images. Complex states do not enjoy the same degree of image structure as those

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states that appear more typical of an image category. This means that policy makers must view new information more closely when contemplating policy action towards a complex state. Cottam (1977) also explicates how states may vary over time, sometimes fitting the prototypical images and at other times becoming more complex. Thus, states fluctuate within the image spectrum and may move away from the prototypical image to take on characteristics that induce a closer consideration of incoming information.

Martha Cottam (1986) looks to the psychological literature to gain support for a new group of images. She defines cognition as the "psychological processes involved in the acquisition, organization, and use of knowledge" (6). People create structures in their minds through the use of information that then structures additional information processing. Cottam (1986) believes that viewing actors' cognitive structures leads to an understanding of how policy makers make their decisions (7). How an individual decision maker structures information leads to an understanding of policy behavior. Furthermore, Cottam (1986) suggests that classifying U.S. policy makers' "world views" or their "perceptual patterns and behavioral tendencies" would benefit understanding and foreign policy formation (17). Decision makers act based on how they believe the world exists and interacts. These images offer an insight into how and why policy makers act. By structuring these images into a framework, patterns of behavior emerge that reflect the cognitive conceptions and behavior of policy makers.

Individuals create images for categorizing people, much like stereotypes, and these categories provide ways of responding to people and/or events (Cottam & Cottam, 2001). If individuals didn't create cognitive structures of information, events would always appear as new, and large amounts of information would necessitate processing. Cognitive categories allow individuals to access preconceived structures through which new information travels. Recalled

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images of an event suggest possible behavior. Images of states develop in the same manner. A categorization of states aids in information processing and structures the political world (Cottam & Cottam, 2001). States and events compared against cognitive categories provide insight into behavior and trigger a response. Cottam also argues that policy makers put states into categories for "cognitive efficiency" and that there is a "prototype" image of a category against which other states are compared (Cottam, 1986). Comparing states with prototypical images allows the policy maker to determine how closely states appear to the image and what reactions best fit the situation. States within the categories appear similar politically, socially and economically (Cottam, 1986). Similar states often spark similar policy options as they fit into the same image categories.

Cottam (1986) promotes a two step process when placing a state into an image category. First, a "nominal" judgment considers what category the state fits. Second, an "ordinal" judgment determines how well the state "fits" the prototypical image. Policy makers place states into these categories through the use of cognition. Drawing on psychology literature, Cottam (1986) discusses the process of nominal and ordinal judgments and the difficulty of changing a state's perceived image. The literature suggests that nominal judgments occur on a subconscious level of analysis. Placing a state within a category utilizes cognitive capabilities that do not reflect a conscious effort. Nominal judgments also reflect the expertise of the decision maker (Cottam, 1986). More experienced policy makers may categorize states quicker and more precisely as their judgments reflect greater familiarity with such situations.

Ordinal judgments determine how well the state fits the ideal-typical prototype of a category (Cottam, 1986). A range of an image occurs within a category with some states closer to the prototype and others further away, or more complex. As the state nears the prototype, the

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decision maker's confidence in his/her decisions increases as less information requires deciphering and analysis. Ordinal judgments filter information and provide information about a state that might not be available otherwise (Cottam, 1986). Policy makers compare new information to the prototype, and then the category itself provides missing information about a state (Cottam, 1986). The closer a state lies to the prototype image the fewer and more restricted the response alternatives, and the further away the state lies from the prototype the larger the number of response alternatives that become available to the policy maker (Cottam, 1986). A complex state requires the decision maker to consider more responses to a state's actions than do states close to the prototype as prototypical states instigate concrete and specific responses only partially available in response to complex states.

Furthermore, several image categories emerge defined by perceptions of motivation, capability, decision style, locus of decision making and domestic forces' interaction (Cottam, 1986). Cottam (1986) outlines seven categories: enemy, hegemonist, dependent ally of the enemy, neutral, ally, dependent of the perceiver's state, and puppet of perceiver's state. Each image develops "through a discussion of the peculiar combinations of the attributes, event scripts prototypes and response alternatives associated with the image" (50). Attributes include military capability, the style of domestic politics, economic structure, cultural characteristics, how the perceived state feels toward the perceiver's state, degree of flexibility in international bargaining and other general goals. Event scripts point to how the policy makers of the perceiver state interpret the actions of the perceived state, such as instances of aggression, government stability, major issues, and analogies (Cottam, 1986). Response alternatives indicate how the policy makers of the perceiver state respond to the perceived state and include diplomatic exchanges, military force, economic force, doing nothing and appealing to the international community (53-

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54). Images spark response alternatives specific to that category. Responses vary from image to image and develop in reaction to perceived characteristics. Through the use of these characterizations, policy makers develop categories, enabling them to perceive possible actions of another state and even predict behavior (55). Information based on image categorization fulfills requirements of providing solutions to questions on what policy actions a perceiver state should take by suggesting the behavior of a perceived state. Thus, observed behavior implies possible future action, sparking responses by the perceiver state.

Cottam (1986) originally developed her categories based on empirical evidence collected through a survey issued to U.S. government officials. The survey asked how the policy makers categorize states. While the hegemonist and puppet states lacked clear identification, the enemy, ally, dependent of the perceiver state, dependent of the enemy and neutral states did have meaningful outcomes as they supported Cottam's hypotheses. Cottam suggests that the hegemonist state, seen as "more powerful than the perceiver's state," lacked salience as the respondents resided in the U.S., and a state more powerful than the U.S. was unfamiliar (76). The puppet state lacks clear categorizing, but the data agreed with projected results (85). The other state images, explained in detail below, supported hypothesized expectations.

Cottam (1986) relates that the enemy state, equal in military power to the perceiver's state, supports a different type of political organization—a centralized and imposing system "devious" in intent. The perceived state, also equal in its economic and cultural development to the perceiver state, holds values that are different and "disdained." Cottam (1986) explains that the enemy state "is unsupportive of the goals and policies of the perceiver state, inflexible in policy formation and implementation, and aggressive in pursuit of its goals" (74). Seeking objectives that differ from those of the perceiver state, the enemy acts forcefully in achieving its

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goals. Several policy options open up to policy makers of the perceiver state. The perceiver state's responses towards the enemy state include diplomatic exchanges, military force and economic force (Cottam, 1986). The perceiver state would first respond with containment policies as any direct contact with the enemy may prove dangerous and risky. Diplomatic efforts in the form of high level dialogues signify a secondary step in a response situation. If high level talks fail, economic sanctions often offer an escalation of the crisis without employing military forces. Finally, military options, including embargoes, force deployment, conventional weapons operations and the threat of nuclear strikes, suggest a threat from the perceived state of extreme dimensions. Policy makers feel compelled to react to the threat of an enemy state, even seeking assistance from the international community (Cottam, 1986). Event scripts—the perceiver state's view of what actions the perceived state will take—support varied considerations. Strong actions against the perceiver state rank high and behavior that threatens their security seems likely. Often, the perceiver state will invoke historical analogies that relate to the crisis situation, with Hitler and other significant enemy leaders a favorite comparison (Cottam, 1986).

The dependent ally of the enemy presents an image weaker in military power than that of the perceiver state, Cottam continues. If acting solely on its own, the dependent of the enemy state offers an easy opportunity for power control by the perceiver state. However, a dependent of the enemy includes the potential to draw upon the deterrent aspect of the enemy's military strength. Extending its deterrent strength to its dependent, the enemy provides an umbrella of military power that inhibits the perceiver state's actions. Dependent of the enemy states may also support the political actions of the enemy and offer the opportunity for the enemy to act through the dependent's political and economic system. Culturally different and economically less developed (78), this image offers opportunity to the enemy not available to the perceiver state.

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Response alternatives including diplomatic exchanges, military action and economic coercion depend on the level of enemy involvement and must consider the enemy's likely response. Indeed, much of the response alternatives focus on the actions of the enemy and seek the involvement of the enemy in solving the situation.

Cottam (1986) asserts that the neutral state image, inferior militarily, presents a state that limits its use of military force. Neutral states seek other means of furthering their goals and objects, preferring not to support either side in a crisis. While the neutral state recedes as a threat to the perceiver state, it also fails to promote completely friendly relations. The neutral state's similarity economically and culturally to the perceiver state suggests that responses to a neutral state's actions focus primarily on diplomatic and economic policies. Since the neutral state only reluctantly uses military force, military action by the perceiver state seems unlikely. A neutral state's actions during a crisis situation, Cottam (1986) continues, consist of doing nothing or appealing to the international community. An event script suggests that neutral states limit their involvement with competing states and fail to support either side. In addition, as neutral states produce stable governments and economies, aggressive behavior by a neutral state and an alliance with the perceiver state appear unlikely (Cottam, 1986). A neutral state seeks to stay neutral.

Cottam (1986) found the ally state equal to the perceiver state militarily, economically, and culturally. The ally state builds capable military and social structures and retains the ability to use them in a crisis situation. Government structures of the ally state also appear similar to those of the perceiver state. The ally state actively seeks to obtain its goals while also supporting the perceiver state's actions. Response alternatives would include diplomatic exchanges, but not military or economic force, as the ally stands as a friend to the perceiver state. Since the ally

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image presents a friendly relationship with the perceiver, failing to respond to the ally seems unlikely. Image characteristics support event scripts of the ally state coming to the aid of the perceiver state with security and economic issues a priority (Cottam, 1986). The ally state and the perceiver state form a cooperative relationship and seek supportive policies.

Cottam (1986) found that the dependent of the perceiver state presents an image inferior in military strength, economically and culturally. The government of the dependent of the perceiver state may be similar to that of the perceiver state, but may also support government aspects differing from those of the perceiver state. The dependent of the perceiver state relies on the military strength of the perceiver state to create a deterrent effect, similar to the relationship between the enemy and the dependent of the enemy. Response alternatives of the perceiver state range from diplomatic exchanges and calls for international involvement to military and economic pressure. Having no response to dependent of the perceiver state actions may also signify an option (Cottam, 1986). Event scripts for the dependent of the perceiver state likely reflect the state's dependence on the perceiver state and dependent's support the perceiver state's policy objectives as well.

Context

Context also influences the perception of a state. The more "accessible" a category the more likely the perceiver makes assumptions about a state. In Cottam's (1986) study, U.S. policy makers more readily used the dependent image for Latin American countries than the neutral state image. Thus, the dependent image was more accessible for categorizing these states than any other image. Also, the more hostile the environment of state interaction when categorized, the more hostile the judgment (121). Cottam (1986) relates that accessibility of a category plus hostile effects may lead policy makers to categorize a state as a greater threat than it is in reality.

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This perceived threat may not really exist, but the policy maker may choose a response alternative based on faulty information processing. Cottam (1986) concludes that "the general implication of these psychological studies is that categories both interact with the external environment and create contexts that influence judgments" (123). Image categories relate to events and actions in the reality of the world, resulting in new events that need processing. Image categories also create levels through which states flow, framing placement within the categories.

Once placement of states occurs both nominally and ordinally, change becomes difficult (Cottam, 1986; Cottam and Cottam 2001). Cottam (1986) lists five reasons for only limited opportunity in changing a state's placement. First, policy makers expect certain behaviors, so they look for them (124). Second, ambiguous feedback and information keep the policy maker locked into his or her judgment of a state (124-125). Third, judgments use old information even if new information suggests change: "Adjusting judgments to new information takes time" (125). Fourth, accessibility of a category keeps the policy maker more inclined to choose one category over another for some states (125). Fifth, "re-education" of policy makers and "the constant close look" of perceived states assist in changing a perceiver's viewpoint, but the perception of outward appearances may fail to indicate inner conditions of change, preserving faulty decisions (126). Thus, moving a state ordinally from one level within a category to another occurs only over time and with extensive new information. A nominal change to a new category presents even more difficulty.

Cottam suggests that context plays a large role in policy makers' placement of states in categories:

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The use of political categories will be influenced by the context created by the environment, the context created by the elements composing the category and the interaction of the two. The *gestalt* created by the combination of each category's characteristics produces general impressions of threat and/or opportunity associated with each type of state. (128)

The creation of categories reflects information processed by perceivers on events. Information about new events structures how states fit nominally and ordinally within the categories. When both new and old event information interact, an overall framework develops that sheds light on state behavior. This framework structures whether a state deserves analysis through an environment of threat or of opportunity. Policy makers ignore new information that contradicts the category while they accept information that fits the image (Cottam, 1986:129; Cottam and Cottam 2001:88). If the contradicting information continues, however, then a shift occurs away from the prototype or to another category (Cottam, 1986:129). Finally, old information used for political judgments takes precedence as policy makers may ignore new information or rely more on the old information that placed the state in its category in the first place (129). Rational actor theory assumes that complete and precise information on an actor exists. Image theory does not assume this. The use of an image overcomes incomplete information and fills in gaps which would otherwise limit policy makers' behavior.

New Developments in Image Theory

Cottam (1992) suggests that, due to the end of the cold war, image theory needs a review and reconceptualization of its main tenants (3). A new image of the enemy emerges, a "cognitive change" that should translate into new policies for states that were in the enemy and dependent of the enemy image categories. A policy of containment may no longer be viable as those states

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that used to be seen as the enemy no longer hold this position and are now more complex in their perceived image by the U.S. In addition, as the enemy may lack meaning in the post-cold war era, the dependent of the enemy also loses its meaning. New international structures or relationships mean new ways of viewing states (6). New categories develop as well as changes occurring within categories. New research focusing on the changes of the enemy and dependent of the enemy images offers insight.

Three stages take place when policy makers place states into new categories (Cottam, 1992). First, new information gathering occurs on the state that goes against prior information. This process may take time as perceiver states often ignore information contrary to an image. Once an abundance of new information suggesting an image change develops, policy makers, depending on their personalities, may consider altering image perceptions. Second, a review takes place on any behavior not in line with past behavior. As images produce event scripts that prescribe a perceived state's actions, behavior inconsistent with projected scripts conflicts with previously held images. Cognitive dissonance occurs requiring either a reconciliation of new information and behavior or a change in image categorization. Third, a new image develops that reflects new information and behavior, resulting in a new categorization of the perceived state (79). As old images become less consistent, the enemy and dependent of the enemy event scripts provide little insight into a state's projected behavior. New image categories emerge.

Martha Cottam and Richard Cottam (2001) suggest a new set of images: enemy, ally, barbarian, imperialist, colonial client, rogue and degenerate. These new images reflect "assessments of capability, culture, intentions, threat or opportunity posed, and decision making patterns; that is , are the decisions made by a small group or a complex assortment of competing groups" (96). In addition, affect plays a large part in the perception of states and in the emotions

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triggered through the observation of a state's behavior. Emotions of the policy maker affect the perception and placement of a state nominally and ordinally. The political context, or the observance of threat or opportunity, also plays a role (105-106). A state perceived through a context of threat suggests event scripts that delve into the perceiver state's security interests. An environment of opportunity, on the other hand, promotes projected behavior limiting aggressive behavior by the perceived state.

The ("diabolical") enemy evolves under a perception of threat:

It is simply and ineluctably aggressive in motivation, monolithic in decisional structure, highly rational in decision making to the point of being able to generate and orchestrate multiple complex conspiracies, and owes its power advantage to a greater will and determination than the threatened public can muster (Cottam and Cottam, 2001:106).

An important characteristic of the enemy image reflects its strength in military capability as equal to or greater than that of the perceiver state. In addition, the cultural and economic levels of the enemy also promote systems equal to the perceiver state. Threatening actions by a state with lessor military, economic and cultural capabilities fall into a different image category. The emotional "tags" associated with the enemy image reflect negative responses to behavior and "include anger, frustration, reproach, envy, jealousy, fear, distrust, and grudging respect" (106). A response to the enemy would be a strong stand against it, such as U.S. containment policies against the Soviet Union. Many of the event scripts and response alternatives previously projected by the enemy image remain in the new categorization.

The ally state seeks a positive relationship with the perceiver state. Again, much of the previous event scripts and response alternatives projected by the ally image carry over to the new set of categories. However, the relationship develops under a context of threat due to the

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perceived threat of their common enemy or threatening state (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Thus, while one might think of the interaction between the perceiver state and the ally state as a positive relationship (Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995), policy in response to the perceived threat of eminent danger brings the perceiver state and the ally state together. The perceiver state and the ally state work together and support each other's policies in order to counter the observed threat of the enemy state or other threatening entity.

The perception of the barbarian state image also occurs in a context of threat. Interestingly, the barbarian image reflects a superiority in military power but an inferior cultural system (Cottam and Cottam, 2001:108). While this image projects event scripts that suggest military action, the cultural level implies a limited moral position and actions that lack support of the international system. The barbarian image promotes aggressive intentions and a "monolithic" government structure, but a group "cunning in decisional style and willing to resort to unspeakable brutality including genocide, and determined to take full advantage of its superiority" (108). Response alternatives to the barbarian state promote actions towards coalition building to counter the perceived threat as the strength of the barbarian state overwhelms the perceiver state. The emotions in response to the barbarian would include disgust, anger, and fear, with a desire not to have direct conflict but to find other states willing to participate in a combined force against the state.

The perception of threat also occurs with the Imperial image. The Imperialist state, superior in capability and culture, exploits the perceiver state's resources (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). The imperial state involves itself extensively in the perceiver state's actions: "On the surface the system appears to operate through local leaders, but in fact the imperial power is perceived as pulling the strings, often at a very detailed level" (112). A "just" relationship

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between the two states projects emotional tags of fear and uncertainty. While a just relationship still includes imperialist involvement into the perceiver state's political, economic and cultural systems, the perceived threat occurs at lower levels, and groups of people (elite) receive positive effects of the relationship. Response alternatives include policies promoting self-protection and avoidance of conflict, with respect towards the imperial power. Event scripts suggest "benevolent paternalistic affection by the imperial group for the subordinate group" (113). An unjust relationship projects behavior of the imperialist state that restricts, constrains and limits the development politically, economically and culturally of the perceiver state. Military power of the imperialist state threatens the security of the perceiver state. Emotional tags of jealousy, anger, shame, and desire for equality support actions that seek to undermine the imperialist hold over the perceiver state. Behavior promoting conflict with the imperialist state permeates policy options of the perceiver state (115). The perceiver state seeks to end the dominance of the imperialist state but encounters its strength, resulting in efforts to sabotage the imperialist state's authority.

A new image since the end of the cold war, the rogue state image, occurs in a context of threat, yet the rogue state's military capability, economic system and cultural level appear inferior to those of the perceiver state (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Most states placed in the rogue state category developed as a dependent of the enemy during the cold war. The rogue state, limited in strength yet naughty in character, aggressively seeks to increase its level of power. There is usually a small group of elite leaders, or even a single leader, who, if removed from power, would allow the rogue state to fall in line with the wishes of the perceiver's state (116-117). As the perceiver state believes itself to be more "mature" than the rogue state, "responses to this type of state are driven by a sense of superiority, hostility, and antagonism" (116). The perceiver state

acts from a position of moral righteousness and views the actions of the rogue state as not only a threat to its national security but also as contradictory to international laws and standards.

The degenerate image develops in a context of opportunity. Equal in capability and culture to the perceiver state, the degenerate image reflects a state "uncertain and confused in motivation, characterized by a highly differentiated decisional structure that suffers from the absence of a clear sense of direction, lacking in a clear decisional trust and largely incapable of constructing an effective strategy, and lacking the will and determination to make effective use of its power instruments or to mobilized effective public support" (117). While the degenerate retains a military capability equal to that of the perceiver state, it fails to generate the ability to take assertive action. This leaves the degenerate state open to the involvement of the perceiver state in a move for power. Thus, opportunity exists for the perceiver state to gain power through the subjugation of the degenerate state. Disgust, contempt, scorn, and anger or hatred reflect the emotions that the perceiver state experiences when relating to the degenerate state.

Lastly, perceived in a context of opportunity, the colonial image appears inferior in capability and culture to that of the perceiver state (Cottam and Cottam, 2001:118). Similar to the two aspects of the imperial image, two types of colonial state occur: those that collaborate with the imperialist state and those that fight against it. Event scripts range from groups of people who willingly adhere to the policies of the perceiver state to active aggression against it. The emotions of the perceiver state towards the colonial state include disgust, contempt, pity, anger, and repression. Furthermore, response alternatives suggest that the perceiver state tries to "civilize" the colonial power. The perceiver state, having reached a higher level of development, seeks to share its political, economic and cultural systems with the colonial state. The colonial state either receives the perceiver with open arms or fights against the injustice.

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While Cottam and Cottam (2001) outline the new categories, room exists for further research, especially on the rogue state image. Since the end of the cold war, the diabolical enemy lacks saliency. A new strategy must be developed, with the rogue state image the focus of new strategies for future international actions. While some theorists may view a state in the rogue state category as the enemy, the limited military strength and unequal aspects of economic and cultural systems make the enemy and rogue state images distinct and suggest unique events scripts and response alternatives. Furthermore, simply looking at the rogue state limits the understanding of this image as a conceptual construct and the state placed in this category. A look along a continuum will provide needed insight into the development of the rogue state and its unusual characteristics. As the rogue state emerges as the major threat to the security of the United States and the international system, research should reflect this need. Additional defining of the dependent of the enemy and rogue state images structures further analysis.

The Dependent of the Enemy Image

The dependent of the enemy image, perceived in a context of threat (Cottam, 1994), depends on the enemy for deterring the perceiver state. As the power of the enemy increases, it uses the dependent of the enemy state as a part of the enemy's plans for expansion. The dependent of the enemy alone lacks the ability to threaten the perceiver state but exhibits a threat based on the power of the enemy behind it (Cottam, 1994:21). Cottam (1994) describes dependents as "weak, childlike, inferior, inept and led by a small and often corrupt elite" (25). The perceiver state acts to weaken the dependent of the enemy and undermine the dependent's authority and alliance with the enemy. A high degree of threat observed by the perceiver state produces response alternatives that include military and covert actions (33). Yet, the perceiver state prefers positive actions (carrots) over negative ones (sticks) (34). Military action against

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the dependent of the enemy may provoke a military response from the enemy, a situation actively avoided by the perceiver state. Furthermore, due to the perceived state's reliance on the enemy, response alternatives likely focus on the enemy state as the source of the conflict and the means through which the situation will end.

The Rogue State Image

Michael Klare (1995) discusses how the enemy no longer appears to exist, nor does the same containment policy that the United States employed in the past. A lack of policy focus created an "identity crisis" in the U.S. (6). A new strategy must take into consideration regional areas where states maintain large conventional armies and/or weapons of mass destruction (16). This "aggressive" "new enemy type" has or seeks to have nuclear weapons (23). Klare (1995) states that the term "rogue state" developed with strategists and policy makers for those states that held anti-western policies and attempted to obtain nuclear weapons and/or weapons of mass destruction (24). A new policy supported by militarists during the Bush years, called the "Rogue Doctrine," required the U.S. to achieve the ability to wage war in two Gulf War-type conflicts at the same time (25-26). States considered rogue states include Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea (25). Klare sees the Gulf War as a test of the Rogue Doctrine.

In determining what type of policy rogue states should exact, Raymond Tanter (1998) looks at rogue states and determines whether U.S. policy should be one of carrot, stick, or a combination of both, based on the desire of "retribution or rehabilitation." Retributive actions against rogue states may include sanctions, military actions, but not diplomatic ventures (Tanter, 1998). Situations occurring in a context high in threat support retributive actions, especially military actions limiting the use of weapons of mass destruction. Rehabilitation actions would consist of diplomatic measures, lessening of sanctions, and possibly economic assistance. A

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rogue state with limited levels of threat towards the perceiver state incurs less retributive actions and may move closer to international standards under rehabilitative response alternatives. Threat levels directly influence the type and severity of response alternatives instigated by the perceiver state.

Paul D. Hoyt (2000) attempts to get at the salience of the rogue state through a frequency count of the number of times *rogue state* appears in documents from the White House, State Department, the Department of Defense and CIA web pages. This study reflects a classic-style of content analysis (see Holsti, 1969). The results of his research showed that bureaucratic communication personnel use the rogue image in statements for the public. Hoyt (2000) believes that there exists an increase in the use of rogue state imagery. He mentions the importance of the rogue state conceptual image and its relevancy to foreign policy, but fails to link the increase in rogue image usage to specific policy action.

Hoyt (2000) suggests that the perceiver state acts based on a compellence policy. A compellent strategy would include the use of force, but would not likely include diplomatic measures because of the differences culturally between the perceiver state and the rogue state. He does not support a rogue state image under a context of lesser threat that results in rehabilitative response alternatives. However, due to the varied nature of those states listed as rogue regimes, Hoyt rejects the rogue state image as a category of state image. He sees the rogue state categorization as a "cognitive construction utilized by policy makers to explain the world around them" (15), but claims this differs from the process of image creation. Yet, as shown above, image development and use employs information processing through cognitively created categories.

A New Image?

Finally, a question arises whether the rogue state image holds meaning for policy makers. In a statement to the press on June 19, 2000, Secretary of State Madeline Albright[9] stated that a change in terms would occur. The rogue state designation was to end and "states of concern" used instead. Richard Boucher, the Department of State spokesman, claimed that states of concern was "a more general phrase," and listed three premises for inclusion into the category: a state would show opposition to 1) the peace process 2) international standards, and 3) liberal government development and democratization. Boucher believed that the White House had made a descriptive change after former rogue states addressed problems established by the U.S. Each state deserved policies based on its own merits. Thus, a politically correct category emerged that reflected a desire to encourage diplomatic interactions and limit negative responses to a suggestive categorization.

Yet, the rogue state image still reflects a category of states prevalent in the international arena. Whether we use "dependent of the enemy," "states of concern," "rogue state," or any other term, policy preferences develop based on the perceived behavior and projected event scripts of a state that behaves in a manner in opposition to international standards. Yet, the response alternatives to the dependent of the enemy differ in some ways to those of the rogue state. Analyzing these differences and the development of the dependent of the enemy image to the rogue state image produce important information for policy makers and researchers. With Iraq and North Korea as the cornerstones of the "Axis of Evil," the rogue state emerges as the major threat to U.S. security and the security of the international community. Some individuals

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[9] Statements made on the Diane Rehm Show, WAMU, FM Radio.

may look to terrorist figures like Osama Bin Ladin and Al Qaeda as major threats, but terrorists obtain money and military support from rogue regimes and would not develop without the backing of rogue states. Limiting the resources of rogue states would directly affect the capabilities of terrorist groups. Thus, U.S. foreign policy should focus on rogue states, making the motivation behind policy choices a major theoretical question for researchers. Image theory seeks to answer this question and shed light on the cognitive processes used by policy makers. Image theory research on the dependent of the enemy and rogue states images provides important information on the role of cognition in policy making and suggests possible responses to states in the rogue image category.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

Theoretical Considerations

Supporting Qualitative Research

From Popper to Kuhn to Lijphart (1971), debates surrounding the necessity for researchers to find precise methods of induction have often included the criticism that qualitative research lacks the ability to be a reliable alternative to quantitative techniques. Now the argument has taken a new turn. Instead of trying to encourage all social scientists to use the quantitative method, peers suggest that the qualitative approach really can work, as long as it is used in a manner drawing it ever closer to the quantitative style. The *APSA-CP* debates this trend (Winter edition, 1996), suggesting ways to create a process for the replication of qualitative research. In addition, the degree of policy relevancy can often prescribe a certain methodological path.

The approach and methodology of qualitative research may provide for important and credible research. Some approaches produce better results than others. The importance of choosing the correct path reflects the desire to reduce error and raise reliability. Researchers hold different opinions on how to approach qualitative, quantitative and case study research. A discussion of the various approaches and methods may suggest specific actions to take when conducting qualitative research.

In the next section I will briefly summarize several important pieces of literature discussing how to approach research. I will discuss the debate over the use of the qualitative method first, then other suggestions on research methods and approaches. Then I will compare

and contrast the various positions, and critique possible problem areas. Finally, I will offer suggestions for future research and areas of debate.

Methodological Questions

Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) delineate specific ways in which to achieve the most precise qualitative research design in their book *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.* King, Keohane and Verba use an argument similar to Ragin's (1994) in their support of the qualitative research method. The authors acknowledge that when cases are few, the qualitative method is the best choice, but they also believe that a research design can incorporate both quantitative and qualitative methods. Ragin, however, sees a sharp contrast between the three styles, especially between the qualitative and quantitative methods, while King, Keohane and Verba proposed that these differences are not what they seem: "A major purpose of this book is to show that the differences between the quantitative and qualitative traditions are only stylistic and are methodologically and substantively unimportant" (4). Yet, both qualitative and quantitative methods suggest differing avenues of research. The substance of each is distinct due to different answers to different questions. As Ragin points out, the qualitative method tends to provide more insight and depth into a subject, while the quantitative method tends to show generalities. The ability of each method to uncover different types of information is what makes them work so well when put together or when used separately to get at different questions around a common theme. To generalize that both methods are substantively the same because they both utilize logical inference in the research program is too broad of a grouping.

King, Keohane and Verba do provide specific procedures to follow when attempting a qualitative research design. They suggest increasing the observations when conducting case

studies or low n research. Instead of looking at one country as a case study in itself, a researcher should observe specific points in time or policy changes. Increasing the number of observations allows for hypothesis testing. Increasing n provides for a better research design.

While increasing the n does appear to facilitate greater explanatory power, making qualitative analysis adhere to mathematical equations as suggested by King, Keohane and Verba almost takes away from the beauty of qualitative analysis.[10] Almond (1990) questions the strict adherence to the scientific structure of social science in "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics." Almond shows that while the hard sciences can easily adhere to the scientific method, just as clocks—or time—can be shown in a structured manner, social science isn't the same type of animal. The "cloud-like" nature of social phenomena is ever changing, reshaping itself into different outlines with growing and shrinking depths and mass. In this way, the qualitative method allows the researcher to expand and contract with his or her information. Johnson (1977) suggests that while qualitative research is less systematic than is quantitative, it is sensitive to context (semantic, political, historical, and situational). Such sensitivity may provide important data not observable in quantitative research. Again, when the question being asked does not easily fit to quantitative research, instead of changing the question or neglecting the research, the qualitative method allows for inquiry.

King (1993) also suggests that both qualitative and quantitative research can be done systematically and are important in theory building. He even suggests that the quantitative method is not always used in a proper manner, resulting in less than precise information. King proposes that qualitative researchers avoid being normative and do research that builds, or can be

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[10] By beauty, I consider the greater depth of research on each case, the varied means for obtaining data, the descriptive aspect of some results, etc.

built upon, especially through replication. In other words, another researcher should be able to repeat exactly the same process as was done the first in order to test further the theory. Besides increasing the n of observations, there should be rules that researchers must follow in order to produce good, systematically obtained results, which could be replicated by someone else.

Alexander George (1982) also supports the use of a rigorous qualitative research approach. While some theoreticians may feel that the comparative method is not as good as experimental and statistical methods, it can be made more systematic and reliable. George also suggests raising the number of cases that are to be observed. In addition, combining similar variables reduces the problem of more variables than cases. George supports King's call for more rigorous rules in qualitative research. George states that researchers should view their theoretical questions from either the *agreement* or *difference* approach. The agreement approach considers similar independent variables that lead to similar outcomes. The difference approach relies on similar independent variables which lead to different outcomes. In this way, an analysis of possible reasons for the agreement or difference between dependent variables provides useable information for theory building.

On the other hand, there are academics who do not believe there is a problem with the normative aspect of some qualitative research. Rosenau (1987) contends that case studies and area studies are important without changing them. Case studies can explain events within a country better than can comparative quantitative methods, leading to better international or foreign policy theory. The question being asked may only be answerable through an in-depth analysis of a single case viewed through the changing environment of a state in flux. If one is viewing revolution in the United States, there is only one case, which may call for a comprehensive analysis of the event. Additionally, the historical content of case studies is

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important to the contextual aspect of most qualitative approaches and to theory building in general. Contextual information may not easily fit into a set of rules that may limit the intuitive nature of qualitative research.

On another note, George (1982) includes policy relevance as an important issue that must be included when conducting research. He believes that comparing cases has policy relevance. More important, however, is the researcher's ability to be policy specific—how does the research help policy makers make their decisions? In order to be more policy relevant, researchers should have precise meanings for concepts and terms, not be too parsimonious, and use language understandable to policy makers. Furthermore, policy makers often find academic information problematic. They believe that academic research is not as unbiased as the quantified techniques imply. Data-based information distorts the reality of political situations. Therefore, policy makers contend that "statecraft is an art not science." George also notes the grumbling of researchers towards policy makers and how they make decisions. Academics believe policy makers use "warmed over" realism, or apply theories improperly, and then blame researchers when theories fail. Policy makers also tend to look more at historical events than at the specifics of an event or possible forces other than power. Plus, policy makers always have political considerations that affect policy making in ways researchers believe it shouldn't. A better understanding of what policy makers need from research allows researchers to focus parts of their analysis towards these needs.

Pros and Cons

While King, Keohane and Verba present a variety of helpful suggestions on how to advance a more scientific research design, some of their analysis appears to call for a limit on those characteristics that add to the qualitative method's uniquely open and intuitive nature.

Nevertheless, the insight they provide into good methods and approach is useful for all researchers. If a large segment of political scientists takes its suggestions under consideration, political science as a whole will be better off. Utilizing systematic models of research and logical inference can help make qualitative research more credible.

On the other hand, applying statistical structures to qualitative research may be going too far. King, Keohane, and Verba's use of numeric representation may be unnecessary and meaningless. By trying to represent numerically low n analysis, important contextual information is lost, and the numbers may not necessarily interpret the event. Applying numbers to contextual information not only takes away from the unique nature of qualitative research but also pretends to quantify an analysis on data collected qualitatively. It could very well be a cosmetic fix to make qualitative research appear quantified. In addition, some researchers may argue that increasing points of observations within a case is simply a superficial process and does not really create more reliable data. Yet, King, Keohane, and Verba do provide food for thought on good social science research and on how theory-building research can be done.

In his *Presidency* article, King does well to caution both qualitative and quantitative researchers to be more rigorous in their research. Especially useful is his suggestion that a set of rules or structures should be developed to make qualitative and case study research more replicable. Rules and structures help focus researchers, creating better theory building results. Unfortunately, replication is very difficult in qualitative and case study research. The reason many researchers use these methods is because of the type of information desired or the question being asked, making the data collection process specific and difficult to replicate. In addition, while King's caution against normative research is important, it is normative work that

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sometimes pushes limiting boundaries in social science. Yet, the warnings provided by our peers in the social sciences can help in the theory making process.

Social science research can benefit from the rules and structures that George (1982) suggests and added to by King (1993). The guidelines suggested by George are important for creating more reliable data and contributing to theory building. His outline of the agreement/difference approach helps make replication at least a concept to consider when setting up a research design. However, for some case studies there may be limits on the effect the rules and structures will have. Not only could the limiting aspect of rules be of little use, but they may actually hide important data that could be produced otherwise.

Conversely, Rosenau's (1987) support of the area/case study approach reinforces the importance of contextual information. Sometimes quantitative work does not adequately explain why events occur. There are also occasions when large n data collection masks important differences, or suggests differences that are actually unimportant. Contextual data that uncover cultural specifics can be used to support or qualify quantitative data. Yet, it may still be valuable to proscribe the type of rules and structures suggested by King (1993) and George (1982). If there isn't any systematic model for obtaining information, there may be a question of whether the information is any better than the author's opinion. Everyone processes information differently, and one perspective may not be the correct or only view. Structures could help make the textual information more usable for other researchers.

Finally, George's (1982) suggestion of policy relevance should be considered by all researchers. Making sure research provides useable information for those who partake in policy action links academic research to the individual in the field. In addition, asking researchers to provide specific concepts and terms can provide policy makers greater access to academic

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research. Even with the best approach, if concepts and terms are vague, the study becomes unreplicable and the information unusable. Clearer concepts also help policy makers understand important theoretical ideas more fully. Recognizing the importance of specific concepts can also bring research and practice together.

Looking Forward: Where Does the Discussion/Methodology Go From Here?

Researchers need to think about what they want theory work to do. Do they want to be policy specific, do theory for theory's sake, or undertake some happy medium in between? Also, some structures or rules for obtaining information will allow for better comparability, theory-building, and the ability for research to be replicated. Focusing the researcher is important for producing usable research.

In addition, researchers should continue the discussion on methodology and approach. As political science grows, instructions on how to conduct research can only benefit social science. Researchers do not have to accept everything offered, but some aspects of prescriptive offerings may ring a bell or spark an interest, providing a focus for better research. Still, political scientists should not rule out the value of work that does not follow all the rules and structures set out by peers, but should recognize the possible limitation of the work.

How researchers approach their work as well as the methods used to obtain data are important concerns of theoreticians. By providing structure and guidelines for qualitative, quantitative and case study research, more systematic and replicable research can be produced. Researchers do not have to accept or use everything suggested, but focusing researchers on specific paths will be better for theory building than will a variety of approaches and methods that fail to connect or support other research. Continued discussion on how to approach research and what methods to use will only create a better path for future research.

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Methodology

Choosing Iraq and North Korea

Similarities and differences emerge in a comparison of Iraq and North Korea. Both Saddam Hussein and Kim Il Sung used purges to limit any possible opposition to their reign. These purges focused on those who sought to change the regime and those who appeared to be gaining popular support. There was no place for individuals more popular than the leader, so individuals who held the hearts of the people often found themselves relegated to lesser positions, removed from power, or even killed. In addition, both Hussein and Kim placed family members into positions of power. Family and kinship loyalties were stronger than party relationships. Vacancies left open through purges were filled by those closest to the leader. Furthermore, the use of the cult of personality reinforced each dictator's hold over his people, using cultural structures to support his reign. Both Iraq and North Korea are ancient kingdoms with long histories and eras of cultural development, with leaders seeking to enter into the world community on their own terms.

Important to my analysis is that both Iraq and North Korea should be placed in the dependent of the enemy and rogue state image categories. Both states were dependent upon the Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. They accepted military advisors into their countries, participated in economic programs, and accepted military and economic aid. Extended deterrence from the Soviet Union to both Iraq and North Korea enabled Iraq and North Korea to take policy actions with the knowledge that the use of force in retaliation would be unlikely from the United States. When military assistance from the Soviet Union ended for Iraq and North Korea, there was an attempt to obtain weapons of mass destruction. More importantly, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist and the umbrella of Soviet nuclear deterrence broke down, Iraq and

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North Korea, understanding the necessity of nuclear capability both militarily and politically, sought to obtain nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. In addition, both states have been accused of going against the desires of the international community and of taking threatening actions against their neighbors. Thus, both states fall into the category of the dependent of the enemy and rogue state image categories.

Interestingly, while some policy preferences of United States policy makers towards Iraq and North Korea are similar, in some cases they differ. While Iraq often incurs the bombing of its cities and military assets, the U.S. tends to use diplomatic measures towards North Korea. The question arises as to what creates both similar and different foreign policy actions. Are there subtle differences in held imagery of the states that suggest a similar image perception but different action? Are image perceptions similar resulting in similar response alternatives, suggesting the difference in policy preferences[11] the likelihood that North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons while Iraq only has chemical or biological weapons? Or is it simply that Iraq has a desired natural resource, oil, while North Korea has nothing of interest?

Research Problem

The research problem centers on the images of the dependent of the enemy and the rogue state. While the terms "dependent of the enemy" and "rogue state" are used in the literature, very few studies investigate this imagery. How policy makers perceive "rogue states" may not equate to the theoretically based image. The policy maker and the researcher may not be on the same page. For the theory to be accurate, it must reflect policy makers' perceptions. The phenomena to which I am seeking to bring clarity are how policy makers use images when dealing with rogue

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[11] As will be explained below, policy preferences are those actions that policy makers promote in a crisis situation.

states and how the rogue state image developed out of the dependent of the enemy image. Also of importance are the similarities and differences between foreign policy preferences of policy makers towards Iraq and North Korea.

Hypotheses

Three questions result from an analysis of the literature. First, the literature suggests there is a relationship between the dependent of the enemy and the rogue state image: *what is the connection between the dependent of the enemy image and the rogue state image?* Second, analysis proposes we focus on the policy responses of the perceiver state: *do policy makers perceive an image of a rogue state in their policy decisions towards states that fit the rogue state image?* In other words, are policy makers' policy preferences the same as what is predicted by image theory on rogue states: *is the rogue state image salient for policy makers*? Third, questions also reflect the similarities and differences in foreign policy preferences towards Iraq and North Korea: *why are policy preferences towards Iraq often more retributive while those towards North Korea appear more rehabilitative?* It is possible that policy makers either place North Korea to the right of Iraq within the image category (farther away from the prototype but still a rogue state), or perceive North Korea to be more complex or in a different category completely.

The first hypothesis that comes from the questions reflects the relationship between the dependent of the enemy and the rogue state images: *a change from the dependent of the enemy image to the rogue state image will produce a change in policy preferences towards the perceived state.* The second hypothesis centers on the development of the rogue state image: *the closer the held image of a state is to the prototypical rogue state image, the more policies of decision makers move towards expected rogue state policies.* A third hypothesis reflects the

comparability of policy makers' policy preferences towards Iraq and North Korea: *a rogue state image observed as less threatening will result in rehabilitative policy preferences while a rogue state image observed as more threatening will result in retributive policy preferences.* The perception of North Korea as less threatening could relate to the successful containment of that state, even though North Korea was thought to have been further along in its nuclear development. Also, if Iraq is observed as a greater threat, this could be due to a greater opportunity to enact punishment or its threat to oil reserves throughout the region, or both.

Independent Variable

The independent variable is the image held by the policy maker of the perceived states. Included in the analysis are both the dependent of the enemy and the rogue state images. The independent variable will be operationalized through content analysis of documents (described below) based on Cottam's (1994) code book. Image indicators include "(1) perceptions of a country's capability, culture, and intention; (2) event scripts, reflecting lessons from history that policy makers use to understand the behavior of a country or to predict its behavior; and (3) response alternatives that were consistently considered appropriate for use vis-a-vis a country" (188). Cottam operationalizes these variables in the appendix of *Images and Intervention,* pages 188-189:

Fig. 2 Image Indicators

IMAGE INDICATORS

The capability attribute [is] derived from statements about the following:

1. Military strength and capability

    a. The country's offensive and defensive military potential

    b. The government's control over the military

c. The likelihood that the country would resort to the use of military force to achieve its goals

d. Whether the country's military force was superior, equal, or inferior to the U.S. military force

e. The country's capability of using, and willingness to use, military force

2. Domestic policy

   a. The country's government structure (open or closed)

   b. The government's effectiveness and efficiency in implementing policy

   c. The organization, size and strength of the government's opposition

   d. The government's ability to carry out a policy, achieve a goal, or abide by an agreement

   e. Whether the decision structure was multitiered or monolithic (monolithic countries are assumed to be more capable since they do not have to please their publics, interest groups, or bureaucratic interests)

3. Economic characteristics

   a. The capacity and stability of the country's economy (industrial potential, agricultural self-sufficiency, growth rate, potential for growth and development)

   b. The interaction between the U.S. economy and the other country's economy (permeability of other economy; threat to or opportunity for the United States)

   c. The country as recipient or provider of international aid

The culture attribute [is] derived from statements about the following:

1. Comparison of culture to U.S. culture

(perception of similarity implies a positive affect with low or no threat)

2. Cultural sophistication

   (includes social norms, literacy, religion, standard of living, scientific and technological capabilities, racial composition, nationalism and the public-mindedness of citizens)

The intentions attribute [is] derived from statements about the following:

1. Goals and motives

   a. Leaders pursuance of their goals

   b. Leaders' and citizens' motives

   c. Compatibility of goals with U.S. goals

2. Flexibility

   a. Leader's willingness to bargain, change tactics, and shift policy in response to U.S. initiatives

   b. The country's flexibility

   c. The linking of flexibility with cause (nationalism, imperialism, etc.)

3. Supportiveness of U.S. goals and policies

4. Whether decision structure is multitiered or monolithic (those seen as multitiered are seen as less threatening)

Event scripts [are] derived from statements about the following:

1. Lessons from history

   a. Historical incident used as analogy to explain current conflict

   b. Historical incident used as lesson regarding appropriateness of techniques for dealing with conflict or issue at hand

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2. Predictions about country's behavior or the outcome of conflicts

Response alternatives [are] derived from statements about the following:

1. Instruments deemed appropriate for use in a conflict with the country (includes military threat or actual force, economic incentives to economic sanctions, diplomatic protests, bilateral and multilateral negotiations, or simply doing nothing; those perceived as weaker are dealt with in a more coercive fashion)

2. Bargaining (those considered equal are dealt with as equals; inferiors are not bargained with)

In addition to the above factors of the independent variable, statements reflecting the reliance on the enemy state will be collected. These could be part of the military capability, part of the economic capability, and also statements suggesting a reliance on the government of the enemy. These statements reflect aspects of the dependent of the enemy image as well as a possible transition image. Once I delved into the work of analyzing the contents of the documents, I found that several sections needed to be added to the measure instrument A in order to adequately incorporate the specifics of the dependent of the enemy image. In capability, under military strength and capability, I include g). military assets obtained from a "parent" state, h). superpower conflict part of state's military capability and i). military policy dictated by "parent" state. Within the first section of culture where the perceived state is compared culturally to the U.S., I add –and/or international culture . Under intentions, I add 6). State's goals and policies influenced by "parent" state. Under response alternatives, I include in 1). sale or gift of military assets, add 3). past policies a). successes and b). failures, and add 4). Call to superpower to intervene in crisis.

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An analysis of public and private documents pinpoints statements reflecting the above criteria, developing policy makers' perceived images of a state. In addition, the relative level of policy makers' perceived threat emerges through an analysis of the above image indicators, enabling the comparison between Iraq and North Korea on the relative strength of the perceived image. Image indicators collected prior to the origination of the crisis situation reflect the image held by the policy maker at the beginning of the crisis.

Dependent of the Enemy Vs. Rogue State

Policy makers perceive the dependent of the enemy state as inferior militarily, culturally and economically. Yet, the dependent of the enemy has behind it the strength of the enemy's military. Response alternatives include diplomatic exchanges and economic sanctions. The use of force is a possibility, but is very unlikely as the perceiver state would not want to incur the wrath of the enemy's military. Response alternative that address the enemy's involvement in the dependent state would rank high on policy makers' list. While the rogue state is also perceived militarily, culturally and politically inferior, it is aggressive in nature and headed by an elite leadership that follows anti-western policies and seeks weapons of mass destruction. Response alternatives towards a prototypical rogue state include compellent strategies and the use of force, economic sanctions, attempts to ruin the leadership and create instability, and restrictive treaties. The two images overlap as they are both seen as inferior militarily, culturally, politically and economically. Yet, the enemy's military strength stands behind the dependent of the enemy image and not the rogue state. Furthermore, the rogue state adopts anti-western policies, seeks weapons of mass destruction and is generally more aggressive in nature than is the dependent of the enemy. Response alternatives also overlap in policy makers' calls for the use of force and economic sanctions. However, policy makers use of diplomacy towards the prototypical rogue

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state would involve less give and take and compromise than with the dependent of the enemy and would include treaties limiting rogue states' actions.

One of the interesting possibilities that may come out of the data centers on the deterrent capabilities of the perceived dependent of the enemy and rogue state images. Since the dependent of the enemy has the military of the enemy as part of its deterrent capabilities, this capability was lost after the end of the cold war, along with the dependent of the enemy image. It may be that some states previously in the dependent of the enemy image determined that in order to achieve the deterrent level previously held through the umbrella of the enemy, the perceived state must seek weapons of mass destruction. Thus we end up with a rogue state.

The interaction between the dependent of the enemy and the enemy will be key observing a difference between the dependent of the enemy and rogue state images. There should be some discussion of the enemy in conjunction with the dependent of the enemy. Policy makers' statements should imply the selling of weapons to the dependent, monetary and military support, a government observed as bending to the will of the enemy, and other remarks toward the enemy-dependent relationship. The rogue state image does not have the support of the enemy. Seeking power, rogue states may look to regional opportunities or threats rather than furthering the aspirations of the enemy.

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Fig. 3 Identifying the Differences in the Dependent of the Enemy and Rogue Images

Dependent of the Enemy Image	Rogue Image
inferior militarily	inferior militarily
inferior culturally	inferior culturally
inferior economically	inferior economically
support of "enemy's" military in creating deterrence	no deterrence from "enemy's" military
	elite leadership
	anti-western policies
	aggressive
	seeks weapons of mass destruction
response alternatives:	*response alternatives*:
diplomatic exchanges	compellence
economic sanctions	use of force
covert actions	economic sanctions
calls to the "enemy" to intercede	create instability
	restrictive treaties

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is a range of policy preferences, or those actions that policy makers voice as appropriate towards the perceived state in a crisis situation. I operationalize policy preferences by viewing public and private documents and observing the foreign policy preferences of policy makers towards the perceived state. The policy preferences of the policy makers may or may not reflect the image perceived through the image indicators. Policy

preferences reflect an action of some kind or, in some instances, a choice not to take action. Policy preferences for the dependent of the enemy would include diplomatic exchanges, covert actions, economic sanctions, and calls to the "enemy" to intercede in the crisis. Policy preferences towards the rogue state can be divided into retributive and rehabilitative policy actions. Retributive actions seek to uncover policies that reflect a prototypical rogue state image. Retributive actions would include economic sanctions, military actions or the use of force, blockades and coalition building. Rehabilitative policy preferences may reflect a less strict rogue state image, the desire for policy makers to promote regime change if instability is observed, or policy makers that do not perceive the state as a rogue at all. Rehabilitative actions would include diplomatic measures, the reduction of sanctions, and economic assistance. Policy preferences that could be either retributive or rehabilitative, or somewhere in the middle, include creating instability within the government structure, restrictive treaties, and containment strategies.

Policy preferences are the final decisions policy makers make towards the perceived state. In this way, policy preferences are collected after the origination or near the end of a crisis situation. Thus, there is a line between the collection of data for image indicators and the collection of data for policy preferences.

Fig. 4 Image Influences Policy Preferences

Image of Perceived Country *dependent of the enemy* *rogue state*	→	**Policy Preferences** *diplomatic exchanges* *retributive policies* *rehabilitative policies* *containment* *restrictive treaties*

For the dependent variable, changes in the policy preferences of the policy maker are expected from one image to the other. Also, similarities and differences of policy makers' policy preferences between Iraq and North Korea should occur. Part of this research is to determine what actions would be taken against a rogue state. I expect that as the rogue state increases in salience that the policy preferences of the perceiver state progresses towards expected response alternatives, including a greater use of force, restrictive treaties and the use of compellent strategies. In addition, I expect to observe a difference in degree of threat observed by the perceiver state and an obvious division between retributive and rehabilitative policy preferences.

Sample Collection

I viewed three different points in time for Iraq and North Korea. Specific points of time were selected based on crisis situations where images could be formed. For Iraq, the first sample was taken during the years 1969 to 1973 for image indicators and 1973 to 1974 for policy preferences. During this time, a crisis situation occurred due to the Arab-Israeli war and the ensuing oil embargo that threatened the national interests of the United States. As oil is imperative to the mobilization of the military and the economic strength of the U.S., the crisis situation of the Arab-Israeli War and the subsequent oil embargo is ideal for observing the relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union as perceived by U.S. policy makers. The second sample for Iraq was prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, specifically, the years 1989 to 1990 for image indicators, and then 1990 to 1991 for policy preferences. For the last sample, the period 1997 to 1998 prior to and during the Desert Fox campaign in December 1998, was chosen.

For North Korea, the first image indicator data was collected prior to the *US Pueblo* crisis in 1968. This presents the least supportive section of the study as there was a limited number of public remarks regarding North Korea prior to the *Pueblo* incident from which to obtain policy

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makers' images of the state. Yet, there is enough data to get a good understanding of the relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union. The policy preferences of policy makers develop through an analysis of the crisis beginning in January 1968 and ending in December 1968. The second sample of image indicators was collected prior to the crisis in 1993-1994 when North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the period that followed. The difficulty for this time period was that the Clinton administration entered office January 1993, allowing for only a few short months to gather data before the onset of the crisis. I do include congressional statements prior to that time period, however, as there is more of a consistency with their holding office throughout this period of time. Policy preferences are gathered throughout the crisis starting in March, 1993 and ending in November, 1994. The last period for sample collection in North Korea was from 1997 to 2000, before and during the crisis instigated by the testing of the Taepo Dong missile by North Korea and a questioned underground facility within that state. The image indicators were collected prior to the onset of the crisis, while policy preferences developed from a sample collection once the crisis began.

As I hoped to observe the transition from the dependent of the enemy to the rogue state, a point before, during, and after the end of the Soviet Union was selected. The crisis point before the end of the Soviet Union should show a dependent of the enemy image. A crisis period around 1990 should show the beginning of the rogue state image, but there may be a transitional phase where a mixed type of image appears. Finally, a crisis point in the latter part of the 1990s should show a strong image of the rogue state. I expect that, as the rogue state image becomes more salient to the policy maker, policy preferences will reflect the changing image. Furthermore, I expect that, as the rogue state image becomes more salient and complex, policy

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makers' policy preferences will reflect similarities and differences in the perceptions of Iraq and North Korea through retributive and rehabilitative policy preferences.

In both the Iraq and North Korea sample collections, an effort was made to separate the collection of data on image indicators and that of policy preferences. In some instances, this separation resulted in a less than desired number of coding units. However, I felt it better to draw a specific line between the data used for collecting the image indicators and the policy preferences than to blur the line and gain more image indicator coding units. In this way, every attempt was made not to create tautological data that simply reflected in the policy preferences the data obtained for image indicators. In addition, for the most part, the data on image indicators was collected, coded and analyzed prior to the collection of data for policy preferences, making the analysis of the image indicators a "clean" analysis without the prior knowledge of what policy preferences policy makers actually voiced during the crisis situation. The only instance where this did not occur was with the *Pueblo* incident, but I had collected all the data at one time nearly a year prior to the actual analysis of the data, and had only a vague remembrance of what policy makers actually voiced in their calls to action.

Data Collection

Policy makers share a conception of images used to structure the international system. In order to gain a clear picture of the arguments involved, I include a variety of policy makers. First is the executive branch: the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Advisor and the CIA director. In all cases, the executive branch, as per the president, is held constant from image indicators to policy preferences. Thus, data is collected on the executive branch only those years (or months) prior to the crisis when the same administration is in office. In addition, I include national legislature members. I searched

internet libraries (i.e. Lexus Nexus), official web sites (i.e. White House), the Congressional Record, the Department of State Bulletin, Vital Speeches of the Day and Public Papers of the Presidents. In addition, autobiographical texts were searched for statements that reflected images and policy preferences. While the data collection for the dependent of the enemy consisted of in depth library research with microfiche, micro film, primary documents and secondary documents, rogue state image data collection employed extensive internet research tools in additional to more traditional means.

Forms of Data

I performed content analysis on primary documents, including interviews, speeches, public documents and press conferences, as well as secondary documents like autobiographies, in order to obtain the images held by policy makers and their policy preferences. Public statements provide information on policy makers for evaluation and analysis when data would otherwise be unavailable (Starr, 1984). As national leaders tend to be inaccessible to researchers and not likely to sit for a series of personality tests or fill out questionnaires, use of their statements in a systematic way provides the best solution for collecting useable data (Hermann, 1977). Statements by high level officials are often used to collect important data, especially when viewing personality, belief systems, and image creation (see Hermann, 1984; Holsti, 1977; Rosati, 1987). Ideally, the more spontaneous the statements, the more likely they will reflect the beliefs of the policy maker and not the beliefs of possible "ghost writers" (Hermann, 1984). Press interviews are an excellent source of spontaneous statements, as policy makers have less time to construct answers and will reflect their own beliefs (Hermann, 1984; Hermann, 1980b). In addition, House debates or the use of the Congressional Record, which tend to be more

spontaneous statements or at least statements written by legislators, provide useful data for analysis (Hermann, 1977).

Yet, speeches, official statements and autobiographies should not be negated altogether. While some content analysis looks only at specific words, image theory looks more generally at the image portrayed, an image held by a group of individuals. There tends to be a "collective consciousness" within a group (Finaly, Holsti, and Fagen, 1967). This consciousness may be the same whether expressed by the policy maker or his/her speechwriter. In this way, a speechwriter would be presenting the image desired by the leader, an official statement reflecting the beliefs of the policy maker or the autobiographical sentiments of its writer. There tends to be a "prevailing view" of images used for foreign policy making, making speeches and statements of policy makers reported in the media acceptable sources for data collection (Herrmann, 1985a). In addition, while press statements may be more spontaneous than speeches and are less likely to reflect the writer's beliefs over those of the leader, many leaders are prepped by their staff on what to say, an influence that could also be considered the views of staff rather than those of the policy maker. Furthermore, interviews and press conferences may be ideal sources of communication for data collection, but also tend to be limited in crisis situations (Holsti, 1976). Thus, speeches and autobiographies, when there is no other communications available, may still be useful in providing data on the images held by policy makers.

A caveat to any material communicated in writing or through statements is an acknowledgement that a particular audience exists to which the communication is directed, typically an appeal to a public audience (Holsti, 1976). Thus, any communication has the potential for being a political statement rather than a view of the individual's beliefs. Yet, even

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the politicalization of an event reflects aspects of the policy maker's personality and beliefs, observable through the images created and the policy preferences enacted.

Use of Content Analysis

As a method of research, content analysis has unique characteristics that allow answers to questions not perceivable through other means. Content analysis provides useful information on decision makers who are otherwise inaccessible to researchers (Hermann, 1977; Starr, 1984). While some questions and research designs allow for the use of questionnaires and personal interviews, other questions necessitate looking outside the light and searching a little in the dark to find possible answers. When data are limited or the actor is inaccessible (or no longer alive), content analysis provides the means through which research can still be done (Holsti, 1969). In international relations, answers often come from past events or are singular occasions that are rarely reproduced, often with few or no accessible participants. Content analysis overcomes this barrier and allows for the study of questions with answers lying in inaccessible events. Content analysis allows a researcher to take words communicated by policy makers and translate them into informative data, a form of inference (Starr, 1984; Holsti, 1969). Thus, inaccessible events are accessible through the use of content analysis. Furthermore, surveys tend to be intrusive and memories of individuals unreliable (Holsti, 1969). Content analysis allows data to be collected on statements when the event occurred or when researchers don't want to invade the privacy of policy makers.

While the quantitative use of content analysis counts the frequency of words and is considered more systematic, generalizable, and theoretically relevant, qualitative content analysis provides the opportunity for researchers to infer a relationship between outcomes and events (Holsti, 1969). Political science and psychology both tend to use content analysis (Holsti, 1969),

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providing a rich history and support for its use in political psychology research. Both quantitative and qualitative content analysis should be used in research as they are part of a "continuum," and qualitative content analysis may be best if it answers the "right" question (Holsti, 1969).

As with any good research method, content analysis is made better when certain rules are followed. Holsti (1969) defines content analysis as "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" (14). Communications produce answers to questions through a deductive process whereby data are gathered and general concepts derived by reasoning. Such a process provides useful data when three criteria are followed: 1.) be objective, 2.) be systematic, and 3.) make sure the research is theoretically based (Holsti, 1969). Objectivity is relative. I have biases based on my gender, age, interest in international affairs and my unreasonable idealism that desires an end to all war. Yet, most of this can be put aside during the data collection and analysis process through the use of a systematic instrument based on image theory. In this way, all three criteria can be met, allowing for good research that can be replicated, built upon, and theoretically relevant.

Coding Unit of Analysis

The coding unit of analysis differs from the sample unit. Within each sample unit (each time period for collecting either the image indicators or the policy preferences), individuals communicate images and policy preferences that are collected and analyzed. These individuals are the coding unit of analysis. For Iraq in the sample units 1969 to 1973 (image indictors), 1973 to 1974 (policy preferences), 1989 to 1990 (image indicators), and 1990 to 1991 (policy preferences), and North Korea 1966 to 1968 (image indicators) and 1968 (policy preferences), all the statements of each individual over the sample unit of time were collected, colligated, and

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coded as a unit with the measure instrument. Each individual was a separate coding unit, providing an image for that individual. For Iraq 1996 to 1998 (image indicators), and 1998 (policy preferences), and North Korea 1992 to 1993 (image indicators), 1993 to 1994 (policy preferences), 1996 to 1998 (image indicators) and 1998 to 2000 (policy preferences), a computer software program was used to code the data per each speaker and speech. Instead of each speaker being the coding unit, the excerpt was the coding unit. Generally, those within the executive were grouped together as were those within the Legislature, although discrepancies between Republicans and Democrats were noted. Through this process, the n is increased, as per King, Keohane, and Verba.

Measurement Instruments

The first measurement instrument (A) provides the structure through which the perceived image of states by individuals is obtained. Measurement instrument A concentrates on image indicators outlined in the independent variable. Measurement instrument A is used to determine the image held by the policy maker. Measurement instrument A can be found in the Appendix. The measurement instrument states the name of the policy maker, the individual's title, and his/her party affiliation. Next, for those units coded by hand, the measurement instrument section (capability, culture and intent; event scripts; and response alternatives) observed in the documents is highlighted both on the measure instrument and in the documents. Capability is highlighted in yellow, culture in orange, intention in pink, events scripts in blue, and response alternatives in purple. In the margins, I made notes as to which indicators are present and to the degree in which the statements reflect the dependent of the enemy or rogue state imagery. If an image other than dependent of the enemy or rogue state was observed (i.e.: enemy image), this is also noted. Once the software program was available, the tedious work of notation ended.

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Content analysis still progressed through the reading of the excerpt (speech, Congressional Hearing, interview, etc.), but coding entailed the highlighting of the section to be coded by the mouse, and then clicking on the variable (or node) on a node tree (measurement instrument A) in the program (can be coded to multiple variables). A report was then produced for each variable (after the coding was completed for all excerpts) that showed each segment coded to that variable, who said it and when (and what ever other data I deemed necessary to that person), allowing for a more timely analysis of the data. Free nodes were also made that allowed for any unusual data to also be collected. None of the unique beauty of qualitative analysis was lost, but consistency and timeliness were improved. Indeed, coding became quite enjoyable.

The second measurement instrument (B) structures the policy preferences of the policy maker. Again, printed communications of each individual were collected and analyzed as a single coding unit. The second measurement instrument focuses on the policy preferences contained in the dependent variable. Measurement instrument B can be found in the Appendix. The measurement instrument states the name of the policy maker, the individual's title, and his or her party affiliation. For those coded by hand, the policy preferences were highlighted, reflecting either policies for states perceived as dependents of the enemy or rogue states, and further divided into retributive or rehabilitative policy preferences, both on the measure instrument and in the documentation where observed. Retributive policy preferences were highlighted in green and rehabilitative policy preferences in blue. Policy preferences that could be either retributive or rehabilitative were highlighted in pink. Notes were also made in the margins next to the highlighted text logging the degree of response taken by the policy maker. For those units coded by the computer software, the highlight and click method of coding to a tree node was performed.

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Through the use of the two measurement instruments, a systematic collection of data allows for replicability and theory building. The computer software program enhances the systematic process for coding data, significantly reduces the time needed for coding, but does not take away from the unique aspect of qualitative content analysis. In future research with a larger study, it can also help with coder reliability between coders.

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CHAPTER FOUR

IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Iraq

Mesopotamia

Mesopotamia is a Greek word for "between the rivers" and points to the land between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (Hooker, 1996).   Often called the "cradle of civilization," Mesopotamia rivals any other area of the world for its cities and development of government structures. The Middle East supported the unique development of social, economic and political structures at a time when most of the world lagged behind. An area often considered part of the "Third World" today existed as the hub of trade and culture before the common era (BCE). Specifically, the area centering on the Tigris River and the surrounding fertile plains, sometimes referred to as *al-'Iraq*, suggests an identity of ancient power (Tripp, 2000).

Sumeria existed from 3100 to 2000 BCE and provided structures of civilization that would continue long after the demise of their existence. During this time, city-states emerged with the temple as its central feature and a division of labor that allowed a few people to grow food for the rest of the population through a distribution system governed by priests (Hooker, 1996). Growers controlled rivers in order to cultivate the land, an extraordinary capability for the time. The Sumerians developed a bureaucratic and record keeping system, which in turn led to a writing system.   In addition, actions that were deemed unacceptable to society resulted in ramifications designated by a technical legal system (Hooker, 1996).   The downfall of the Sumerian empire occurred due to the constant in-fighting between city-states that weakened the empire and allowed for other groups to invade and take over (Hooker, 1996), an occurrence observed over and over again in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Sumerian structures would

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continue to endure, as each succeeding group would adopt the cultural, economic and political structures originally developed by the Sumerians.

Each succeeding empire contributed to the development of civilization in the Middle East. Akkadia (2350-2200 BCE) further developed trade and culture and elevated the role of Babylon as the hub of economic growth and influence. Babylonia (2000-1600 BCE) followed, with Humurumbi uniting many of the city-states and constructing a "code of law" that governed many aspects of life (Hooker, 1996). The Kassites dominated militarily and commercially, while the Hittites (1600-717 BCE) were traders and spread their legal and political structures throughout the East. The Assyrians (1350-612) were great conquerors of both North and South Mesopotamia. In order to maintain control over the conquered populations they forced people to migrate to other areas, creating a diversification of cultures. As with modern states, technical achievements grew out of the needs of the military (Hooker, 1996).

The Development of Arabism

Two groups lived on the Arabian peninsula—the Sabaeans in the South who were dependent on the inter-state trade routes and the Arabs in the North who, as Bedouins, were nomadic or had developed the areas around oasis along the boundaries of the great desert—eventually leading to the Arab empire. Judaism and Christianity spread throughout the area and influenced the cultural development of city-states. The Bedouins grew as a military force and centered their power around the city of Mecca (Hooker, 1996). The religious tradition of the emerging Arabism included Bedouin goddesses who were subordinate to the one God, Allah (a likely inclusion from Judaism and Christianity), and other aspects of Christianity and Judaism. Ultimately, political, cultural and religious traditions would change with the advent of Muhammad and Islam.

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Muhammad saw himself as a "Messenger of God," who brought to the world a new message, later incorporated into the Qur'an (Hooker, 1996). The central message transmitted by Muhammad was that the whole community must be taken care of and that wealth should be distributed among all, a concept not appealing to the wealthy clans but accepted by the poor and unfortunate (Hooker, 1996). The parts of the Qur'an taught in Mecca focused on one's relationship with God. Once Muhammad moved to Medina, he began to concentrate on building communities based on one religion. While Muhammad at first incorporated Jews into the new religion, in Medina he pronounced that Mecca was the direction to face when praying instead of toward Jerusalem, a point that divided followers of Muhammad from the Jewish population (Hooker, 1996).

With the death of Muhammad, change occurred in the Middle East. Contention arose between Muslim factions as to who should lead the people. Abu Bakr, Muhammad's father-in-law, was tapped and led as khalifa (caliph). During this time, Arabs partook in jihads ("striving in the way of the Lord") and conquered neighboring areas, vastly expanding the Arab empire. After Bakr's death, Muhammad's son-in-law, Muhammad Ali, desired to lead the people, but Umar, another follower of Muhammad, was chosen instead. When Umar's successor, Uthman, was assassinated, Ali was made caliph, but he, too, was assassinated due to rumors that he had been involved in Uthman's demise. Under Mu'awiyah, the caliph was made a hereditary position, giving rise to the Umayyad clan's reign of power with its center in Damascus (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994). Arab expansionism spread into Europe, resulting in a huge empire ruled by the caliph.

Yet, contention between factions continued. In 680, Ali's son, Hussein, based in Iraq, led a revolt against the Umayyeds. Hussein's supporters, called sh'at Ali or "partisans of Ali," rose

up in support of the hereditary line of Muhammad. While the revolt was put down, this began the division between the Shi'ites (followers of Hussein) and the Sunni Muslims, which continues to this day throughout Iraq and Iran (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994).

During this time, multiculturalism reigned in the Middle East. As a crossroad of several cultures and a focal point for trade, Arabs, Jews, Greeks, Christians and Persians all lived together (Hooker, 1996). With the advent Abbasidian power—when a descendant of Muhammad's uncle overthrew the Umayyads—Arab power moved to Iraq. Taboos against intermarriage loosened and relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims occurred (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994). Baghdad ("gift of God") was built and stood as the center of Arab power, trade, and commerce. While the Arab warrior had previously stood as the "ideal citizen," judges, merchants and government officials filled the new position. Significant cultural and scientific advancement in astronomy, literature, economics and trade occurred, and an increase in the relative wealth of individuals resulted, especially during the reign of Harun (813-833) (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994).

While counties develop, rise, and produce advances, they ultimately fall. The Abbasids were no different. Divisions within the government structure and despotism reduced Baghdad's control over the vast Arab empire (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994). Different Caliphs rose in various areas throughout the empire, further dividing people along tribal lines. While Baghdad still maintained power within Iraq, Cairo emerged as the center for trade and culture. As a result of the weakening of the Arab empire and the division of its loyalties, the Turks were able to move down from the north in 1055 and entrench themselves throughout the Middle East, initiating the rule of sultans (Duiker and Spielvogel, 1994). Muslim leaders would continue for a time in various areas of the Middle East, but divisions along religious and tribal lines, as well as

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the influence from the Turks and Mongols, further reduced the ability for any united Arab effort to emerge to counter the invaders (Hourani, 1991). Furthermore, the advent of the plague reduced the population of both cities and countrysides, limiting the capability of governments to collect taxes and produce armies (Hourani, 1991). Ultimately, the Turks won out, and the rule of the Ottoman Empire began.

The Ottoman Empire

The area of the Ottoman Empire where Iraq now exists often felt pressure from the Safavid Empire to its east. The Safavids (Shi'i Muslims) and the Ottomans (Sunni Muslims) shared a long border along which conflicts between the two Muslim groups occurred (Tripp, 2000). The Iraqi region consisted of three main areas: Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. A strong Kurdish system of government existed in the Mosul area, while a tribal system emerged around Baghdad and Basra. Central to the Arab Ottoman empire, especially in Baghdad, was the rule of the *mamluks*, foreign born leaders raised Muslim who structured power through a tributary system, sending tribute irregularly to the Ottoman sultan in Istanbul (Trip, 2000). Power structures relied on familial supports and political relationships based on kinship (Tripp, 2000). Though mostly Muslim, the Mosul and Baghdad areas also included Christians, Jews, and other religious faiths. Basra alone consisted of a population of Shi'i Muslims governed by Sunnis. This would later raise political problems.

In the early 1800s, the Ottoman empire sought to exert its control over the three districts of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, redefining the political and economic system through a series of mandates. In an attempt to limit power relationships based on family ties, the Sultanate only strengthened kinship structures as "clients" obtained benefits from the government through established networks (Trip, 2000). Part of this new structure incorporated a constitution,

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providing for some pluralistic political structures. Later, in the late 1800s, Sultan Abdulhamid II suspended the constitution and ended reforms, personally creating relationships with top officials in the provinces (Tripp, 2000). Counter movements grew within groups of young men educated in the schools and colleges of the area. Ties were created between provinces as commonalities were found (Tripp, 2000). These "Young Turks" forced the reintroduction of the constitution in 1908, gaining political power and supporting a growing pluralist political dialogue throughout the Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra areas (Tripp, 2000). These groups called for equality, the inclusion of Arabic as a language of state along with Turkish, and an increase of power to the various provinces (Tripp, 2000). Thus, Arab unity around an Arab identity began in the latter end of the Ottoman Empire with the hope of creating an Arab state.

Arabs came into Word War One in opposition to the Turks who had supported the Axis powers. Arabs hoped that they would obtain their own state at the conclusion of the war (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Instead, through the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Britain, France and Russia divided the Middle East into "spheres of influence" (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). While most Arab states' boundaries were set by the Green Line of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of July 29, 1913, the borders of Iraq and Kuwait were created when Perry Cox, at the Ugair conference on December 2, 1922, drew a red line on a map, setting the scene for later conflict (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). The Middle East fell under the domination of European powers through a variety of mandates, many of which supported the development and production of oil reserves in Iraq and other states to the benefit of European powers (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). While Kings of Iraq sat in traditional positions of power, the real policy making came from Britain (Tripp, 2002). Yet, with the support of the League of Nations, Iraq obtained a certain level of independence with the Hashimite Monarchy (Tripp, 2002). However, factionalization, Kurdish dissent in the

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north and Shi'a rebellion in the south provoked harsh measures, limiting popular influence on Iraqi policy making (Tripp, 2002). The Iraqi government supported the British at the beginning of WWII, interning Germans and enacting harsh policies to control public dissent (Tripp, 2002). After several coups forced changes in the prime minister, the British doubted that Iraq was still loyal to the British. Britain requested that troops be allowed to enter Iraq, and when the nod failed to appear, the British forced their way into Baghdad with the help of many Kurds and Shi'a fighters (Tripp, 2002). Shortly after the end of WWII, the Portsmouth Treaty allowed British influence in Iraq to continue for an additional twenty-five years (Tripp, 2002). While the monarchy would continue for another decade, the Iraqi people were effectively denied the ability to control and create their own domestic political and economic policies, which were orchestrated instead by the British government.

The Arab states acted to end the encroaching Jewish state and the domination of European powers. The "Arab revolution" evolved out of nationalism in the form of a developing parliamentary system and an easing into secularism, socialist ideology through the nationalization of industries and the move towards a welfare state, and Islamic fundamentalism (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Arabs sought to end the dominance of European powers and their acquisition of the Middle East's natural resources. While the influence of the European countries would continue to structure political and economic policies for years to come, Arabs sought to create autonomy within their respective states. Due to the political nature of oil, European and American powers would not easily be dissuaded and would compete to situate themselves as the dominating force in Arab countries.

The inception of the Baath party occurred in Syria during 1943 and traveled to Iraq in 1950. This political ideology promoted Arabism and sought to eliminate classist structures

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(Anderson and Khalil, 1991). The Baathists would come to power in 1966, but their influence was limited as leaders soon found themselves in exile (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). In the seventies Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia vied for the leading position in the Ba'athist desire to unite the Arab world under one political system (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). This aspiration to create Arab nationalism and unity underlay the political actions of leaders from the fifties to the present.

1958 to 1968

In 1958, 'Abd al-Karim Qasim[12] led a revolt against the monarchy and British influence, instead supporting a more militaristic establishment. Qasim encountered strong political influence from the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) in the first two years of his leadership (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987), reflecting leaders' desires to reclaim political autonomy and national resources through structures opposing European influence. The Soviet Union found the leadership of Iraq amenable to Soviet involvement in Iraqi politics (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987), and Iraqis saw opportunity under the Soviet umbrella. Yet, by the end of 1959, the ICP lost much of its clout with political leaders and found itself out of power. In addition, the Ba'ath party, the nationalists, and the National Democratic Party (NDP) sought to affect politics in Iraq (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987), each jockeying for superiority.

Iraq and other Arab countries began to develop some clout in the international oil market with the inception of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. As Western powers still desired cheap oil and sought resources to develop in the Middle East, the threat to limit oil or oil development directly threatened the national security of the major powers

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[12] President of Iraq from the revolution in 1958 to 1963.

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(Anderson and Khalil, 1991). If OPEC were to obtain control over the flow of oil in the Middle East it would become a political force with oil as its weapon (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Part of Iraq's move to gain power through the acquisition of oil under al-Karim Qasim included the attempt to annex Kuwait June 25, 1961, after the British left June 19, 1961 (Cordesman, 1999). Fortunately for Kuwait, the U.N. admitted it into the organization, solidifying its status as an independent state and providing legitimacy to the Kuwaiti regime (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). While Iraq had sought to retake the portion of its state that had been cut off at the Ugair conference in 1922, the United Nations has acknowledged the nation and its autonomy for the last forty years. Yet, this would not be the last time Iraq would seek to retake Kuwait and place it within its borders.

In 1959, the Soviet Union sought to influence Iraq and initiated arms imports into the state. Once started, arms proliferation into Iraq led to Iran's seeking of comparable capabilities. Soon, both states were competing with each other in an arms build-up in order to keep the other state from obtaining greater military (Cordesman, 1999). The beneficiaries of this buildup were the countries supplying the arms to the two countries, the Soviet Union and the United States. These two countries sought to influence the political positions of Iraq and Iran through the promise of arms and the subtle influence through intelligence lines.

On February 8, 1963, the Baathist and Nationalist supporters violently took over the government under the guise of a Marxist/Socialist agenda (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). In November of '63, Abdul-Salam Arif took power as the head of the government (Cordesman, 1999). During this time Iraq sought Soviet help in oil development (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987), allowing the Soviet Union to influence political and economic policy in Iraq. Rumors circled that the CIA, not likely to sit by as events unfolded in the Middle East, helped

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Baathists Nayef and Dawd regain power in 1968 (Pelletiere, 2001). As the Baathists had developed into an Arab nationalistic party that supported the rise of Arabism, the CIA likely saw the Baathists as a better alternative to the Marxist/Socialist ideologies of other factions.

1968 to 1972

In the late1960s and early 1970s, a change in political identification emerged with the rise of individual leaders rather than of political parties taking precedence. Instead of aligning themselves with a political party, people followed specific individual leaders (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). There occurred a re-emergence of familial identification whereby leaders placed family and home-town members in positions of power, gaining support through personal relationships (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Ahmad Hasan al Bakr led the country for eleven years beginning July 30, 1968,[13] with Saddam Hussein as second in command (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Both men participated in purging the government of individuals considered disloyal to Bakr and put loyal supporters in their place (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Their Revolutionary Command Council, with Saddam Hussein as vice-chairman, strongly enforced new policies that structured people's behavior. A repressive government based on mistrust and paranoia emerged, limiting the ability of citizens to influence the development of their government.

The Soviet Union materialized as a major player in the development of Iraqi political, military and economic policy. Bakr strongly opposed western countries and sought the friendship of the Soviet Union (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). The Soviet Union and Iraq signed an agreement on June 21, 1969, that promoted Soviet assistance in technology, with more

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[13] Cordesman (1999) places the date as July 17, 1968.

agreements to follow (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Originally relying on the French for oil development, Iraq sought Soviet knowledge and resources, leading to Iraqi dependence on the Soviet Union for oil production (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Saddam Hussein even visited the U.S.S.R. in December of 1971 to promote the Soviet-Iraqi relationship and sought a "solid strategic alliance with the Soviet Union" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987:146).[14] On April 9, 1972, Bakr of Iraq and Alexi Kosygin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, personally signed a Friendship Treaty, calling for "cooperation in political, economic, technical, cultural and other fields" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987:147). The Soviet Union was fully entrenched in Iraqi politics, and Iraq emerged as a client state of the Soviet Union.

1972 to 1975

In the seventies, the Iraqi Communist Party sought support from the Soviet Union in the hopes of gaining strength within the Iraqi government, but the Soviets adhered to a policy of supporting those in power and not providing support to opposition parties (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). However, the Soviet Union did develop a relationship with Mulla Mustafa Barzani of the Kurds who sought an independent zone in Northern Iraq. Yet, Barzani, influenced by the CIA, found solace with the United States in the seventies in hopes of gaining military and economic support against the Iraqi government (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Barzani and the Kurds also formed an alliance with the Shah of Iran thinking that it would lead to an independent Kurdistan, but the alliance failed to topple the Iraqi Ba'athist and Communist run government and likely would not have resulted in a Kurdish state (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). This relationship between the Kurds and forces against the Iraqi government would lead to repercussions for the Kurdish population in the north.

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[14] Quoted in Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, from the BBC, SWB, January 13, 1972; ARR, February 10, 1972.

During this time, states dependent on the Soviet Union militarily and economically set the stage for a great powers altercation. States in the Middle East that depended on either the Soviet Union or the United States for their military strength found themselves the focal point for super power conflict. While a state, such as Israel, accepted aid and arms from the United States, the Soviet Union also sought to influence the power structure of the Middle East by arming states, such as Iraq. As the Soviets did not seek direct conflict with the U.S., dependent states of each country found themselves the tools of the great powers (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Instead of fighting each other and risking a nuclear war, limited conflict occurred between dependent states (e.g., the Arab Israeli war). The Iraqi government obtained most of its arms from the Soviet Union (Tripp, 2002) and used these weapons against U.S. supported states. Interestingly, although Iraq threatened the national security of Israel and the flow of oil, Iraq never directly aroused the military power of the United States, possibly due to the deterrent effect of its parent state, the Soviet Union.

An oil embargo in the early 1970s threatened national interests in the U.S. as gas prices soared, affecting all areas of the economy and political interests. OPEC sought to increase the price of gas in a "price run up" in 1973 (Pelletiere, 2001). This included an embargo against the U.S., creating a crisis in the U.S. economy and military (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). OPEC's limiting of the United State's access to oil reduced the capability of the U.S.'s military and increased economic spending. The national interests of the U.S. were clearly affected and the security of the country was at risk. Also, Iraq increased its level of participation in oil production through the nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company in June 1972 (Pelletiere, 2001; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). This move by the Ba'athist leaders galvanized support for the government and created legitimacy for its political leaders (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett,

1987). A "revolution" in OPEC leading to its increased stature as an oil cartel opened up new markers for Iraqi oil (Pelletiere, 2001; Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). As Iraq holds the largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia (Arnoue, 2000), this Middle Eastern state retains great political opportunity and power, a force that threatens western powers.

The seventies also saw another attempt by Iraq to take property belonging to Kuwait. The altercation started when Iran and Iraq disagreed over the Shatt al Arab waterway and its use as a portal for oil distribution. Iran began firing into the waterway, so Iraq sought an alternative and wanted to use Kuwait as an access for shipping oil. Kuwait refused to allow Iraq access. On March 20, 1973, Iraq moved into the northern part of Kuwait in an effort to force compliance. Later, in 1975, Kuwait and Iraq normalized relations and Bakr acknowledged Kuwait as legitimate and not a part of Iraq (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Yet, this would not end the threat of Iraqi desire to reclaim Kuwaiti land.

1975 to 1980

In the latter part of the 1970s, the Baathist regime in charge in Iraq moved away from its dependence on the Soviet Union economically, politically and culturally, but still relied upon the U.S.S.R. militarily (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). The Baathist ideology of pan-Arabism supported the development of Arab culture and political identity. In addition, due to the desire not to appear threatening to the U.S. and its interests (Israel), the Soviet Union reduced its influence with Arab states in the 1970s (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Concerned that the Soviet Union's continued support of regimes vehemently against Israel would be seen as a direct assault against U.S. national interests, Soviet leaders sought to reverse some of the Soviet Union's visible involvement in Arab states, limiting the possibility that aggression between the two superpowers would erupt over dependent altercations.

The unity between the Baathists and the Communist in Iraq began to tear in the mid-seventies. As Soviet influence waned in Iraq, the Communist influence also shrank, and the Baathist forces gained strength. April 1976 marked the beginning of the split with ultimate consequences for the Communists as purges and murders of individuals who took part in communist activities occurred (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). The Baathist leaders once again expunged those whom they felt held agendas counter to that of the Baathist party and put in place members loyal to the individuals in power. As family and home-town members often stood above suspicion, tribal and familial roots determined placement in leadership positions.

A change in the leadership of Iraq occurred on July 16, 1979. Saddam Hussain took over the reigns from al'Bakr and controlled the political and military systems with a firm hand (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987;). A continuation of the policy of placing those loyal to the leader into prominent position would continue. Shortly after his acquisition of the leadership position, Hussein called a meeting of all top officials. During the meeting he called the names of some officials, who were subsequently arrested. Many of these officials met with their death at the order of Saddam Hussein, while others were kept incarcerated for an indeterminate period of time ("Personal"). Thus, socialization into loyalty without dissent developed within the regime, as dissent often meant the imprisonment and death of those considered disloyal.

1980 to 1990

A short year after Saddam Hussein's takeover of the top position in Iraq, conflict between Iraq and Iran arose. On September 22, 1980, Hussein instigated war by invading Iran (Cordesman, 1999). Often seen as an aggressive act against an innocent state, others see it as the rational action of a leader under pressure from a more powerful, expansionist country (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003). Iran's leaders had supported Kurdish rebellions in northern Iraq

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and only agreed to stop when Hussein gave Iran part of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. After the Shah fled and Khomeini ascended to power, Khomeini sought to expand his Islamic revolution first to Iraq and then throughout the Middle East. Khomeini again supported Kurdish rebellions as a way to end Hussein's regime. Thus, it was rational for Hussein to take action against Iran and seek to end its involvement in Iraqi politics (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2003). The Iraqi leader saw a threat to Iraq's national security and his own political power and sought the means to end Iran's influence and gain territory as a buffer between the two states.

In order to maintain his military strength, Hussein obtained funds from both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the form of loans and aid (Cordesman, 1999). Perceiving itself as the barrier between Persian Iran and the rest of the Arab world, Iraq sought support from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In 1984, Iraq possessed the ability to launch chemical weapons at Iran (Cordesman, 1999). Iraq's capability to use chemical weapons became more precise in 1987 (Cordesman, 1999). On the other hand, Iran chose a new strategy by threatening oil tankers in the Gulf. In this way, Iran hoped neighboring countries, like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, would feel the brunt of these attacks and force Iraq to end the war (Cordesman, 1999). In order to combat Iran's attacks on Gulf shipping, the United States allowed the ships to be re-flagged with U.S. symbols and guarded by U.S. ships (Cordesman, 1999). This unwittingly drew the U.S. into the conflict and started a "tanker war" between the U.S. navy and Iran (Cordesman, 1999). Through late 1987, Iran appeared to be the stronger of the two Gulf states, defeating the Iraqi military (Cordesman, 1999). Then, in May through July of 1988, Iraq's military strength excelled and was able to take back lost ground. On July 18, 1988, Iran sought an end to the war, and in August, 1988, Hussein agreed to U.N. resolutions (Cordesman, 1999).

In the extended conflict between superpowers, the Soviet influence in the Middle East continued. In 1982, the Soviets supported Iraq militarily by supplying it with weapons for the war with Iran (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). Ironically, the U.S also supplied Iraq with military weapons, placing the Soviet Union and the United States in the unlikely position of being on the same side in a war (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987). In 1984, the U.S. normalized relations with Iraq, setting up economic and military contracts and aid to follow (Sciolino, 1991). The United States sought to access the natural resources of Iraq by extending economic and military aid, which would continue up to the eve of the Gulf crisis in August 1990.

One of the devastating and often disparaged issues in the Iran-Iraq war was the use of Iraqi chemical weapons on Iran's military personnel. Yet, both sides used chemical weapons, with Iraq launching mustard gas and Iran letting loose blood agents (Pelletiere, 2001). In 1988, Iraq launched chemical weapons into Halabja, which found itself under the control of the Iranians (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Caught in the middle of the fighting were the Kurds, whose blue extremities suggest that the blood agent produced and expelled by the Iranian military killed the Kurds and not the gas from Iraq (Pelletiere, 2001). Other Kurdish areas also came under the assault of the Iranian military. Thus, Pelletiere (2001) suggests, the use of the gassing of the Kurds to incite negative feelings towards Iraq and Saddam Hussein may lack actual validation. On the other hand, some Iraqi military analysts might have considered the town of Halabja an enemy position and acted accordingly. Yet, does the occupation of a town validate the use of chemical weapons, even as an act of war? 6,500 people were killed in Halabja (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). As a comparison, over 200,000 people died in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and tens of thousands of civilians died in the fire bombings of Dresden. In fact, says

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Pelletiere (2001), the U.S. never really backed Iraq against Iran in the war, it was simply against Iran.

Furthermore, other issues were used to increase support for military action against Iraq in the Gulf War, including Iraq's importing of capacitors, the acquisition of large pipes for a "big gun," and its hanging death of Bazoft as a spy. Pelletiere (2001) asks readers to consider that Bazoft really did spy in Iraq, that the large pipes considered parts for a huge gun actually were for use in oil piping, and that the capacitors had other uses than for nuclear weapons. If this alternate view of Iraqi transgressions is considered, U.S. government accusations of the evil aspect of the regime suggest ulterior motives. Yet, the iron hand of Saddam Hussein, the purges and murders of individuals and the disappearance of citizens who oppose the Hussein regime reinforce views of an oppressive government.

The end of the Iran-Iraq war left Iraq with limited resources. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had loaned Iraq money to fund the war, but Iraq was in the position of not being able to repay its debts (Cordesman, 1999). In addition, Iraq once again sought an access to the Gulf via Kuwait in order to stay clear of Iran's weapons by using the islands of Warbah and Bubian (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Iraq further complained that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirate's sought to use oil as a weapon against Iraq by selling more oil than allowed by OPEC, causing prices to plummet. This hurt Iraq as low prices limited the recovery of the Iraqi economy, seen by Iraq as a threat to its security. Furthermore, Kuwait was said to have moved the Kuwait-Iraq border north in order to cut across Iraqi oil fields (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Iraq made demands of Kuwait, including the waving of required repayment of loans, the limiting of oil production, and the use of the islands as ports, many of which Kuwait acquiesced to (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Yet, Iraq still felt its security threatened and invaded Kuwait on July 31, 1990. The aggression

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against Saudi Arabia also may have derived from that state refusing to wave the debt Iraq owed to it (Cordesman, 1999).

While many politicians expressed surprise and disdain at Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, his position could have resulted from the policies of Western powers. U.S. policies promoted Saddam Hussein as the top Arab leader through economic and military provisions and sales (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Western powers had fully supported Saddam Hussein and Iraq as an Arab state against Iran. Saddam Hussein could not back down when the security of his state and his acquisition of power was threatened (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Arab nationalism, the cornerstone of the Baathist party, required Hussein to act to preserve his place in the Arab world, which meant going against Western powers and policies (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Feeling threatened by Israel, which had unilaterally struck Iraq's nuclear program in 1981 and enjoyed Western support, Hussein fueled the flames of crisis by announcing Iraq would use chemical weapons against Israel if Israel took military action against Iraq (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). The Bush administration failed to take the opportunity to chastise Iraq strongly nor did the administration dissuade Iraq when it complained about Kuwait (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). The Bush administration's policy was indecisive at best, causing Iraq to believe no action would be taken if it were to invade Kuwait. For the most part, researchers suggest that the U.S. supported Saddam Hussein up to the invasion of Kuwait (Arnoue, 2000).

Nevertheless, reports suggest that the Hussein regime supported actions that undermined human dignity and human rights. Information out of Iraq shows that Saddam Hussein employed periodic purges and executions of people who plotted against his regime or that gained too much popular support (Cordesman, 1999). Even though Hussein used a form of tribalism, the placement of individuals from one's family or hometown into power positions (Cordesman,

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1999), coups, desertion and emigration still threatened Hussein's power. In addition, an individual who enjoyed popular support either in the military or the bureaucracy might undermines the power of Hussein and lead to the rise of a rival political power. Both types of actions threatened Hussein's hold on power and were guarded against, resulting in a repressive and frightening regime.

1990 to 2000

An alternative view of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq suggests that Kuwait should take responsibility for instigating the situation. Not only did Kuwait go over its oil quotas, lowering the price of oil and hurting the economic situation in Iraq, but Kuwait also refused to cede the two islands in the Gulf to Iraq so that it could have access to a Gulf port to export oil and importing other goods (Pelletiere, 2001). From this standpoint, if Kuwait hadn't blocked Iraq from developing its export/import structures and had curtailed its oil production, Iraq wouldn't have been forced to invade Kuwait. Furthermore, Anderson and Khalil (1991) suggest that the mightier-than-thou stance of some permanent members of the U.N. security council promoted an hypocritical policy as these same members had invaded other countries in the recent past (U.S., U.S.S.R., China) (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). In other words, the national security interests of Iraq were less important than those of the more advanced states.

Prior to and after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, negative images of Iraq developed in U.S. policy makers' minds. In one highly touted statement by Bush, he stated that Hussien was a "modern-day Hitler" (Sciolino, 1991). Sciolino (1991) suggests that this remark lacked negative connotations in Iraq as many people there had supported Hitler during WWII. Furthermore, many Iraqi Arabs considered actions against the Jewish population to be good policy measures.

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Furthermore, rather than hurting the political position of Saddam Hussein, western policies and the Gulf War projected Hussein into the hearts of many Third World counties. By fighting against western expansionism into Third World countries, Hussein became a leader of the people in the Middle East and the Mediterranean (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). The more Western powers fought Saddam Hussein, the greater his popularity among segments of the Arab population. U.S. intervention in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis sparked sentiment that the U.S. only wanted greater influence and positioning in the Middle East in order to gain political and economic advantages (Anderson and Khalil, 1991). Rather than trying to eliminate Saddam Hussein from the Arab world, many Arabs believed that only a strong Iraq kept Israel and Iran from taking over the region. Actions by western powers that reduce the political power of Iraq might spell doom for any peace in the Middle East.

The terms of the cease fire sought to limit Iraq's military and economic capability. Resolution 687, enacted April 3, 1991, called for the dismantling of all weapons of mass destruction and of the capability to produce them, the ability for the U.N. to conduct inspections and oversee the elimination of parts, and the limitation of oil exports (Cordesman, 1999). These sanctions effectively crippled any possibility of rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure unless Iraq conceded to U.S. and coalition terms. In addition, compliance fell under the interpretation of the U.S., under the guise of the United Nations, making submission to the terms reflective of U.S. policy and continued changing goals.

Left in disarray and limping after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi economy deteriorated further during and after the Gulf war. From the western powers perspective, since Hussein refused to allow UNSCOM to do its job in investigating and eliminating weapons of mass destruction, sanctions remained in place (Cordesman, 1999). Interference by the Iraqi

regime with UNSCOM efforts often took the form of "challenge and response" actions whereby the Iraqis challenged parts of U.N. sanctions as a way to inhibit or suspend searches and investigations while waiting for a response by the U.N., often projecting the altercation into a crisis situation (Cordesman, 1999). Only when forced did Iraq allow inspectors into questioned areas, with additional intervention in UNSCOM attempts to destroy weapons of mass destruction capabilities (Cordesman, 1999). Inspectors found that only limited amounts of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities were destroyed during the Gulf War (Cordesman, 1999). Only after the defection of Lieutenant General Husayn Kamel Majid and his revelation of secret information about WMD capabilities did Iraq suddenly find documents uncovering a weapons program more significant than had previously been thought (Cordesman, 1999). In addition, after several years of sanctions, Iraq obtained economic contracts with Russia, China and France, splitting the U.N. Security Council (Cordesman, 1999). In the end, however, even France and Russia grew impatient with Iraq, strongly condemning it on November 1, 1997 about its circuitous and evasive actions (Cordesman, 1999). Cordesman (1999) believes that Iraq used any means possible, including misdirection and untruths, to obtain WMD capabilities.

After the end of the Gulf War, the attacks on Iraq continued. Often, these attacks came after Iraq refused to allow weapons inspections or denied access to weapons inspectors (Arnoue, 2000). The fifth crisis began January 12, 1998 when Scott Ritter, a weapons inspector from the U.S., was denied entry into Iraq (Arnoue, 2000). Iraq complained about the over abundance of western inspectors on the teams that inspected facilities and the lack of representation by Middle Eastern states. Arnoue (2000) suggests that the United States sought to find a reason in order to take action against Iraq. The sixth such major crisis was on December 15, 1998. In this instance, Richard Butler announced that Iraq failed to comply with U.N. resolutions. Even before the U.N.

had a chance to review the report, the United States and Britain began bombing Iraq (Arnoue, 2000). Named "Desert Fox," this bombing campaign lasted from the fifteenth of December to the twenty-second. B-1 bombers, F-16s, F-14s, F-18s, A-10 fighters and cruise missiles all left their mark on the Iraqi landscape and people (Cordesman, 1999). Even though the official action ended, subsequent attacks on Iraqi installations occurred when radars locked onto U.S. or British planes below the 32nd parallel.

Saddam Hussein

As much of the perceptions of Iraq center on Saddam Hussein, and U.S. policies reflect his status as a tyrant leader, some consideration of his history merits consideration. Saddam Hussein was born on April 28, 1937 in Auja, 100 miles north of Baghdad. His father either died or abandoned the family about time he was born.[15] Saddam's mother, Subha, remarried, but his step father, Ibrahim Hassan, was said to have made Hussein steal and abused him until he went to stay with his uncle, Khayrallah Tulfah, in Baghdad ("Personal"). The circumstances of his birth stigmatized Hussein and made him an outcast, while his relationship with his step-father enhanced the dysfunctional aspect of his family (Yaphe, 2000).

In Baghdad he began his education, completing his intermediate schooling (about 9th grade) when he was sixteen. Denied entry into the Baghdad Military Academy due to poor grades, he focused on the political opportunities available to him. Hussein participated in the failed attempt to overthrow King Faisal II ("Personal"), and, in October of 1959, then 22 year old Saddam Hussein, along with other Ba'thist members, participated in a failed assassination attempt on the leader of the country, Qasim (Tripp, 2002). Strong and prominent actions in

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[15] Some documents question whether Hussein's mother was married to his father; the story of his father's death may have been used to limit repercussions from family and village members (see Judith Yaphe, "Tribalism in Iraq, the Old and the New").

support of the Baathist party projected Hussein into a Baathist leadership position. Wounded in the attack on Qassim and sought by the government, Hussein left Iraq and escaped into Syria and then Cairo ("Personal").

While in Cairo, Hussein completed his basic education and began law school, never far from conflict due to his political beliefs.[16] When Qassim was publicly tortured and killed in 1963, Hussein returned to Iraq and participated in the torture of individuals who opposed the Baathist party. Although jailed by rightist military opposed to the Baathist party, Hussein was named as the deputy Secretary-General position of the Baathist party in 1966 by his cousin, General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. Hussein escaped from prison, and soon found himself as a top official in the Iraqi government when Bakr and the Baathist party took over the government ("Personal").

As Deputy in Charge of Internal Security, Hussein created a system of intelligence that included spies, informers, and assassins loyal to Hussein. Many people promoted to powerful positions were family members, considered less likely to oppose Hussein and more likely to do his bidding. Hussein also commanded much wealth and control over exports of oil, as well as other business adventures. In 1979, Bakr resigned,[17] and Hussein placed himself as the leader of the Iraqi state. His first step reflected his suspicion of Iraqi leaders as he ensconced family members and people loyal to him into top leadership positions while purging and interning those who might oppose him, many of whom were subsequently killed ("Personal").

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[16] Saddam Hussein was arrested twice for threatening other students due to their political beliefs ("Personal").

[17] It is suggested that Saddam felt Bakr was getting close to forming an alliance with the leaders of the Baathist party in Syria, with Bakr as leader and a Syrian leader in the number two position. As this would have reduced Hussein's power and diminished his desire to be the pan-Arab leader in the Middle East, Hussein forced Bakr to resign ("Personal").

During the next two decades, Hussein instigated the war with Iran and the Gulf War. Yet, rather than rousing the public against him, Hussein was able to strengthen his position and has often been seen as a leader or "hero" of Arabism in the Middle East ("Personal"). Many Arabs dislike the incursion of western ideology and culture that has spread throughout the Middle East, and see Saddam Hussein as a stalwart against imperialist United States. Thus, in a way, the efforts of the United States and coalition members to limit the effectiveness of Hussein may actually have launched him closer to his desired outcome of being the pan-Arab leader in a united Middle East.

Saddam Hussein employed policies and structures used by former leaders, which may have created legitimacy for his government. These structures and policies include social ties, the use of force against citizens, and strict laws against opposition (Tripp, 2002). As the second in command, Saddam Hussein supported his kinsman, Bakr, by eliminating any group that might influence dissention towards the government through purges, accusations of spying, and televised trials and hangings (Trip, 2002). Such actions reinforced the legitimacy of the Baathist government, as prior governments also used oppressive actions to limit opposition. Furthermore, the policy preferences of Saddam Hussein limited the desire of his opponents to oppose him publicly, effectively silencing voices of dissent. One additional component used by Hussein is the cult of personality. Through setting himself up as the supreme leader, supported through declarations of his greatness, pictures of himself throughout the country, songs that sing his praise, and other cultural admonitions of the powerful authority of his rule, Saddam Hussein created a cult around his person that engulfed the entire population. This use of cultural structures to support his dictatorship enhanced his ability to control the minds and beliefs of his people, strengthening his rule over them.

From the literature and history presented above, questions arise on the transition of Iraq from a perceived dependent on the Soviet Union to a rogue state acting against the norms of the international community. What was the perceived relationship by U.S. policy makers of Iraq and the Soviet Union? Why did the U.S. seek to involve itself with Iraq in the eighties and why did this relationship turn bad in 1990? How did the perceived image of Iraq by U.S. policy makers influence decision making during the dependent stage and into the 1990s? What influenced Iraq's desire to obtain weapons of mass destruction, as perceived by the U.S.? The problem I seek to answer centers on how policy makers can successfully interact with perceived rogue states. By exploring the Iraqi cases, a prototype of the rogue state image emerges that sets the stage for future policy actions towards perceived rogue states. As rogue states stand as the focal point for U.S. foreign policy making, determining how policy makers perceive rogue states and their subsequent policy preferences sheds light on possible future policy decisions.

North Korea

Ancient Korea

Recent archeological findings show that people lived on the Korean peninsula as far back as 600,000 years ago (Information). From 7193 to 3898 BCE, rulers used the designation *Han-In* (Lord of Heaven) to preside over the area of *Han guk*. In 3898 BCE, a new group emerged, the *Han ung*, who ruled until 2333 BCE. During this time, animal husbandry began, as well as did the use of medicines and agricultural development. 2333 BCE saw the beginning of the *Ko-Chosun* rule of *Tangun* (a legendary hero) in the Pyongyang area. The Three Kingdoms era (Koguryo, Paeche and Shilla) began in 57 BCE and ended in 668 CE, with the continued conflict

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between these states and the Han Chinese for control over East Asia. Beginning in this era and continued in later centuries was the use of mythical legends to create legitimacy for the people in power (History). Situated between China and Japan, Korea acted as a "cultural bridge" for the two states, as seen with the transmission of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism from China, through Korea, and into Japan (History).

The Koryo dynasty began with the unification of the Three Kingdoms in 918 CE and Buddhism as the state religion. Buddhism affected much of the cultural and political development of the era, while Confucianism influenced the political structures. In the Chosen Dynasty (1392-1910) Neo-Confucianism became the state ideology. The political structure included a bureaucratic system with a king as a figurehead and a State Council as the real political power. Within the State Council sat the three High State Councilors who directed public policy, while six ministers took care of the administrative end of the system. In order to obtain a position in the political system, individuals had to take a civil service exam, which systematically allowed the best people to hold office. This era typically emerges as the "traditional" period in Korean history. The thirteenth century saw the invasion of the peninsula by the Mongolians who used Korea as a base for the conquest of Japan. However, their influence was limited as the Mongols extended their forces too far and were forced to retract. 1592 through 1598 saw the invasion of Korea by Japan, but the Koreans successfully repelled the attempts. In 1876, the small country known as the "Hermit Kingdom" opened its doors to the international community and allowed trade with foreign countries. While a tributary state to China and invaded by Japan, Korea maintained sovereignty of its borders and continued its march toward modernization.

Modern Korea: 1910 to 1945

In 1910, everything changed for the Korean population. Japan invaded again, and this time successfully implanted its political and cultural systems within Korea. The Japanese colonial period is traditionally separated into three distinct phases. The first phase, 1910 to 1919, reflects a forceful Japan that sought to destroy the culture of the Koreans and put in place a forced agricultural development that benefited the Japanese population (through cheap rice exports). Japanese was the language taught in schools and a Japanese version of history limited knowledge of Korean culture, language, politics and history. All opposition to the Japanese influence was squelched, but underground groups and those Koreans in other countries kept nationalistic views alive and helped keep the Korean language and history intact (History). It appeared that Japan sought to make Korea another Japan with Koreans as second class citizens. The March First Movement was an attempt to refute Japanese rule. Despite being a peaceful march, many Koreans were killed by the Japanese policing force. While it failed to change the colonialist influence of Japanese rule, it did raise nationalism among the Koreans and led to the creation of the provisional government located in Shanghai. The provisional government brought together different factions: Syngman Rhee (South Korea's first president) who held a western democratic view of government and Yi tong-mui who held a strong socialist view of government. Divisions on ideology made united actions difficult.

The second phase of Japanese colonialism (1919-1931) centered on the cultural policy of the imperialist government towards Korea. Koreans sought to include the Korean language, history and culture into the school curriculum and to participate in more political structures. Bloody clashes between the Japanese and the Koreans occurred. The reduction of some political restrictions occurred, such as those against political publications and political groups. Yet, the

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Japanese colonial government implemented a stricter police system that dealt with political activists. The governor of Korea, Saito, sought to present Japan as the wiser older brother of Korea, worthy of respect in the Confucian ideology. Saito created an aura of "tolerance and freedom" that some Koreans considered open to change through the process of "gradualism," political influence in a step-by-step process. On the other hand, socialist ideology crept into the vocabulary and thoughts of Korean activists as they sought to regain their freedom.

The third phase of Japanese colonialism reflected Japan's invasion of Manchuria through to the liberation of Korea. Due to its activities in Manchuria, Japan needed more solders to fight its war. Many of these new soldiers were Koreans, some who elected to go and others who were forced into fighting for Japan. Korea became a base for Japanese excursions into China. More than four million Koreans were moved to Manchuria and Japan to work in mines and factories as part of the Japanese war efforts. Later in the war, Koreans also filled the void left by dead Japanese soldiers as the human resource of young men in Japan was limited. In addition, the colonial powers once again strictly enforced Japanese policy as any façade of political leniency ended. Finally, in 1945, the Japanese surrendered and gave up their colonial Korea to the allied powers.

1945 to 1950

The intrusion of the Soviet Union and U.S. forces lagged for a time after Japan's surrender, allowing the Koreans to set up a political structure under the banner of the Korean People's Republic. This was a committee based structure that allowed for local input into political decisions, primarily focusing on socialist ideology for public policy. The allied forces of the U.S.S.R, U.S., Britain and China, however, did not feel that Korea was capable of governing itself. As early as 1943, the allied states met to consider how best to "raise" Korea and

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conduct its own affairs after "due course." "General order number one" divided Korea between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in order for them to supervise Korea's political development with the intention of unification through elections. The U.S. ignored the KPR and instead worked with former collaborators of the Japanese colonial power. This sparked dissent in the areas under U.S. control. On the other hand, the Soviets purged all former leaders who had any connections with the former Japanese government and worked with the people's committees formed by the KPR. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. employed Soviet Koreans as mediaries between the Soviet Union and Korea, as they knew and understood both Soviet and Korean culture and systems (Chong-Sik, 1968). The communists, led by Kim Il Sung, agreed to the supervision of the Soviet Union. Kim, one of several important figures after the war, depended on the support of the Soviet Union in placing himself as the leader of the Koreans in the north (An, 1983).

In May 1947, conflict rose between the Soviet Union and the U.S., and any possibility of a joint governing system faded. The United Nations continued to promote a general election to unite the two spheres, passing a resolution calling for a watchdog group to go to Korea and oversee elections. Made up of mostly U.S. allies, the group was welcomed in the south but denied entry by the north. At this point, the U.N. decided that separate elections could take place with unification a desire further down the line. Thus, North and South Korea were effectively created through the machinations of the U.N. and U.S. allies. The South held its elections in May 1948, electing Syngman Rhee, with the North's elections not far behind in the autumn with Kim Il Sung elected as premier.

One of the major challenges of the new governments was how to create legitimacy. Both states claimed to be the sole governing body of the Korean peninsula and called for the destruction of the other. Tensions grew between the two Koreas over the next two years. The

Korean People's Army in the North formed with the help of Soviet advisors and military resources, while the South was supported by the U.S. Rhetoric reigned as Rhee called for a "march north" to take over the North Korean area even though his military did not match that of the North.

Not only did Kim Il Sung have to deal with the South Korean leadership, but he also had problems within his own party. While Kim held the powerful position of premier, he still had to respect the divergent forces in the Korean Worker's Party. Three other men held prominent positions in the party: the leader of the Soviet-Korean faction, Ho Kai-I; Southern Korean-raised Pak hon Yong who moved to the North at the end of the war; and Chinese-Korean Kim Tu Bong, part of Kim Il Sung's guerrilla faction. To remedy possible disunity, Kim eliminated the opposition and become the sole "voice" for North Korea (History). Yet, this took time, and a perception of a unit of leaders existed until after the Korean War (Chong, 1967).

The Soviet Union continued to strengthen its influence over the East Asian state. North Korea was a "client" or "satellite" state of Moscow and acted based on its "hospitality" and "paternalistic guidance" (Tai, 1983; Chung, 1978). The Soviet Union occupied North Korea until 1948 and dictated its policies (Chong, 1967). Some experts would even go as far as to say that Kim started out as a Soviet puppet (Tai, 1983). In addition, the U.S.S.R. supplied arms and advisors to North Korea's army (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997; Chung, 1978), a likely influence during the Korean War.

1950 to 1953

While the Korean War began with North Korea invading the South, both sides instigated the conflict with fighting words that raised tensions between the two states. President Rhee of the South called for South Koreans to march into the North and to end the reign of the Korean

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Worker's party. At the same time, Kim sought to promote his government as the only legitimate one on the peninsula, calling for a militaristic unification of the North and South.

On June 25, 1950, 70,000 North Koreans invaded South Korea with Soviet weaponry and made their way all the way down to lower South Korea (An, 1983; History). MacArthur and the U.S. troops, under the banner of the United Nations, landed on the western city of Inchon and fought to regain the territory lost to the North. Not content with moving the North back to the 38th parallel, MacArthur urged his troops all the way to the banks of the Yalu River on the border of China. Having been warned not to threaten Chinese security by pushing the North into China, the Chinese military entered the war enforce and pushed the Southern and U.S. forces back below the 38th parallel. After a little movement back and forth, the fighting settled around the 38th parallel. At this time, talks started between the two sides while guerilla fighting and U.S. bombing persisted. On July 27th, 1953, an armistice was agreed upon, and the fighting stopped.

More than three million Koreans died in the Korean War, and many more were made homeless. One million Chinese were killed, and 54,246 U.S. forces died (History). This occurred in a short three year period. The human loss was tremendous.

1953 to 1960

Kim Il Sung supported a cult of personality (Tai, 1983). Concerned about the rise of individuals opposed to his rule or those gaining more popular support, Kim sought to limit the influence of such individuals through purges of government officials at various times (Tai, 1983). In 1956, a group of opposition leaders, with the support of the Soviet Union, sought to end Kim's leadership based on personality, via a Khrushchev directive, but failed (Chong, 1967). His nationalistic ideology also supported the philosophy of *Juch'e*, or self-reliance and self-sufficiency as part of a national identity (Tai, 1983). As a response to former dependence on

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Soviet resources, *Juch'e* developed as part of North Korean policy (Tai, 1983). Kim Il-Sung changed his ideology from one of being under the rule of a great power to one of self-reliance (Park et al., 1987). Through the combination of the cult of personality, communism, nationalism and *Juch'e*, Kim sought to control the thoughts, hearts, and minds of the population (Tai, 1983). Furthermore, the move towards militarism was reflected in North Korea's economic structures centering around cooperative farms—leaders went to local farms and directly taught methods of farming with their "superior" knowledge based on communism. Economic rewards were few. Instead, the benefit to Korea and its economic productivity were the ideological rewards of the masses (Chong, 1967).

After the Korean War, communist ties to the Soviet Union persisted, but outright dependence on the Russian empire began to ease (Tai, 1983). A "coexistent" policy existed with the Soviet Union (Tai, 1983). Yet, resources from the U.S.S.R., both economic and military, still found acceptance in North Korea. While the North sought to fulfill its philosophy of independence, reliance on Soviet knowledge and resources proved necessary. Furthermore, the Soviet Union helped North Korea after the war to repair its damage (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). The economic assistance brought with it political influence. In 1959, North Korea and the Soviet Union signed an Atomic Energy Agreement for Peaceful Use, another means for the Soviets to influence economic policy (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). While meant to provide electricity for a growing economy, some nations saw this as a move by the North to obtain nuclear weapons (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). Such a heavy water plant provided the opportunity to produce the material needed for manufacturing nuclear devices.

Soon another communist state entered the picture and sought to influence the "Hermit Kingdom." China began to compete with the Soviet Union for sway over North Korea (Tai,

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1983). Although both were Communist countries, the leaders supported differing views about the strategic means of producing a Communist state. During the 1950s, North Korea needed the resources of China and sought to keep the flow of goods coming into North Korea. While Juche was still the ideological goal, the reality was that North Korea needed the resources of "parent" states in order to survive. Furthermore, by the summer of 1958, North Korean leaders adopted economic and political systems based on the Chinese model (Chung, 1978). In many respects, North Korea played the Soviet Union off against China, especially in the 1960s (Tai, 1983). In this way, North Korea was able to obtain economic and military benefits from both countries as the Soviet Union and China sought to influence North Korea.

1960 to 1980

The sixties saw an increasing desire in North Korea for the development its *Juch'e* ideology to become less reliant on the Soviet Union and China (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). Indeed, some theorists consider the influence of the Soviet Union and China to be minimal. North Korea often blazed its own path and sought autonomy outside the world of communist states (Haggard, 1965). Haggard (1965) believed that Soviet and Chinese forces were not prevalent in North Korea and did not affect policy making. In addition, despite an agreement between the North and the Soviet Union for the latter to provide military assistance, there was a greater trend towards an alliance with China as it was more hard-lined and was seen as having a greater ability to keep the U.S. at bay (Haggard, 1965). North Korea interpreted Khrushchev's backing down in the Cuban missile crisis as a sign of weakness and that the Soviet Union wouldn't stand up to the U.S. (Haggard, 1965). In addition, China was a better partner for the possible reunification of Korea (Haggard, 1965). Another issue that created a separation between North Korea and the Soviet Union was Khrushchev's move away from a "Stalinist" view of

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power politics.   The North Korean leadership refused to "de-Stalanize" and eliminate the "cult of personality" as it would have reduced Kim Il Sung's power. North Korea took a strong stance against Soviet influence both politically and economically (Haggard, 1965).

The end of the Korean War did not end North Korea's desire to unite the two Koreas. The North continued to pester and disrupt the balance between the two states. The North increased its excursions into the South with 566 "significant incidents" in 1967 alone (An, 1983). A major incident occurred in January, 1969, when the North Koreans seized the U.S. ship *USS Pueblo*. The United States claimed that the ship came under attack while it was in international waters (An, 1983), while the North Koreans claimed it was spying in North Korean waters. The ship was seized and one crew member was killed in the crisis. A year-long negotiation occurred between the U.S. and North Korea, ultimately resulting in the release of the *Pueblo's* men. The ship itself still resides in a harbor in North Korea, a trophy highly regarded by the North Koreans.

Internationally, North Korea moved through several stages in the sixties and seventies. It was considered a "pariah" state after the Korean War and only interacted with communist states. 1960 saw North Korea's first diplomatic relations with non-communist states, and, by 1965, the North interacted with over thirty states. Of course, the non-communist states held radical nationalistic, non-western views (Haggard, 1965) and typically denounced the policies of the U.S. The intrusion of the U.S. into Third World countries developed as a major foreign policy concern for North Korea (Park et al., 1987), gleaning support from these states for North Korea. During this time, much of the international community saw North Korea as one of the most "hostile" and "isolated" countries in the world (An, 1983). On the other hand, North Korea also changed its blanket support of communist actions in the sixties and seventies. In an effort to open doors of dialogue with the South on unification, North Korea offered economic support to

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its southern neighbor (Haggard, 1965). This type of maneuvering, at one time towards the west and South Korea and at other times away, would portend North Korean actions in years to come.

The late 1970s saw a warming of relations between North Korea and other non-communist states. North and South Korea opened talks and began a "dialogue" (Park et al., 1987), possibly seen as a first step towards unification. In addition, North Korea began to consider talks with the U.S. (Park et al, 1987). Yet, the bi-polar aspect of North Korean actions made the possibility of talks unlikely as instances of conflict in the demilitarized zone proved difficult to overcome. One such instance still loomed in the memories of officials. On August 18, 1976, two U.S. military men were killed and nine South Koreans and Americans injured by North Koreans during a tree pruning incident. In addition, instances of incursions against opponents occurred between North Korea and the United States. Often seen as claims meant to discredit the other, both states partook in complaints about the other's actions, child-like if not in such a high-tension area. For instance, on August 26, 1981 the U.S. complained that North Korea had shot at an SR-71 flying over South Korea and international airspace, an action which North Korea denied, saying that the U.S. was just trying to cause problems (Shinn, 1982). The North accused the U.S. of being Imperialistic (Shinn, 1982), while the U.S. saw the North Koreans as Stalinist Communists. Thus, a relationship at times conflictual, at other times conciliatory, continued to exist between the North and the U.S.

A change also occurred in the late seventies in the relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union. While reliance on the Soviet Union receded during the sixties, a move towards the auspices of the Soviet Union occurred in the seventies. 1978 saw a rapprochement between North Korea and the Soviet Union (Shinn, 1982). Economic ties also continued to grow, despite North Korea's access to China's influence. Indeed, North Korea had extensive trade with the

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Soviet Union, twice as much as with China (Shinn, 1982). North Korea needed the resources of the more advanced communist states, taking the opportunity to obtain desired assets from both countries.

1980 to 1994

The 1980s saw the introduction of Kim Jong Il as the successor to Kim Il Sung (Shinn, 1982). While Jong Il emerged as a "co-leader" with his father, Kim Il Sung kept his leadership position, but now as the "elder statesman" who sought to "tutor" Jong Il (Shinn, 1982). Pro-successionists viewed the succession of Il Sung by Jong Il as an extension of the theory expounded by Marx and Engle. Supporters said that no other communist state fully addressed the successionist issue, and that North Korea had set a precedent by instating a hereditary model of succession (Shinn, 1982). In 1984, Kim Jong Il took over more of the administration roles previously held by his father and cohorts of his father (Kihl, 1985). Thus, Jong Il began to clothe himself in the trappings of authority designated by Il Sung.

An ongoing issue for both North and South Korea was the reunification of the peninsula. Despite desires for unification, or perhaps because of them, North and South Korea moved farther apart in 1981 (Shinn, 1982). Attempts by North Korea to undermine the political stability of the South only succeeded in creating a pariah state of the North. On October 9, 1983, North Korea orchestrated the bombing of South Korean cabinet members in an attempt to assassinate then President Chun doo Hwan of South Korea who was visiting Ragoon, Burma (Kihl, 1985). President Chun survived, but several others were killed. Questions arise concerning why the North would take such an action as all it did was to cause many states to sever ties to North Korea.

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In 1984, North Korea made moves to be more open to South Korea and the international community. Observable in its aid to South Korea for flood victims, North Korea tried to find ways to open lines of communication (Kihl, 1985). Developing a relationship proved difficult as the North had to overcome the image of the "Hermit Kingdom" and its comparison to an authoritarian Stalinist-like state (Kihl, 1985). North Korea sought to begin tripartite talks between the U.S., North Korea and South Korea, to end the U.S. presence in South Korea, and to sign a peace agreement with the U.S. (Kihl, 1985). In addition, North Korea tried to stimulate economic recovery by opening up areas for foreign investment (Kihl, 1985). Unfortunately, an incident in the demilitarized zone worked against North Korea's plans. In 1984 (Nov 23), when Vasily Matuzok, a Russian tour guide and diplomatic student, crossed into the demilitarization area, shots were fired and both sides reacted. A South Korean was killed as well as were three North Koreans, and an American and a Korean were injured (Kihl, 1985). Incidents like this limited the effectiveness of North Korea's attempts to strengthen international relations.

Kim Il Sung continued to seek assistance from both China and the Soviet Union. In talks between the U.S. and North Korea, China often acted as an intermediary (Kihl, 1985). On the other hand, Kim Il-sung made a trip to the Soviet Union in 1984 to seek military and economic benefits (Kihl, 1985). Thus, the policy to accept assistance from both communist states continued as North Korea sought to create its own nationalistic, Stalinist state.

The fall of the Soviet Union affected North Korea in a variety of ways. Economically, North Korea lost its major export market, which had repercussions for the North's ability to sell its products (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). No longer able to export products to the Soviet Union, North Korea's economy faltered and the ability to purchase goods from the Soviet Union ended. As with other dependent states of the Soviet Union, the end of Soviet influence and

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support reduced North Korean movement towards self-reliance and shocked backward several decades its economic development. Kim Jong Il believed that the demise of the Soviet Union was a direct result of the imperialist influence of the west on the communist regime (Kim, 1995). Perestroika and glasnost brought down the great empire, revealing the destructive force of western imperialism and the capitalist structure. The Soviet Union gave in to capitalism and western ideals, an obvious denial of the supremacy of communist thought.

Yet, North Korea continued its love/hate relationship with the South and its allies. North and South Korea signed a basic agreement in 1991 that called for the de-nuclearization of the peninsula (Doh). The agreement between the two states involved the U.S, an achievement necessitating talks between the U.S. and North and South Korea. Eventually, the U.S. removed its land-based nuclear weapons in 1991 (Kang, 1995). The removal of the U.S.'s nuclear weapons depended on the non-nuclearization of North Korea and its agreement not to acquire nuclear weapons, a question that would arise several times over the years to come.

Starting in 1993, disputes over North Korea's nuclear program rose (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). The IAEA requested to search two areas near Yongbyon, which North Korea refused to allow (Kim, 1995). In addition, South Korean and U.S. military forces still conducted the "Team Spirit" war games that the North considered a blatant rehearsal for the invasion of North Korea (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). Both the attempts to inspect the "off limits" sites and the Team Spirit games influenced the North to back out of the Non-proliferation Treaty in March 1993 (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). At this same time, North Korea refused the International Atomic Energy Agency's request to visit the Yongbyon site (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). Several states saw North Korea's actions as threatening, as North Korea would now legally be able to continue its nuclear program. Analysts saw this as a blackmail attempt by

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North Korea to secure direct talks with the U.S. and to gain economic benefits (Kim, 1995). Talks between the U.S. and North Korea did occur, causing North Korea to put its decision to withdraw from NPT into limbo, being neither in nor out (Kim, 1995).

North Korea sought concessions from the U.S. and South Korea, but failed to obtain what it wanted, so it halted all IAEA inspections in early 1994. As a result, both North and South Korea, as well as the U.S., began to fortify positions along the demilitarized zone at the 38th parallel by March 1994. By May 1994, the crisis escalated, and at least 8,000 fuel rods were removed from the 25 megawatt reactor in Yongbyon, once again instigating a crisis situation (Kim, 1995; Blanc, 2001). When North Korea began de-fueling its nuclear reactors, it prompted a meeting between U.S. military leader Gary Luck in South Korea and generals in the U.S. to devise the support aspects of a war in Korea (Doh). They estimated a four month war with 1 million casualties, eighty to ninety thousand of them American, total destruction of South Korea's economy and possible nuclear radiation clouds over the peninsula (Doh). A policy of brinkmanship emerged with the U.S., instigated by North Korea (Kim, 1995).

1994 to Present

June 1994 saw movement in the U.S. and North Korean stances towards finding a solution to the standoff. The IAEA withdrew its technical assistance from North Korea on June 10, and the North responded on the 13th by withdrawing from the IAEA (Kim, 1995). On June 14th, the U.S. called for sanctions against North Korea (Kim, 1995). Former President Carter then visited Kim Il Sung and determined what the North would accept in order to comply with the IAEA, easing the crisis situation (Kim, 1995).

On July 8, 1994, Kim Il Sung, at the age of 82, passed away, but his legacy lived on in his successor, Kim Jong Il. This line of succession, though supported through years of preparation,

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was not a certain outcome. Some talk occurred about the possibility that Kim Jong Il might not garner the support of his policy makers and that he lacked the ability to run the country adequately. Steps were taken to solidify Kim Jong Il's position in the Korean Worker's Party and as the next leader of North Korea. Even the eulogy of the "Great Leader" placed an emphasis on the transition from Il Sung to his son Jong Il (Kim, 1995). Nevertheless, even by the end of the year, Jong Il still was not officially announced as the head of state (Kim, 1995). Some suggested that this was due to Jong Il respecting the mourning period after the death of his father and that such pronouncements would occur in due time. Yet, accepting the lesser position of president was really only a figurehead title for international affairs, a role not wanted by Jong Il. The real power lie in being the leader of the Korean's Worker's Party. Interestingly, the actions of President Clinton helped solidify Jong Il's position. After an announcement by North Korean Vice-Foreign Minister Choi that Jong Il was the supreme leader of North Korea and the military, Clinton sent a letter to Jong Il as the head of state, an act seen as a political victory by North Koreans (Kim, 1995). However, such an act by Clinton could have been an effort to solidify the Jong Il regime, as a disruption in the government or the turnover to a more radical group could have been detrimental to the ongoing talks.

At first, Clinton took a firm stance against North Korea in the nuclear proliferation crisis, but decided on dialogue and approved talks in Geneva (Doh). Finally, on October 21, 1994, North Korea and the U.S. signed the Agreed Framework (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). The agreement included two light water reactors for North Korea to be completed by 2003, and heating oil to replace the electricity lost by turning off the Yongbyon reactor. In addition, North Korea would face only limited U.N. sanctions. The North also agreed to stop construction of its new reactor, halt refueling of the old reactor, allow IAEA inspections, and reinstate talks with the

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South (Henrickson and Jonguyn, 1997). The U.S. would also open the door to economic trade and move towards normalizing diplomatic relations (Doh). However, for North Korea to obtain all of its promised benefits, it had to prove that it was keeping its end of the bargain first (Doh). Both the North and the U.S. agreed to take reciprocal steps, fulfilling their obligations only after the other had acted first (Kim, 1995). The reciprocity of obligations would continue to cause dissent between the U.S. and North Korea, each condemning the other for not fulfilling its promises.

North Korea saw its ability to negotiate directly with the U.S. as a major step toward its stature within the international community (Kim, 1995). The negotiated agreement set a precedent, however, that North Korea would fight or talk, depending on the actions of the U.S., showing that the U.S. still affected the peace and security of the Asian world (Kim, 1995). In other words, North Korea could effectively blackmail the United States into obtaining what it wanted under the threat of developing nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea's use of a nuclear threat reinforced the view that nuclear weapons are integral to foreign policy and that they provide power to a state (Kim, 1995). Whether used as a deterrent force or as a threat to produce, nuclear weapons affect foreign policy making. Even a small state with limited capabilities can gain tremendous power through the acquisition of nuclear capability.

Despite North Korea's acceptance of the Agreed Framework, it continued to hold a trump card in its hand. Analysts believe that the nuclear site at Yongbyon produced enough weapons grade plutonium for at least one nuclear weapon (Blanc, 2001). Depending on the missile capability of North Korea, it could effectively threaten Asian countries, including the U.S.'s close ally, Japan, and even western parts of the U.S., such as Hawaii and Alaska. In addition, two sites in North Korea that the IAEA desired to inspect have never been seen by any inspections team,

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leaving North Korea with the capability to threaten major countries while seeking economic benefits. It may be that North Korea's desire to seek nuclear weapons reflects the withdrawal of the Soviet Union's nuclear umbrella (Kim, 1995). Without the deterrent capability of its parent state, North Korea may have considered that its only option was to secure national security via the acquisition of nuclear capability.

Tensions rose in the East Asian community when North Korea tested it Nodong and Taepo Dong missiles in 1998 (Blanc, 2001). These missiles, especially the Taepo Dong, threaten not only South Korea but also China and Japan. If these missiles were tipped with nuclear technology, the North could effectively hold hostage several Asian countries. For months, the testing of these missiles produced a crisis situation between the U.S. and North Korea. Talks occurred between North Korea and the United States in 1999 and 2000 (Blanc, 2001), but little agreement resulted. Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited North Korea in October 2000 (Blanc, 2001). This was the first time a senior official went to North Korea and commenced talks. Agreements eased the crisis situation between the two states.

North Korea's actions continue to support the view that it is an unpredictable pariah state (Kang, 1995). Sometimes acquiescing to international pressure, but then testing missiles over the skies of neighboring states, presents a country that may not adhere to the standards of the international community. Yet, North Korea may purposely create this perception as a way to influence U.S. foreign policy. Kang (1995) suggests that a neo-realist view of North Korea explains its policy as unified and predictable. He states that five facts believed to be true about North Korea are non-falsifiable and not necessarily true: 1) North Korea is expansionist and aggressive; 2) the U.S. and South Korea are pacifist; 3) as South Korea grows economically and

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militarily, North Korea will become more dangerous; 4) North Korea holds the greater military strength; and 5) the North-South Korean relationship is a "powder keg" (Kang, 1995).

First, Kang (1995) considers whether North Korea really desires to expand its territory and act aggressively. This question is reflected in the position that the North could invade the South at any time. Kang (1995) asserts that the only time North Korea came close was in 1950 when the U.S. said it had no plans to support South Korea, and South Korean president Syngman Rhee said South Korea would "march northward." Thus, tensions were high on the peninsula and exchanged signals may have prompted preemptive action. Subsequent actions of the North since the end of the Korean War have only been taken when the cost was low, with the North backing down when the threat was high. Thus, North Korea takes a rational view of how to retain power and will not rashly throw it away for no beneficial outcome. In addition, Kang (1995) questions the position that the peninsula rocks on a shaky boat of deterrence. If the area is so unstable, then why hasn't deterrence failed? Tensions are high, the situation is open for misperception, and North Koreans are risk takers and not satisfied with the status quo—a situation ripe for deterrence failure. Kang (1995) believes that the U.S. promotes an image that any invasion by North Korea of the South not only will fail, but will provoke an immediate and destructive response. Thus, a stable situation of deterrence exists on the Korean peninsula.

The second issue countering beliefs about North Korea suggests that the North may not view the U.S. and South Korea as the pacifists presented to the international community. Team Spirit exercises between the U.S. and North Korea appear, to North Korea, offensive in nature— an only slightly veiled rehearsal of an invasion of the North. Team Spirit exercises suggest that U.S. forces in the South are there for more than just defensive reasons (Kang, 1995). In addition, South Korean military capabilities exceed those of North Korea, and, even though no U.S.

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nuclear weapons exist on the peninsula, submarines retain the capability of delivering nuclear weapons to North Korea. Unpopular in the world community, North Korea feels alone in its position as a voice against the intrusion of the U.S. on the Korean peninsula (Kang, 1995).

Third, analysts suggest that North Korea feels threatened by the South's increased economic and military strength. As a result, North Korea may become more likely to invade the South. Such an analysis fails to mesh with North Korea's cost-benefit analysis and past actions. If the North only invaded when benefits were high and the costs were low, increased costs would inhibit future action (Kang, 1995). Thus, rather than prompting an offensive move by North Korea, South Korea's continued advancement economically and militarily would further restrain the North's action. On the other hand, the fourth point suggests that North Korea holds military dominance over the South and will use its strength to unify forcefully the peninsula. An analysis only viewing the number of forces may support a militarily superior North, but when subjected to a critical view, the North lacks the technological and educational levels of the South (Kang, 1995). Due in large part to its relationship with the U.S., South Korea maintains a technologically advanced military that sharpens it tools through military exercises with the U.S. On the other hand, while the North received both Soviet and Chinese assistance, North Korea failed to keep up with the South. Nevertheless, the North does retain a formidable force, and, if true, the North's possession of nuclear weapons deters other states from seriously confronting its national interests.

Finally, the North-South situation often draws remarks suggesting that the DMZ is the most dangerous and conflict prone area in the world. Due to a continued armistice between the U.S. and North Korea, and the often called for reunification of the peninsula by both the North and South, the Korean peninsula is a "powder keg" waiting to go off. Yet, for fifty years,

successful deterrence has existed on the peninsula. Even when altercations sprouted up, like the *Pueblo* incident and the various North Korean excursions into the South, both sides refrained from escalating events into a crisis situation. Therefore, if conflict between the North and the South has not occurred, then the area is not as volatile as previously thought (Kang, 1995). If deterrence has been successful so far, then continued stability likely will continue to exist.

Recent events in North and South Korea suggest a new deterrence. As reliance on a superpower's extended deterrence wanes, smaller states must create their own deterrence, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons (Kang, 1995). Nuclear weapons serve a dual purpose: they deter states from infringing on one's national interests and affect the foreign policy making of much larger states. The precedent set by negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea have likely been viewed by other smaller states wishing to control their own destinies.

Kim Il Sung

As with Iraq and Saddam Hussein, the conception of North Korea as a rogue states has been influenced by the leadership of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. A review of these leaders' histories broadens our understanding of North Korea's placement in the international system. Kim Il Sung, born in 1912 near Pyongyang, moved to Manchuria in his youth with his family to flee the persecution of the Japanese. Korean communists proliferated in this area near the Korean border with the hope that Soviet Russia would assist Koreans in their desire to liberate Korea from the Japanese (Chong, 1967).

Part of the myth around Kim suggests that he fought against the Japanese in their invasion of Manchuria (Chong, 1967). In addition, communist Koreans made excursions into Northern Korea in order to promote communist nationalism in the populace. After being hunted down by Japanese forces, Kim fled into Siberia with his followers in 1941 (Chong, 1967). Kim was in

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Russia for four years and learned Soviet Communism first hand. Thus, he was well known to the Soviets and after WWII was an ideal leader for the newly formed dependant state (Chong, 1967). While there were other leaders after the end of WWII who had political clout, Kim had earned the support of the Soviet Union and was their man (Chong, 1967).

As an ideological structure, the cult of personality of Kim Il Sung found prominence in North Korea and reached the ultimate in actuality. As a part of the structure behind the Kim Il Sung's cult of personality, North Korea has erected more monuments of and written more ideological declarations about their leader than any other state (Kim, 1995). When the "Brezhnev" doctrine emerged in the Soviet Union, calling for an end to cult of personality leadership, Kim Il Sung kept his "proletarian" view. Kim saw the Soviet Union's pressure to change as a move to undermine his authority, creating a rift in the relationship (Zhebin, 1995).

Kim Jong Il

Jong Il went to Kim Il Sung University in 1961 and began his training to take over from his father (Shinn, 1982). Jong Il took over the reigns when Il Sung went on state visits starting in 1975 (Shinn, 1982). Kim Jong Il wrote on "Kimilsungism," which promotes the ideological stance of "juche." Jong Il never felt comfortable in the realm of international relations and is much more versed on domestic politics (Kim, 1995).

Branded a recluse, Jong Il produced few documents and interviews, making an analysis of his personality difficult. A theoretical piece written in 1994, "Socialism as a Science," promotes his ideological view of socialism. He addresses the downfall of the Soviet Union and the move by China to open up areas of trade. Kim states that those who once supported socialism but now state there is no value in the theory are "renegades." Furthermore, those who open their doors to "opportunism" hurt socialism, but socialism will win out in the end. Private ownership leads to

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individualism, which leads to class conflict only remedied by a communist state. Individualism supports greed while collectivism creates a society that meets the needs of all the people. The "social collective" frees one politically and socially, enabling equality throughout the state and the development of all its citizens. On the other hand, imperialistic states, based on an inequality of wealth, force political and social ideals onto a country and fail to enable all citizens to compete in the world. Those who act against the state are re-educated in order that they live up to their full potential and support the theory of *Juch'e*.

The Threat of North Korea

Kim Il Sung was seen as an international problem second only to Saddam Hussein (Doh). Now, Kim Jong Il and his projected personality of an eccentric playboy who threatens the United States continues the threat of an irrational, pariah state. North Korea presents an image of a "renegade state" officiated by a group of "paranoid survivalists" (Kang, 1995). Such an image suggests specific policy actions that must consider the possibility that North Korea has nuclear weapons. Yet, U.S. policy states that it will not allow North Korea to obtain nuclear capability. This situation continues to threaten the peace and security of the Korean peninsula and the international community.

There is no real framework for creating a long term peace between the North and the South (Doh). Indeed, even though there have been some regional differences between North and South Korea, it has been the influence of the superpowers that has created the problems between the two states (Doh). The extension of the cold war to the client states increased the tensions between the North and South and supplied arms and military knowledge that exasperated tensions. Russia's foreign policy in Asia and North Korea reflected the bipolar relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union and the fight against the expansionist Imperial west (Zhebin,

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1995). Korea has found it difficult to find a balance between opening its doors to international powers and keeping its own sovereignty (Doh). This dichotomy has often resulted in an image of unpredictability and irrationality. There is a triangular dependent relationship among North Korea, South Korea and the U.S.—the armistice between the U.S. and North Korea, the dependence of South Korea on the U.S., and the relationship between North and South Korea (Doh). While its socialist ideology is important to any view of North Korea, its relationship with the U.S. has influenced its development and international position (Doh). The relationship between the U.S. and North Korea has been a balance between conflict and rapprochement. Even crisis between the two states (e.g., the *Pueblo* and tree cutting incidents) resulted in dialogue and not military confrontation (Doh).

Yet, there is always the threat of war when a crisis emerges, as in 1993 when a plan of action in case of war was drawn up and submitted to Clinton (Doh), or when North Korea has threatened war if the U.S. or South Korea invade. North Korea asserts that any sanctions against it equate to a declaration of war, resulting in the past in the U.S. negotiating with North Korea (Kim, 1995). Continued acquiescence to North Korean threats will only reinforce the behavior of North Korea to threaten action. Yet, a strong stand against North Korea, calling its bluff, may result in conflict undesirable to the U.S. and the South. There is no easy answer when dealing with a rogue state.

Questions from the Literature

North Korea emerges as a state high on the list of those states that the U.S. keeps its eye on. North Korea has often busied itself in acting against South Korea and the U.S. in small incidents that threaten the security of regional states. While contemporary historians and political scientists understand the division between the Soviet Union and China today, the

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perceptions of policy makers and the end of the 1960s likely reflect a continuing "Monolithic" Communist empire headed by the Soviet Union, using states like North Korea as pawns in the Cold War game. Viewing the changes in U.S. policy makers' perceptions of North Korea from a dependent to a rogue may provide needed information for future policy actions. What was the perceived relationship by U.S. policy makers between the Soviet Union and North Korea? How did this perception change over time? What were the policy differences between the two perceived images? Furthermore, the similarities and differences in image perception by U.S. policy makers of Iraq and North Korea may also offer insight into past foreign policy action and future decisions. While similar policy preferences occurred in the past (the U.S. took military action against both Iraq and North Korea when each state invaded a neighboring state), some policies also appeared to differ (Iraq was bombed for not allowing in inspectors and for its suspected WMD program while North Korea was not). What perceptions of each state by U.S. policy makers suggest similar policy preferences and why are there different policy preferences in other cases? Are the differences in policy preferences due to different perceptions of each state, or are the policy differences a reflection of the larger cost of taking military action in North Korea? The puzzle I seek to put together answers these questions and furthers the knowledge and understanding between image perception and policy outcome.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS: IRAQ

Introduction

In the next two chapters I present the results of the data collection and briefly analyze the results. This chapter will cover Iraq and chapter six will cover North Korea. Chapter seven will discuss the data as it pertains to the hypotheses. The data I present focuses on the information relevant to the hypotheses, so not all nodes of the image indicator are reflected in the following results. In each chapter, I test the hypotheses by first considering the relevance of the dependent of the enemy image and the policy preferences of the policy makers in the subsequent crisis situation to observe whether the perceived image relates to the observed policy preferences. Next, the emerging rogue state image and the policy preferences of the ensuing crisis situation are considered. Finally, each chapter reports on the data collected for the last time period where I hope to view a strengthening of the rogue state image and related policy preferences. Chapter seven discusses how the data supports or disaffirms the hypotheses.

The Dependent of the Enemy Image Development, 1969 to 1973

The time period used to obtain the image indicators for the perceived image U.S. policy makers held of Iraq during the Cold War was the years prior to the Arab-Israeli War and after the inauguration of Nixon as President in January of 1969. The differences between the dependent of the enemy and rogue state images focus on those image indicators that, in the first image, show a relationship between the perceived state and the enemy, especially in the area of military assistance, in order to create deterrence.

The involvement of the Soviet Union in Iraq specifically, and with Arab states more generally, was abundant. President Nixon[18] often commented on the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and how that affected U.S. policy options towards Mideast states. Mixed in with the images perceived of Iraq and other Arab states was the image of the U.S.S.R. While not actively recorded for this research project, the image of the enemy was prevalent throughout recorded statements of policy makers, especially in the comparison between the intent of the Soviet Union and that of the U.S. Nixon saw the interaction between the Soviets, Iraq, and other Mideast states as a Soviet attempt to provide "money, men, and material" in exchange for access to "land, oil, power, and the warm waters of the Mediterranean" (Nixon, 1978a:477). Unlike that of the U.S., Nixon saw Soviet influence in the Middle East as a self-interested move to gain power, while the U.S. simply desired peace (Nixon, 1978a:477). It appeared that Nixon perceived the influx of Soviet aid to Iraq and other Arab states as a means to gain influence over the states and as a way to access their natural resources.

Kissinger also perceived Soviet military influence in the Middle East, specifically in Iraq, with the latter state a client of the Soviet Union, but not quite a "satellite" state like those countries in Eastern Europe. In this role, Iraq used Soviet weapons to further the Soviet goal of "intimidating pro-Western governments" (Kissinger, 1982:674-675). Kissinger perceived the Soviets as having supplied the means for Iraq to bully other Arab states that had shown favoritism to "pro-Western" states (read U.S.), an act that provided a level of offensive potential for the Soviets in the region. This statement also reflected Kissinger's belief that Iraq used its Soviet weaponry to forcefully achieve its goals. Thus, clearly Kissinger perceived Soviet influence in the military capability of Iraq, who then supported the expansionist intentions of the

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[18] Please see the appendix (C) for a policy maker's rank and party affiliation.

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Soviet Union counter to the goals of the U.S. While the data suggested that Kissinger perceived an Iraq less than completely reliant upon the Soviet Union, a dependent military relationship emerged of Iraq on the Soviet Union, and Iraq naturally fit with Soviet policy in the Middle East.

In the Congress, Senate members also perceived a relationship between Arab states and Soviet militarily influence. Senator Jacob Javits was by far the most prolific with his views on this relationship. Javits also perceived "Arab clients" dependent on the U.S.S.R. for military weaponry in their position against Israel, and Javits specifically outlined the capability of these states. Furthermore, Javits pointed out how Soviet arms supported Iraqi atrocities, as with the hangings of individuals wrongly convicted of being spies in 1969 (*Congressional Record* (CR): January 29, 1969). The public executions of Iraqis of Jewish decent and others observed in Iraq as threats to the state produced statements by other Senate members that showed how U.S. Legislators perceived the Soviet Union as having supplied Iraq with arms. Senator Thomas Dodd stated that the Soviet Union had provided Iraq over a 10 year period with $200 million in economic aid and $250 million in military assistance. Dodd further suggested that Iraq's military was fully equipped by the Soviet Union (CR: January 31, 1969). Thus, support militarily from the Soviet Union existed and influenced the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Iraq, supporting a dependent of the enemy image.

Also part of the dependent of the enemy image was the Cold War influence on the various relationships in the Middle East. As was often the case, Cold War confrontations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were played out in the smaller countries under the superpowers' influences. While the positioning of U.S. and U.S.S.R. ships in the Mediterranean was a direct reflection of the superpowers' desires to influence the area, Congressmen believed that the Soviets had directed the terrorist actions of Arabs in the Middle East in order to control

oil (Pucinski, CR: September 24, 1970). Thus, data also supported Soviet influence on the military policies of other Arab states as well. While not a direct reference to Iraq, Soviet influence on other Arab states did show that Soviet policies were observed as expansionist and included their desire to access Arab oil. As Iraq was one of the top nations with oil reserves and was a known "client" of the Soviet Union, including Iraq as part of the observed Middle Eastern conflict bore consideration. In doing so, policy makers perceived Soviet influence in the actions and policies of Iraq as part of Mideast Soviet policy. This perception appeared to reflect a matter of fact attitude that Soviet influence was prevalent in the region of which all policy makers in the U.S. should have been aware.

The perceived domestic policy of Iraq by Congressional members reflected a general consensus that Iraq lacked the level of civility most international communities promoted (Farbstein, CR: January 28, 1969; Fascell, CR: February 6, 1969; Harrington, CR: March 21, 1973; Ribicoff, CR: January 28, 1969; Ryan, CR: January 30, 1969; Kuykendall, CR: February 5, 1969; Brooke, CR: January 29, 1969; plus numerous others). In addition, Pucinski believed that it was only a matter of time before the Arabs states were as dependent upon the Soviet Union as were Eastern European states (CR: July 8, 1970). He also perceived as a threat Iraq's Communist Party being reinvigorated and orchestrated by the Soviets as they were "bringing influence to bear by way of suggestions and promises of extended economic and military aid and by agitation and incitement, direct and indirect" (CR: July 8, 1970). In addition, the economic and military aid provided by the Soviets came with strings attached: adherence to Soviet policy preferences. As a result, the statements of these policy makers suggested a perception of an Iraqi government whose domestic policies were influenced by the Soviet Union.

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The influence of the Soviet Union economically in Iraq emerged as a perception of U.S. policy makers. Lee Hamilton perceived the Soviets as interested in Iraq's oil, especially after the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1972. Not only was the economic aid of the Soviet Union seen as an influence, but also the extension of two billion dollars in credit over a thirteen year period (Hamilton, CR: September 29, 1971). Hamilton's statements registered his concern for the possible influence Soviet economic connectedness had on the policy making of Iraqi leaders. Part of the perceived ploy of the Soviets was to keep the Middle East in turmoil, thus keeping Arab states dependent on the Soviet Union for military, economic and technical aid (Jackson, CR: December 31, 1970). A strength of Arab states was that they controlled the flow of oil, a necessity for the United States, Europe and Japan. This was perceived as a level of power that exceeded the Arab states' positions in the international community, a grab for power above and beyond their relative capability, and opened them up to the influence of the Soviet Union, a state that did not have their best interests at heart.

The cultural perception of Iraq by U.S. policy makers reflected a state that failed to meet the standards of the international community, supporting a perception of the state as inferior. Kissinger (1982) was inclined to use the term "radical" in conjunction with Iraq in many instances, and Nixon saw a difference between moderate and radical Arab states in the Middle East (Nixon, 1972:688-690). In response to the hanging deaths of Iraqi citizens of Jewish, Christian and Muslim faiths in 1969, Senators lashed out with revealing words about the observed level of social development in the Iraqi government and society.[19] Terms used by

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[19] These comments could be understood in a time when many nations were re-assessing the use of capital punishment in the judicial system as no persons were put to death by the U.S. government in the years 1968 to 1976. Yet, from 1930 to 1967, the United States killed over 3,500 people through capital punishment and over 700 since 1977, and the numbers are generally increasing yearly (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/exetab.htm).

policy makers reflected their perception that this event was comparable to Hitler's mass killing of Jews in Germany (Javits, CR: January 29, 1969). Other terms used for the actions of the Iraqi leaders included "bestiality" and a "return to the age of barbarity" (Farbstein, CR: January 28, 1969); "macabre" acts of "genocide"[20] and "violations of human rights and lack of human decency" (Farbstein, CR: February 6, 1969); a "bloodbath" of "murder and tyranny of Jewish alleged spies," the "monster of the 'Final Solution'—a monster which, if unleashed again, could destroy us all" (Fascell, CR: February 6, 1969); an "outrageous, deplorable situation" (Williams, CR: January 31,1969); "repugnant acts" (Ryan, CR: January 30, 1969); "reprehensible" (Mikva, CR: September 11, 1969); acts that come from the "Dark Ages" (Thompson, CR: January 28, 1969); and more. Clearly, the Iraqi regime was viewed as less than human, having partaken in acts that reflected the recessive animalistic condition of man represented in the state of nature before enlightenment to humanity. Even the society of Iraq was seen as backwards and lacking in social development. Finally, some policy makers also perceived a connection between the hangings in Iraq and the Soviet Union. While conceding that the Soviet Union no longer openly persecuted Jews, Representative Brasco did perceive a connection between past actions of the Soviet Union and those of the Iraqi regime:

> Today, the Jews of the Soviet Union are not being physically wiped out on a methodical bases. . .

> That syndrome, however has shifted its location, and is still to be found. Nowadays it dominates the lives of those Jews remaining in certain nations of the Arab world. . .notably in Syria and Iraq.

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[20] More than ten Congressmen used the term "barbaric" in describing the Iraqi regime.

Both countries are today characterized by barbarous regimes, closely allied

with the Soviet Union, and blatantly anti-Semitic. Neither of these two states,

whose internal politics would do justice to Byzantium at its worst, is know for

reason, logic, or adherence to accepted rules of international behavior. (CR:

March 1, 1973)

Thus, the barbaric tendencies of the Iraqi regime continued to be perceived by congressional

policy makers through 1973, and some individuals perceived a link between the repressive

actions of Iraq and the U.S.S.R.

U.S. policy makers' perceived goals and motives of Iraq surrounded the question of

whether Iraq supported U.S. policies or those of the Soviet Union (the enemy). Kissinger flat out

perceived the Iraqi regime's intent as opposed to western influence in the Middle East and acted

against any Arab state that accepted western aid (Kissinger, 1982). Javits perceived a focused

intent of Iraqi leaders specifically on Jewish genocide within Iraq, and then their more general

goal to disrupt the peace process in the Middle East (CR: January 29, 1969). Iraqi feelings of

detestation could have been more broadly construed as having been towards all Jewish people in

the Middle East, especially those in Israel. Representative Williams, in May, 1970, flatly states

his view that Iraq and other Arab states sought the annihilation of the Israeli state: "The Arab

States, particularly Egypt, Syria and Iraq are fighting to destroy Israel as a nation" (CR: May 5,

1970). Congressmen Fong (CR: February 4, 1969), Scott (CR: January 28, 1969), Goodell (CR:

January 29, 1969), Brasco (CR: March 2, 1972), and Pepper (CR: March 2, 1973) all reflected

the perception that the intent of the Iraqi leaders included aggression against the Israeli state or

positions against U.S. goals in the Middle East. Thus, it appeared that the intent of the Iraqi state

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was to eliminate the Jewish population in the Middle East, both within its nation's borders and the state of Israel itself. At the very least, U.S. policy makers perceived an intent of the Iraqi leaders that lacked compatibility with U.S. and international goals. Furthermore, U.S. policy makers perceived that the intentions of oil producing Arab states was to "squeeze" the United States and further the goals of Arabs generally (CR: September 8, 1972). Considering the importance of oil as a national security issue, the control over this resource by the Arab states caused U.S. leaders to perceive a threat. Cheap oil may no longer have been an actuality, and policy responses reflecting this new development were considered. Therefore, the perceived intent of the Arab states in regard to oil was for their continued move towards oil-producing states' control and manipulation of the market, goals that were not compatible with the United States' desires.

An important aspect of this study was the influence of the Soviet Union's intent on Arab States. Several Congressmen perceived the Soviets as acting to inflame the already tense situation between the Arabs and the Israelis. Senator Jackson's report "The Middle East and American Security Policy," excerpted in the Congressional Record cited Soviet intentions in the Middle East as an important consideration for U.S. foreign policy:

> The peace and stability of the Middle East in (sic) now threatened by the aggressive ambition of the Soviet Union, which transcends the tragic conflict between Arabs and Israelis and, indeed, is based upon its exploitation. This policy of Russia to manipulate the conflict in the region for its own advantage is the key reality upon which American Middle East policy must be based. (CR: December 31, 1970)

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Soviet intentions in the Middle East, as perceived by U.S. policy makers, not only reflected the desire to keep the relationship between the Israelis and Arabs unsettled, but also to take advantage of tensions for their own gain. Thus, the perception of the intent of the Soviet Union in the Middle East was for the Soviet Union to take advantage of the tensions and use the opportunity to its own benefit.

The event scripts put forth by U.S. policy makers also supported the perceived influence of the Soviet Union. The perception was that the radical Arab states, at the urging of the Soviets, sought to move against that state under the auspices of the United States—Israel—if the Arabs observed any sign of weakness. Iraq and other Arab states were perceived as "unlocked doors" through which the Soviet Union was able to enter the Middle East and create "mischief" (Jackson, CR: December 31, 1970). Thus, the perception of U.S. policy makers was that the Soviet Union emerged as a disruptive force in the Middle East, supporting militant regimes possibly acting against the policy goals of western states. Furthermore, the perceived possible actions of Arab states, including those of Iraq, on oil production promoted an image of states stretching their newly obtained political and economic power. During the sixties and early seventies, many Arab states sought to control their own oil production, which had often been in the hands of western oil companies. With the nationalization of these oil production facilities, Arab states developed a new level of political and economic power. The unification of oil producing states through OPEC—which first met in September, 1960, in Baghdad—created a new political force with which to contend.

The response alternatives that policy makers suggested revealed a perception of an Iraqi state that fits the dependent of the enemy image. Policy makers in the U.S. suggested several response alternatives when contemplating Iraq's threat to the Middle East and U.S. interests. In

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1969, after the hanging of several Iraqis, Congressional members suggested ways of dealing with Iraq. Most often, Congressmen perceived their only real options to be taking diplomatic action, calling for official statements against the act (Farbstein, CR: February 6, 1969; Fascell, CR: February 6, 1969) and requesting that Iraq allow its Jews to emigrate to the United States or another country (Javits, CR: January, 1969; Kennedy, CR: February, 1969; Fascell, CR: February 6, 1969). In addition, Javits suggested that a possible option was to let loose Israel to take retaliatory actions against Iraq if Iraq failed to cease its actions against Jews in its state (Javits, CR: January 29, 1969). Furthermore, in order to create peace in the Middle East, Javits believed that Israel must maintain its ability to deter Arab states from taking action against it and from taking action against Jews within the Arab states, specifically within Iraq. Javits also suggested that the United States refrain from taking undue action as well and continue to guide Israel on what actions it should take. Finally, Javits believed that some means of communication must be built in order for increased dialogue to occur between concerned parties (Javits, CR: January 29, 1969). Yet, many Congressmen promoted sending military assets to Israel to insure its ability to respond to any aggression as the best solution: "I firmly believe that there is no contradiction in my own often expressed view that we leave Vietnam and, at the same time, provide Israel with the means to deter aggression and guarantee its own security" (CR: August 17, 1972). Thus, at a time when the U.S. was pulling away from one hot spot, some policy makers perceived that it must keep its eye on another as U.S. interests in the Middle East were considerable. In addition, asking the Soviet Union to intervene and take advantage of the influence they had on Iraq was also perceived as a possible policy response to Iraq's actions against Iraqi Jews. Senator Dodd perceived the Soviet Union as party to the actions of Iraq, and as such, the Soviets must take actions to insure Iraq ceases to murder any more Jews:

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In this situation, the Soviet Government, because of the very great influence it
has in Iraq, bears a heavy responsibility. . .The question which remains to be
answered is whether Moscow is willing to use the influence which has inevitably
accrued to it as a result of its massive military and economic aid, in the cause of
urging restraint on its Iraq protégés. (CR: January 31, 1969)

Policy makers perceived Iraq as being influenced by the Soviet Union, its mentor and "parent" state. As the Soviet Union had given Iraq both military and economic aid, it was perceived by U.S. policy makers that the Soviets had the ability to keep Iraqi leaders from taking further actions against Jews. Yet, not all Congressmen perceived the Soviet Union as having complete control over its dependent states, as Representative Hamilton suggested in 1971: "The Soviet Union continues to lack a high degree of political control over Arab countries with which she has extensive ties" (CR: September 29, 1971). Thus, while the Soviets influenced the Arab world due to its military and economic aid, the Soviet Union lacked the ability to keep its dependent states under the control of the Soviet leadership. Ultimately, U.S. policy makers believed it was the responsibility of the two "parent" states, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., to act to bring peace to the Middle East.

In response to increasing demands for oil in the U.S. and perceived instability in the oil producing Arab states, several oil-policy response alternatives were put forth. Most interesting was that of Representative Rarick (CR: July 21, 1972), who claimed that "bird-watcher" groups sought increased oil imports rather than drill for oil in undeveloped areas of the U.S. His first solution was to create the Alaskan oil pipeline. He also suggested that extending the oil trade with Arab states could be a possibility, but since the U.S. public perceived the oil producing Arab

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states as pro-Soviet, this did not carry much political clout. He also argued against oil-for-grain trading with the Soviets, as only big business would benefit and not farmers. His obvious preference was to drill for oil in the U.S. wherever oil existed. Senator Stevens suggested that searching for new oil opportunities was an act of "self-defense" as Arab states would act in their own self-interests. Stevens also perceived that the best response alternative was drilling for oil in Alaska's Prudhoe Bay and creating the means for delivering the oil to the rest of the U.S. (CR: September 8, 1972). Senator Hansen agreed, and stated that "the most enlightened course for our government would be to adopt policies that will enable the search for our domestic oil and gas reserves to go forward as rapidly as possible. This is the only near-term alternative to prolonged and perilous dependence on Arab oil" (CR: September 8, 1972). Representative McCormack also perceived a threatening situation in the possibility that oil producing Arab states may limit access to cheap oil, and called for the "people's" support for the research and development of new oil sources (CR: June 7, 1972). Thus the response alternative for possible oil restrictions on Arab oil was to find other sources of oil, especially those in the United States, decreasing U.S. dependence on Middle East oil.

Policy Preferences and the Arab-Israeli War, 1973 to 1974

The crisis event used to observe the actual policy preferences of the U.S. towards Iraq and the relevance of the policy preferences to the dependent of the enemy image was the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 between Israel, Syria, Egypt, and several other Arab states, including Iraq, and the resulting oil embargo/crisis. This crisis showed the responses considered by the U.S. in a situation when dependents of the Soviet Union were in direct conflict with a dependent/ally of the U.S. It was the Cold War at its most volatile moment, a time when the inclusion of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as direct combatants almost occurred. Thus, it is ideal in observing the policy

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preferences of the U.S. as its policy options were restrained by the extended deterrence of the Soviet Union over the Arab states.

In order to convince the reader that Iraq was a participant in the Yom Kippur War, not only factually but in the minds of policy makers, comments from the Congressional Record show the relevance of Iraq's placement in the Mideast crisis. Senator Robert Dole connects the attack on Israel with the acquisition of two U.S. oil companies by Iraq: "Just today, the papers carry word that Iraq has seized two U.S. oil companies in response to the latest outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the Arabs" (CR: October 8, 1973). Thus, while the major aggressors were Egypt and Syria, the "Arabs" included other Middle East states, including Iraq. Senator Mike Mansfield, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, also perceived Iraq as a member to the conflict which was far reaching throughout the region: "At the present time, it seems that it [the Middle East conflict] stretches from the Atlantic coast clear across the Magreb and the rest of Northern Africa, over into Syria, Jordan, Iraq, possibly Saudia [sic] Arabia, and the Lord or Allah only knows where it is going to end" (CR: October 16, 1973). Once a cease fire was agreed upon by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and accepted by both "sides," there was continued fighting, the instigation of which was blamed on the other "side." Representative Bertram Podell implied that the agreement to a cease fire must go beyond Israel, Egypt and Syria, and must include other Arab states, most prominently, Iraq: "In the north, Syria, showing her normal distrust for peace has not answered the proposals [for a new cease fire] and Iraq has flatly rejected them" (CR: October 25, 1973). In the mind of Podell, Iraq was a player in the ability of the Arab states to agree on a cease fire in the war. Furthermore, Representative Clarence Long cites the military capabilities of neighboring Arab states, including Iraq, as possible belligerents whose aircraft numbers far exceeded those of Israel. Finally, Representative Johnson voiced his concern over

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the escalation of events with the airlift of arms to Israel and the presence of U.S. ships in the Gulf and how they would affect the actions of the Arab states beyond Egypt and Syria: "These are not just acts of friendship toward Israel—they are also acts of war toward Egypt and Syria and the other Arab countries now involved in the war" (CR: October 17, 1972). Thus, it appeared that Iraq was perceived by U.S. policy makers as a member of the "Arab states" that were part of the conflict and an important actor in the ensuing peace.

In the record of the Yom Kippur War, Iraq also appeared as a major player. There were nine states on the Arab side of the Yom Kippur War, including Iraq. Even before the war began, Iraq assisted in the build-up of forces along Israel's border by supplying a squadron of Hunter jets to Egypt. During the war, Iraq sent 18,000 soldiers and several hundred tanks to the Golan Heights, which were subsequently part of the October 16 attacks on Israel's positions. In addition, Iraqi MiGs flew over the Golan Heights throughout the war, beginning October 8 (Bard, 2003). Thus, even though Egypt and Syria were the main players in the war, as they were the bordering states, Iraq supplied both arms and people in the actions taken against Israel. Thus, using the Yom Kippur War and the related oil embargo/crisis to investigate the policy preferences of U.S. policy makers towards Iraq is supported.

There were two main reasons for the Yom Kippur War. First, the Arab states sought to regain the land taken from them during the 1967 Six Day Wa,r and second, Israel continued to see the need to occupy the strategic areas of the Golan Heights and the West Bank, as the Arab States refused to recognize Israel's right to exist. U.N. Resolution 242 stated that this land should be returned to the Arab states in exchange for their acceptance of Israel's borders and statehood. Yet, neither side accepted the terms of the resolution. Israel refused to give back the territory, feeling that the Arab states did not have the capability of defeating Israel and so would

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not attack (Bard, 2003). Many of the Arabs were against re-affirming Israel as a legitimate state in the Middle East. Thus, the two sides were in conflict, and found opportunity in their relationships with the two superpowers.

The Yom Kippur War, also known as the October War, or the Ramadan War, began on October 6, 1973. It was instigated on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, thus its title. At first, the Arab forces did well against Israeli forces due to the imbalanced force size that pitted thousands of Arabs against a few hundred Israelis. The tide turned on October 10th, when Israel pushed Syrian forces back into Syria. On the Egyptian front, General Arial Sharon participated in a push through a hole in Egyptian forces that would later lead to the opportunity for the Israelis to surround the Egyptian forces and threaten to annihilate them. At this point, the Soviets began re-supplying Syria and Egypt in order to keep the Arab states strong. In response, the U.S. initiated its "operation Nickel Grass," a month long airlift that would supply Israel with 56 combat planes and 27,900 tons of arms and supplies, the largest airlift ever for both the U.S. and Israel ("Course"). The exact date of the beginning of the airlift varies in sources on the Yom Kippur War, with Nixon (1978) stating that the airlift began on Tuesday, October 16, the Palestine Facts page at October 14, and the North Park University Web Chronicle page stating it was October 12 and 13th. Regardless, it wasn't until October 19th that Nixon went before Congress and requested funding (2.2 billion dollars) for the airlift to support Israel. By October 16th ("Course") or October 17th (Nixon, 1978), the Arab states had voted to put in place an oil embargo against the U.S. and any state that supported the U.S. This affected the airlift as no European state, other than Portugal, allowed U.S. planes to land in its territory for refueling in the fear that they too would be included in the embargo ("Course").

By October 21st, the Israelis had the war well in hand and had encircled the Egyptian army after crossing the Suez Canal. The Soviets threatened to enter the war on the side of the Arabs. At this point, negotiations for a cease fire were actively sought between U.S. and Soviet diplomats, with an agreement reached on October 22nd for the implementation of U.N. Resolution 242 and further negotiations for peace in the Middle East (Nixon, 1978). Yet, either the Israelis or the Egyptians broke the cease fire and the altercation continued. Nixon and Brezhnev communicated directly with each other to come up with another cease fire on October 24th. Later, two phone calls came to Nixon from the Soviets, the most serious requesting that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. send troops to the Mideast to insure peace, and if the US did not respond, the Soviets would send in their own troops. Late that evening, U.S. bases around the world were put on alert. Nixon then responded to Brezhnev stating that joint coordinated action was infeasible and that unilateral action would be unacceptable as "such action would produce incalculable consequences which would be in the interest of neither of our countries and which would end all we have striven so hard to achieve" (940). Brezhnev backed down, saying he would send seventy "observers," to which Nixon responded stating that the observers should be named by the U.N. Secretary-General. Finally, the Soviets backed down completely, and while the Israelis continued to surround the Egyptian Army, peace negotiations occurred between the combatants and the two superpowers returned to their detente relationship. Disengagement between Israel and Egypt occurred on January 17, 1974. Both sides claimed they had won the war, yet the real losses were in the people killed. North Park University claims 8,500 Arabs and 6,000 Israelis were killed, while Palestine Facts state 2,700 Israelis, 3,500 Syrians and 15,000 Egyptians were killed. The war also caused economic problems for the three states, increased the dependency of Israel on the U.S. and of Arabs on the Soviets, while the oil embargo led to the 1974-1975

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recession in the U.S. (Bard, 2003). On a side note, several sources lament the time it took for the United Nations, especially the Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, to take diplomatic action towards peace, suggesting that while the Arabs were winning, the U.N. did not see the need for peace, yet, when the Israelis began to win, the U.N. took action (Bard, 2003). Indeed, some U.S. Congressional Members also voiced this observation in their statements for policy action throughout the Yom Kippur War.

The policy preferences of the policy makers centered on four options: diplomatic exchanges, calls to the "enemy" (Soviet Union) to influence the Arab states towards a peace process, moves to arm the U.S.'s own dependent (Israel), and domestic policy options. It was difficult to determine if covert actions were involved unless a search of archival documents was conducted. However, Nixon (1978) admits to calling for the airlifts without the knowledge of Congress or the people of the United States. Airlifts to Israel were already occurring when, on October 19th, Nixon requested 2.2 billion dollars for military aid to Israel. Thus, this could be seen as a covert action for a period of 3 days. There was also no hint of developing economic sanctions against the Arab states, even after the emplacement of the oil embargo. Finally, while President Nixon contemplated having to use U.S. forces in the Middle East if the Soviets acted on their threat to introduce Soviet soldiers into the conflict, the act of using U.S. forces against the Arab states was not actively considered due to the deterrent aspect of the Soviet nuclear capability. Indeed, the Soviets appeared to be deterred by the alert level increase of U.S. forces when Brezhnev threatened to send in Soviet troops.

The first policy option considered by most policy makers was the use of diplomatic channels to try and find a path towards peace. Kissinger and Nixon both took steps through diplomatic means to create peace in the Middle East. Nixon spoke on several occasions with

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Brezhnev, keeping the lines of communication open even when the Soviets threatened to enter into the war (Nixon, 1978). Kissinger made several trips to the Middle East and to Moscow in order to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis without sparking increased tensions. Furthermore, Members of Congress also called for diplomatic means towards the end of the conflict. Senator Jacob Javits (CR: October 8, 1973) commended the actions of Secretary of State Kissinger's diplomatic measures and called for a peace process that would first return all belligerents to their pre-war boundaries and then work towards a lasting Middle East Peace. Some Congressmen took a stronger stance. Senators Abraham Ribicoff and Richard Schweiker each felt that the United Nations should become involved by supporting Israel's position. To do otherwise would support the aggressive actions of the Arab states and imply that solving political conflict by military means was acceptable (CR: October 8, 1973). Most Congressmen suggested some kind of multi-lateral diplomatic action (Bella Absug, CR: October 18, 1973; William Keating, CR: October 16, 1973; William Scott, CR: October 18, 1973) that included the participants in the conflict under some kind of U.N. auspice (William Roth, CR: October 12, 1973; Robert Dole, CR: October 8, 1973). Ideally, U.S. policy makers desired that all parties accept U.N. Resolution 242, setting Israel's boundaries at the pre-1967 locations and having the Arab states accept Israel as a legitimate state (Walter Mondale, CR: October 11, 1973; J.W. Fulbright, CR: October 9, 1973). Yet, as mentioned by Representative Bertram Podell (CR: October 25, 1973), neither group agreed to the interpretation of the resolution. In addition, some U.S. policy makers suggested that the language used to bring the belligerents into the peace process must not be arrogant as it would only make the situation worse (William Keating, CR: October 16, 1973). Some Senators understood the role of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as that of "parent" states that had the responsibility of rectifying the situation and forcing the belligerent

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states into a cease fire (Angelo Roncallo, CR: October 16, 1973; Mike Mansfield, CR: October 16, 1973). Even though some policy makers saw the 1973 Arab-Israeli War as a failure in diplomacy, they also believed that actions towards finding an end to the conflict through diplomatic means must continue (William Cohen, CR: October 23, 1973; Bertram Podell, CR: October 16, 1973; Joseph Montoya, CR: October 9, 1973). Finally, in regard to the oil crisis, Nixon (1978) and Representative Wilmer Mizell (CR: October 13, 1973) both suggested that multi-national actions must be taken in order to keep oil flowing, including incentives for oil producing states and continued multi-national research and development.

One of the policy preferences of policy makers was the call to the "enemy" (Soviet Union) to intercede in the conflict. This shows that U.S. policy makers felt that the Soviets had some influence with the Arab states due to the Arab states' dependence upon the U.S.S.R. Representative Wilmer Mizell (CR: October 13, 1973) sought more than a limited cease fire and called for continued work towards peace in the Middle East. Furthermore, Representative Charles Vanik (CR: October 16, 1973) suggested that if detente was to work, then the Soviets must convince the Arab states to enter into negotiations. Other Congressmen called for the Soviet Union and United States to meet together to find a solution, and for the Soviets to stop supplying arms to the Arab states (Bertram Podell, CR: October 17, 1973; John Tunney, CR: October 11, 1973; Herman Talmadge, CR: October 11, 1973). If the situation in the Middle East did not come to a quick end through superpower influence, said Angelo Roncallo (CR: October 16, 1973), it could easily blow up into WWIII. Some policy makers felt that the Soviet Union caused the 1973 War in the first place, and that the Soviets must take action along with the U.S. to find a peaceful end to the conflict (William Roth, CR: October 12, 1973; James McClure, CR: October 18, 1973). Finally, Nixon (1978) and Kissinger took active steps to work

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with the Soviet Union to find a cease fire to the conflict. These two world leaders obviously felt that the Soviets could influence the positions of the Arab states and force them into reaching an agreement with Israel and stop the fighting.

Policy makers largely agreed that United States must arm its own dependent state, Israel. The reasoning behind sending arms to Israel varied, with most U.S. policy makers having stated that it was imperative for Israel to maintain its borders (George McGovern, CR: October 8, 1973; Walter Mondale, CR: October 11, 1973; Elizabeth Holtzman, CR: October 16, 1973). Much of the debate surrounded the perceived need to maintain a balance of power in the Middle East, and since the Soviet Union was supplying the Arabs, then the U.S. must supply Israel (Jacob Javits, CR: October 8, 1973; Mike Mansfield, CR: October 16, 1973; William Cohen, CR: October 23, 1973; William Keating, CR: October 16, 1973). Indeed, it was in the interests of U.S. national security that Israel be armed and able to repel any advances by the Arab states (Mike Mansfield, CR: October 16, 1973; Lester Wolff, CR: October 16, 1973). While almost all policy makers agreed on supplying arms to Israel, there was some discussion on who should pay for it: Israel or the people of the United States. In other words, should the arms delivered be on credit or through a grant (arms given without expecting payment in return). While Senator John Tunney (CR: October 11, 1973) and Representative Joseph Maraziti (CR: October 25, 1973) believed that credit should be the means of supplying arms to Israel, Representatives Robert Drinan (CR: October 23, 1973) and Bertram Podell (CR: October 25, 1973) both support a grant proposal for any further arms sent to Israel. Furthermore, several Congressional members saw movement by the Arab states to restrict oil exports to the U.S. as a form of blackmail to restrain U.S. aid to Israel. Under no circumstances did these policy makers believe that the U.S. should give in to the blackmail and cease the shipments of military supplies to Israel

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(Jennings Dorn, CR: October 24, 1973; Bertram Podell, CR: October 17, 1973; Mario Biaggi, CR: October 18, 1973; Bella Absug, CR: October 18, 1973). Jennings Dorn (CR: October 24, 1973) reflected that giving into blackmail was what led to Hitler's rise in Europe and to WWII.

On the other hand, there were three Congressmen who saw the arming of Israel as a mistake and an act that should not be proceed. Senator William Scott (CR: October 18, 1973) did not believe that the U.S. should act as the world's police force, and that arming Israel would set up the U.S. as such an entity. Senator Hugh Scott supported Israel, but sought "restraint" by the U.S. and not act to "broaden" the "passage of arms" (CR: October 9, 1973). Representative Paul Findly (CR: October 17, 1973) saw arming Israel as a hypocritical act, as the U.S. had already called for the Soviets not to rearm the Arab states. Findly also believed that the U.S. was to blame for the crisis situation, as the U.S. had vetoed a U.N. Resolution on the Middle East that could have settled down the Arab states, and that U.S. policy appeared to support Israel's occupation of the territory taken in 1967 and not U.N. Resolution 242. Findly considered that such actions by the United States may have led to Arab frustrations with the lack of international involvement and the Arab states' desires to regain the occupied territories.

The last policy preference of the policy makers centered on the emplacement of the oil embargo against the United States. Nixon (1978) actively cautioned against taking any frustration with the lack of oil in the U.S. out on the Arab states: "The temptation to lash out against the Arabs would have to be kept in check in order to capitalize on the tremendous success of our policy during the Yom Kippur War" (977). Instead of taking action against the Arab states in their attempts to influence U.S. policy making though the restriction of oil exports, policy makers called for domestic policy changes. Nixon (1978) promoted a "three stage conservation effort" that encouraged executive, state and local, and congressional action. He suggested seven

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policy preferences: lowered heating in federal buildings and a call for the same in private homes; a call for car pooling; a request to set state speed limits at 50 mph; a request to congress for the ability of the president to enact an emergency executive order that would "relax" environmental restrictions; a return to daylight savings time; a request for a nationwide speed limit of 50 mph on federal highways; and a proposal for "Project Independence" that would actively seek to gain U.S. energy independence by 1980. Only the change in speed limits and a return to daylight savings time were enacted before the Congressional Winter break, while action was taken on the Alaskan Pipeline Bill to create a means of delivery for oil produced by controversial drilling in the pristine lands in Alaska. While several Congressmen called for increased conservation efforts to deflect decreasing oil supplies (Lester Wolff, CR: October 16, 1973; Bertram Podell, CR: October 16, 1973; Jacob Javits, CR: October 8, 1973), other Congressmen called for increased production (Robert Dole, CR: October 8, 1973; Wilmer Mizell, CR: October 13, 1973). Part of the conservation effort was the call for gas rationing, which would limit how much gasoline citizens could purchase each week/month (Wayne Owens, CR: October 26, 1973; Roger Zion, CR: November 13, 1973). Representative Wilmer Mizell (CR: October 13, 1973) also suggested several other domestic policy options, including a reevaluation of U.S. military requirements, increasing stockpiles, the need for more facilities and ships, increased research and development, and the reduction of environmental restrictions on fuels previously banned (coal and high sulfur oil). Finally, Robert Price (CR: October 31, 1973) suggested a review of U.S. national security interests to reflect a response to those European states that had refused to help in the refueling of U.S. planes re-supplying Israel.

The policy preferences of the policy makers appeared to reflect an image of the dependent of the enemy for the Arab states, which included Iraq, when viewing the crisis situation of the

Yom Kippur War and the ensuing oil embargo. Policy makers sought diplomatic avenues to resolve the conflict and called for the inclusion of the "enemy" to step up to the plate and do its part to achieve a win (for diplomacy) in the Middle East. Indeed, several policy makers believed it was due to the actions and influences of the Soviet Union in the first place—through arms supplies and policy suggestions—that the conflict occurred. After the crisis occurred, it was the responsibility of the "parent" states of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to find a solution that both the Arab states and Israel would accept. In response to the Soviets re-supplying of their dependents, the U.S. re-supplied its dependent. There was some hesitancy on the part of U.S. policy makers to become directly involved in the conflict as it would have led to a direct altercation between the two superpowers. Instead, U.S. policy makers desired to leave the actual combat to the two dependent states, a prime example of Cold War politics. Both the U.S. and the Soviets appeared to be deterred from entering the war with troops by the possibility that any such action could end in a nuclear conflict. Finally, in response to the Arab states' oil embargo against the U.S., the United States did not countenance discussions on direct retributive actions against the Arab states, seeking domestic policies and international efforts for conservation and research and development only. The U.S., despite the national security interests in having enough oil to supply its huge military, did not consider taking direct action against the dependent states of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the image of the dependent of the enemy observed in the years prior to the Yom Kippur War that predicted responses to a conflict that would consider the extended deterrence of the enemy and the enemy's influence over the dependent's actions, held true in the ensuing crisis of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and ensuing oil embargo/crisis.

The Emerging Rogue State Image, 1989 to 1990

In this section, I show the changing image of Iraq as perceived by U.S. policy makers, from the dependent of the enemy image of earlier years to that of a rogue state who sought weapons of mass destruction in order to create a deterrent capability no longer satisfied by Soviet extended deterrence. The time period under analysis was from January 1989 to the end of July 1990, just prior to the first U.S. Gulf War. The image indicators viewed that reflect the changing perception of Iraq by U.S. policy makers were its military capability, especially in regards to Iraq's desire to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction, the culture level of Iraq, the intentions of the country and leadership on why WMD were obtained, how they would be used (event scripts), and response alternatives reflecting the perceived image. These image indicators show whether Iraq was perceived as a rogue state or if it fit into some other image category. It was also likely that some variance in the image perception of U.S. policy makers would occur at this time as the rogue state image was not yet fully developed and some individuals may still have perceived remnants of the dependent of the enemy image.

Many policy makers perceived an image of a state seeking weapons of mass destruction. Often, the perception focused on Saddam Hussein alone and his desire to increase his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability. One category of WMD discussed by U.S. policy makers, chemical weapons, also implied aspects of a state that had less economic strength and sought to obtain a capability equal to that of great powers without the financial output. CIA director William Webster echoed many policy makers in his reference to Iraq's seeking of chemical weapons as the "poor man's answer to nuclear weapons" (Senate Hearing, Feb. 9, 1989). This perception reinforced an image of a state that had less capability than the perceiver state but was still seeking to obtain the capability to deter others from attacking it. While chemical weapons

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could also have been used in an offensive act, and indeed were used by Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war, nuclear weapons were a capability associated with deterrence and, as such, suggested a deadliness that an opposing force would not want to test. Webster and other policy makers also perceived the stockpiling of chemicals used in making chemical weapons, supporting the claim that Iraq sought to create an arsenal of these weapons.

Senator Robert Dole agreed that the development of Iraq's chemical weapons may create deterrence at a "bargain basement" level, or create "bargain basement blackmail" (CR: May 17, 1990). Policy makers who believed that Iraq had chemical weapons perceived that the weapons might be used in a manner different from the nuclear weapons employed by the superpowers. Instead of seeking only to keep other states from attacking it, U.S. policy makers perceived an Iraq capable of using its WMD to threaten the great powers and others and making them to bend to Iraq's will, or it will unleash its power. Insight into the perceived mentality behind the use of chemical weapons in Iraq emerged from additional comments by Webster and other policy makers. Webster suggested that chemical weapons were being developed in secret as the Iraqis made their chemical weapons production sites look like regular industrial buildings. This secrecy was likely the result of not wanting to incur a preemptive strike from another state, or because the Iraqis were sneaky and didn't want to show their hand (democratic states are more open and so are less likely to partake in misperceptions). Furthermore, since Hussein had used chemical weapons in the past, policy makers believed that he would have no problem using them in the future. It was this deterrence situation that kept states like Israel from taking preemptive action against Iraq, like Israel did in Osirik in 1980, and destroying Iraq's WMD capability early on.

Of even greater concern to many policy makers was the possibility that Saddam Hussein also sought nuclear weapons. Senator John McCain relayed how Iraq's desire to obtain nuclear weapons spanned a decade, and, as Iraq was a "terrorist" state, it must be dealt with harshly. On the other hand, President Bush did not want to say positively or negatively that there was any real substance to the belief that Iraq was building nuclear weapons in the spring of 1989. Yet, Bush also stated that he wouldn't "give credence *to the fact* that Iraq is in the process of building nuclear weapons. I cannot confirm that" (Address to Regional Reporters, March 31, 1989) (italics added). It could have been a misuse of the above italicized statement, or an acknowledgement that indeed Iraq was in the process of developing nuclear weapons, but because of diplomatic necessity, and a perceived opportunity in Iraq, Bush was unable confirm this development officially. Closer to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, many policy makers voiced their objection to the "triggers" that were found in Britain, soon to have been sent on to Iraq. While Iraq denied that the triggers were to be used in nuclear weapons, policy makers perceived this as an immediate threat and denounced Iraq for attempting to import the technology.

However, not all policy makers saw Saddam Hussein and Iraq as a belligerent in the Middle East. Many policy makers, mostly Republicans, also believed Hussein could be the cause for peace in the region. Senator Specter stated that if Hussein were "properly motivated," he could be a unifying force in the Middle East and play a "constructive role" in the peace process (CR: March 6, 1990). Policy makers delicately discussed Hussein's merits and his charismatic aura, and that policies toward Iraq that enhanced rather than deterred closer relationships between Iraq and the U.S. should be followed. Saddam Hussein could have been a "spokesman for peace" in the Middle East if provided the opportunity through U.S. economic and political

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policies (Senator Metzenbaum, CR: May 17, 1990). These statements came only two to four months prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the U.S.'s response. However, in terms of the number of positive versus negative remarks made about Saddam Hussein and Iraq during the time of this analysis, by far the majority of statements reflect the perceived threat of Iraq, its likelihood of seeking WMD, and the likelihood that it would use them in the future.

The dependent of the enemy image often became apparent through the acquisition of weapons from the Soviet Union. During the 1989-1990 time period of this analysis, there was some mention of past and present reliance on the Soviets and other states in order for Iraq to build up its arsenal. For those believing that Saddam Hussein could play a pivotal role in the Middle East peace process, the perceived lack of ability of the Soviets to continue to supply its dependent states with weapons and other goodies was forcing these dependent states to look elsewhere, i.e., to the U.S (Senator Spector, CR: March 6, 1990). Instead of Soviet assistance, policy makers perceived that the U.S. could now fill that role for Iraq and become a powerful force determining the direction Iraq would take militarily, economically, and politically in the future. Others, such as CIA director Webster, believed that, while Iraq was dependent in the past on the Soviets, and had obtained the precursors to chemical weapons through other foreign states, that was no longer the case. Iraq now had the capability to develop its own WMD and could use them with a variety of delivery methods (Senate Hearing on Chemical and Biological Weapons, February 9, 1989). Thus, there was definitely a change occurring in the perception of Iraq, from a state once dependent on the Soviets to a state either open to U.S. influence through trade and association or to a state that was a threat to the U.S. and should be watched carefully in the years to come.

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Another aspect of the rogue state image is a culture that does not support the same values as those of "our" country, does not value human life to the same degree as the "civilized" world, and will take actions that go against international standards. Many policy makers tended to see Iraq in this negative view. Iraqis didn't understand "our" "outrage" and "horror" at the use of chemical weapons, that a "moral barrier" had been passed as numerous states, including Iraq, sought biological weapons (CIA Director Webster, quoted in an article by Ali, February 10, 1989).[21] Congressmen saw Iraq as a "terrorist" state with "ruthless and unprincipled" leaders and advisors (Senator McCain, CR: May 17, 1990), the "darkest place in hell" (Senator Glickman, CR: July 26, 1990), a "gangster state" (Senator Heinz, CR: May 2, 1989) and more. The overwhelming majority of policy makers who voiced their opinions on Iraq saw the state as taking inhuman action in the Iran/Iraq war and against Kurdish insurgents by using chemical weapons against them. If one were to realistically analyze the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, their use could have been the consequence of a cost/benefit analysis supporting their use at that time. Due to little international disapproval at the time, the use of chemical weapons could have been considered acceptable when used against insurgents threatening the security of the government in the Kurdish event. It seems hypocritical for the only country to have used nuclear weapons against another state to claim abhorrence when a state less powerful than itself used a limited WMD. Yet, not all policy makers believed that Iraq would be compelled to continue down its path of international disfavor. President Bush continually danced around condemning Iraq for its radical statements and apparent desire to seek nuclear weapons.

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[21] With this analysis, the U.S., who stockpiles and develops chemical and biological agents for weapons, threatens every individual in the world with death through its grotesque supply of nuclear weapons, and continues to develop tactical nuclear weapons for use in theatre-based warfare, disregards the innate human right of every individual on the planet to live free of fear.

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After Hussein had made a statement setting forth the policy that an attack by Israel on any of its assets would, in turn, provoke the annihilation of Israel by Iraq, Bush simply said that Saddam Hussein had made a "bad" statement and that he "would strongly urge Iraq to reject the use of chemical weapons" (*The Boston Globe*: April 4, 1990). Yet, even those who believed change could occur within Iraq based their optimism regarding this change on a willingness by Hussein to be truthful and compliant to international restrictions (Senator Dole, CR: April 20, 1990; Senator Specter, CR: March 6, 1990). The outcome was that most policy makers saw Iraq as a state with cultural values different than, and inferior to, those of the U.S.

The perceived intentions of Iraq by U.S. policy makers also supported the developing rogue state image of Iraq. For many policy makers, there was a direct link between Iraq and terrorism. If Iraq obtains WMD, then it would have given the weapons or technology to terrorists to use on western countries around the world (Senator Pell, CR: May 16, 1990). The real direction of Iraq was based on the needs of Saddam Hussein and his desire to be the "messianic" leader of the Middle East (Senator McCain, CR: April 2, 1990). Furthermore, Iraq sought the destruction of Israel, the U.S.'s friend in the Middle East, and would annihilate Israel and all of its people at the drop of a hat (Senator Pell, CR: April 2, 1990). Thus, the intent of Iraq was the destruction of other states in order to promote the power of its own state, and to also supply terrorists with WMD. This perception of the intentions of Iraq fits well with the developing image of the rogue state.

An interesting aspect of the rogue state image is the view that much of the problems associated with the state and its inability to relate to the international community or abide by social norms reflect the leadership and not necessarily the people themselves. In support of this view, many policy makers perceived the capability, culture, and intentions of Iraq as those of its

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leader, Saddam Hussein. Hussein was "ruthless and unprincipled," (Senator McCain, CR: May 17, 1990) used chemical weapons as blackmail to bully others (Senator Lautenberg, CR: July 31, 1990), had a "malignant attitude" and "squandered" his chance for good relations with the U.S. (Senator Metzenbaum, CR: June 12, 1990). Saddam Hussein wanted to be the leader of the Middle East and further a path of deadly destruction, including the end of Israel (Senator D'Amato, CR: April 20, 1990 and May 17, 1990; Senator Reid, CR: July 18, 1990). He was "the Butcher of Baghdad," the "Mad dog of the Middle East," a "murderer," and a "radical," (Representative Kasich, CR: June 6, 1990; Senator D'Amato, CR: April 20, 1990; Senator Lieberman, CR: March 30, 1990; Representative Henry Hyde, CR: March 23, 1989). It was likely that Saddam Hussein would actualize the "madman" scenario, according to which a radical leader thinks irrationally and launches WMD in a first strike action (Vice President Dan Quayle, May 1, 1990). Thus, if Hussein was removed from power, then Iraq would open itself to political and economic reform, making it no longer a threat but an opportunity for U.S. involvement. Yet, some policy makers saw a different Saddam Hussein in the months prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. After a meeting with Saddam Hussein in January, 1990, several Senators relayed their impression of an "imposing figure who exudes strength and confidence," that could advance the cause for peace in the Middle East, who was "cordial and candid," and who, while focusing on peace with Iran, could look to finding a solution to peace with Israel in the future (unknown Senator, CR: February 27, 1990; Senator Dole, on CBS This Morning, April 13, 1990; Senator Spector, CR: March 6, 1990). However, while a select few Senators believed there was an opportunity for closer relations with Saddam Hussein, the vast majority of policy makers perceived Hussein as an evil and dangerous leader of an influential state in the Middle East.

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There were a variety of response alternatives that came with the developing perception of Iraq as a rogue state. Some policy makers saw the problems with Iraq and its WMD as having developed out of past U.S. policies that failed to come down hard enough on Iraq when chemical weapons were used in the late 1980s. The Reagan's administration's (via the State Department) opposition to sanctions at that time sent a message to Iraq that chemical weapons were okay to use. The solution, as Senator Pell suggested, was to penalize harshly and sanction any state that used chemical weapons (CR: May 16, 1990). Others believed a containment policy towards Iraq, enforced by the U.S., the Arab states, and Israel, was the best solution (Senator Reid, CR: July 18, 1990). While some policy makers believed that laws should have been changed to limit business transactions based on Iraq's desire to obtain WMD (Senator Lieberman, CR: March 30, 1990; Senator Helms, CR: January 25, 1989; Representative Schumer, CR: April 3, 1990); those policy makers who perceived an opportunity in trading with Iraq believed that any sanctions against granting credits to the Arab state would only hurt U.S. businesses (Senator Inouye, CR: May 15, 1990). Interestingly, some policy makers took this opportunity to push for Bush's strategic defense initiative (SDI) program, Brilliant Pebbles, as a means for stopping incoming missiles (Senator Wilson, CR: July 27, 1989; Senator Bond, CR: August 1, 1989; Representative Kyle, CR: June 27, 1990). While many policy makers called for some kind of action before a crisis situation occurred in the Middle East, the vast majority of them only pointed out the problem and failed to put forward any solution. Yet, from the response alternatives suggested, there was a growing view of Iraq as a rogue state, but with a few dissenters whose views on trade suggested a dependent relationship on the U.S. instead.

Thus, from the above analysis, a growing perception by U.S. policy makers of Iraq as a rogue state was emerging. While the term "rogue state" had yet to appear in the vocabulary of

policy makers, the perception of the state fit well with the theoretical view of the rogue image. Iraq sought WMD, would use them without hesitation and with impunity against another state, it was an outlaw state with morals and values inferior to those of the U.S., and had expansive and destructive intentions in the Middle East. Response alternatives ranged from economic sanctions on those who traded WMD supplies to Iraq, to sanctions on Iraq itself, to the development of a strategic defense initiative that really wouldn't apply to regional conflicts. On the other hand, there was the perception by other policy makers that Iraq maintained a dependent position, maybe no longer dependent on the Soviets, but increasingly open to the influence of the U.S. through trade. If the correct actions were taken, then Hussein, who was an intelligent and pragmatic leader, would see the opportunity in becoming indebted to the U.S. and allow its influence through economic, political, and military assistance. Therefore, the image that emerged in the minds of the policy makers at this time was mixed, but heavily leaning towards that of a rogue state, supporting the hypothesis that such an image existed at this crucial time. The key question now was whether the actual policy options that arose during a crisis situation supported the image.

Policy Preferences of the First U.S. Gulf War, 1990 to 1991

On August 2, 1990,[22] Iraq invaded Kuwait. The overwhelming response of the international community was to force Iraq (really, Saddam Hussein) out of Kuwait through diplomacy, economic sanctions, and, if necessary, the use of force. The United States structured and supported UN resolutions, putting in place economic sanctions and embargos against Iraq and Kuwait (in order to guard against Iraq taking advantage of Kuwaiti assets abroad). The

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[22] By some accounts, the invasion began on August 1, 1990; or even as early as July 31, 1990.

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initial U.S. decision to support UN sanctions developed out of the White House as Congress enjoyed a mid-term break at this time. Secretary of Defense Cheney apparently considered the absence of Congress for the decision of early troop dispersal to the Gulf a benefit, as the White House could therefore act in undertaking "what had to be done, rather than explaining it" (Senator Kennedy, CR: Oct. 10, 1990). While Saddam Hussein called the intervention in Kuwait an act to support nationalist factions that sought to "shake off" the imperialistic presence of the west, the international community perceived it as a grab for power by the Iraqi state through the acquisition of land and oil. Throughout the next few months, the safety and security not only of the Kuwaiti people but also of international citizens who worked in Kuwait and taken as "hostages," specifically those from the U.S were of concern to Congressional leaders and the White House.

Interestingly, in light of the September 11, 2001 tragedy, President Bush made a historic speech on September 11, 1990, in which he discussed the evolution of a "New World Order" with the United States as the leader in a new era of influence in the Middle East, a region where the U.S. would never be defeated nor discouraged from taking action. Supporting this view, the United States led an international coalition in an embargo, supporting economic sanctions against Iraq and the buildup of forces in the Gulf in order to coerce Iraq into leaving Kuwait and releasing the hostages. The need for insuring the security of the Gulf from weapons of mass destruction also developed as an interest of U.S. policy makers. Over the next few weeks the U.S. gave an ultimatum to Iraq to leave Kuwait by January 16, 1991, or risk an escalation of events. While several diplomatic exchanges evolved between Iraq and various countries and the hostages gained their release, the U.S. observed no improvement of intent by Iraqi leaders.

On January 16, 1991, the international coalition, led by the U.S., began an air bombardment of Iraqi and Kuwaiti locations to soften military, economic, and structural capability. Six weeks later, a ground assault began in order to solidify the success of the coalition's endeavor to force Iraq out of Kuwait. By the end of March, the war was over, and the long road of sanctions against Iraq to force WMD compliance began.

The policies supported by the President, his advisors, and Congress from August, 1990 to January, 1991, provided support for a shift from the dependent of the enemy image of Iraq to that of a rogue state in the minds of policy makers. Yet, the policy preferences of the decision makers hinted of a lingering acknowledgement of past Soviet influence in the area and supported a transitional aspect of the dependent of the enemy policy preference code. For instance, Bush sought U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the Middle East, even as the Soviet Union was in its last days of power. On August 2, 1990, Bush relayed that the Secretary of State, James Baker, "has been in close touch with the Soviet leadership and indeed, the last plan was for him to stop in Moscow on his way back here" (Press Conference of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President George Bush). In the same news conference there was a discussion on the successful cooperative efforts in conjunction with the Soviets and that Moscow had already acted to stop arms shipments to Iraq. In addition, Baker, in a joint interview with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, provided a reference to the Cold War era and the burgeoning change in the U.S.-Soviet relationship regarding the Middle East conflict. Instead of being on opposite sides as in past crisis situations, Baker saw the U.S. and the Soviet Union standing on the same side, albeit a difficult decision by the Soviets in having taken such a strong stand against its one-time dependent. Yet, the cooperation between the two powers provided influence and support for the developing resolutions in the United Nations (Joint Statement and Press Conference by Secretary

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of State James A. Baker, III and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Aug. 3, 1990). Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney also supported a new, post Cold War, U.S.-Soviet relationship that provided the opportunity for the UN to act as it should have the last 40 years, now that the Soviets were supporting the UN Security Council ("Fox Morning News" Interview with Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, September 4, 1990). Yet, the Soviet participation failed to develop into more than a peripheral influence, more an aspect of what the Soviets weren't doing rather than what they were. Even later attempts to involve itself diplomatically by suggesting a face-saving way out for Saddam Hussein prior to the air war failed to garner support from the U.S. Instead, the U.S. touted its new role as the leader in a New World Order of international cooperation and UN support and effectively silenced any Soviet effort.

Yet, most of the policy preferences in response to the crisis situation suggested by policy makers fell into the *Retributive Actions* section supporting the rogue state image. At the onset of the crisis in August 1990, Bush and his advisors supported economic sanctions, an embargo to enforce the sanctions in the Gulf, and military deployment to deter Iraq from further action in the Gulf, specifically towards Saudi Arabia, and to hopefully coerce Saddam Hussein into withdrawing his troops from Kuwait. Furthermore, Bush and his advisors called for multi-lateral support for economic and military actions, or coalition building, with the United Nations as an integral player in obtaining legitimization. Bush was firm in that any use of force was to be defensive in nature only, that the deployment of forces was not an act of war and not in preparation for a long ground war (Press Conference with President Bush, August 8, 1990). Bush stated that he believed economic sanctions could work, with the support of the UN and participant countries (ibid). Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor, supported sanctions, but also specified that the continued degradation of the situation in Kuwait would

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affect any time table (Special White House Briefing by Brent Scowcroft, September 28, 1990). The Bush administration focused on four goals: forcing Iraq out of Kuwait, restoring the legitimate government in Kuwait, the security and stability of the Middle East, and the protection of Americans abroad. On September 11, 1990, a fifth objective was added: a New World Order with the U.S. as the leader in support of peace and justice, whereby the Rule of Law replaces the Rule of the Jungle, and according to which the U.S. would not be intimidated in its actions (Text of Remarks by President Bush to the Joint Session of Congress, September 11, 1990). The Gulf crisis provided a test of a new post-cold war era whereby international events could be addressed multi-laterally with a strong UN presence (Secretary of State Baker at the Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, September 4, 1990). Yet, Bush considered diplomatic measures toward Iraq hopeless, that the U.S. would refuse any form of compromise or negotiation, and that talks could proceed, but not to expect any flexibility in the coalition's response (Remarks of President George Bush and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, August 27, 1990).

November 1, 1990, Bush directly addressed WMD and stated that if the security of the region was important, then WMD development and proliferation in Iraq must be addressed (Press Conference with President Bush, November 1, 1990). Starting the second week of November, with a large increase in the number of troops sent to the Gulf and a change in troop rotation that eliminated the return of troops to bases outside the Gulf, Bush and his advisors began an effort that demonstrated how economic sanctions would take many months, maybe years, and could provide an opportunity for Saddam Hussein to improve his position. William Webster supported this position in his report to Congress, stating that while sanctions would hurt the lower levels of Iraqi society, it was unlikely to affect the nation's "relatively simple Soviet-style" military capability of Iraq or Saddam Hussein himself, and continued sanctions would not likely dissuade

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Hussein's actions nor spark civil dissent (Text of Letter From CIA Director William Webster to Representative Les Aspin, January 10, 1991). Ultimately, the Bush administration listed its reasons for the use of force against Iraq, and an air war commenced on January 16, 1991.

Similar to the Administration's policy preferences, the Congress also tended to support retributive actions. Even though Congress was in break during the onset of the crisis, interesting discussions occurred. Most Congressional members supported economic sanctions against Iraq and the deployment of troops, and believed that a UN supported, multi-nation effort was the best means for a crisis solution; however, some variance in the degree of support for Bush administration policies existed. On the Republican side, Senator John McCain supported Bush's actions, that this was a national security crisis, a "mission" based on oil needs, and even believed an air war acceptable, but that under no means should there be a ground war and that financial support should come from other countries, especially those whose oil needs made the Middle East an important strategic value (Larry King Live, August 27, 1990; Fox Morning News, September 12, 1990). Senator Kasten went a step further and suggested bringing in NATO into the war in order to defend Turkey (Press Conference with Senator Robert W. Kasten, Jr., August 9, 1990). Republicans also tended to support the use of force as a possible action, with some debate over the constitutional rights of the Congress versus those of the President.[23] Ultimately, Republicans sought to achieve a united front in Congress that would translate the United States' determination to Iraq of Iraq's ouster from Kuwait.

While many Democrats supported sanctions, the economic embargo, and UN/multi-nation involvement, there were some misgivings about the President's policies. From the start,

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[23] I.e., as this was not a war of the U.S. versus Iraq, but a UN sanctioned war, there was no need to invoke the War Powers Act as the ratification of the UN Charter by Congress already provided consent, or that the President didn't need to get consent from Congress as the War Powers Act was unconstitutional.

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many Democrats did not want an escalation of events to the use of force, but rather, wanted to allow enough time for sanctions and the embargo to work (Alan Dixon: CR, August 3, 1990; Lee Hamilton, Press Conference, August 9, 1990; Edward Kennedy, Press Conference, November 30, 1990) When Bush signaled to the world that he was ready to take military action in January, 1991,[24] the debate over whether Congress would support the use of force became more heated. Many Democrats voiced a strong position against military action (Senator Charles Robb, Press Conference, December 20, 1990; Peter DeFazio, CR, January 9, 1991; Senator Paul Simon, United States Senate Debate, January 10, 1991;), while some recognized that force might be necessary in the future after sanctions had been allowed to work (Representative Stephen Solarez, American Interests Program #1010, December 1, 1990, Senator Paul Simon, Press Conference, December 20, 1990), with others in support of a quick and decisive war. Again, much of the debate revolved around Constitutional matters—whether the President had the right and responsibility to start a war without Congressional support,—concern over the number of casualties that would come from U.S. forces versus the forces of other involved states, and who was going to pay the monetary costs of the war.[25] Some Democrats even believed that an end to the crisis could be achieved though diplomatic means if the Bush administration exercised more flexibility and provided a way out for Saddam Hussein (Representative Marcy Kaptur, Congressional Record, October 10, 1990).

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[24] These signals appeared through the covert act of deploying more troops and ending rotations out of the Gulf and in his rhetoric that became increasingly supportive of military action beginning in the latter half of November, 1990.
[25] The payment for the war considered whether the U.S. should seek monetary support by other states (Les Aspin, Press Conference, November 15, 1990) or pay for its own war-making, forcing the U.S. population to consider the real terms of war and not just accept the use of its military abroad (Bob Kerry, Meet the Press, August 26, 1990).

In regard to domestic policies, several Congressional leaders voiced their concern over the increased dependency of the U.S. on imported oil, especially oil from the Middle East.[26] Policy makers suggested various means for reducing this dependence, from oil restrictions, new research and development in oil reserves, to the development of new technologies for fuel.[27]

As the previous section on the developing rogue state image suggested, there was a mixed response to the crisis situation in the Middle East regarding Iraq. Interestingly, the mixed response did not reflect the image some Republican's had of Iraq that observed an opportunity in the relationship with Iraq before the war. As Republican policy makers appeared to support closer ties to Iraq prior to the crisis, policy preferences that supported finding diplomatic and economically beneficial solutions may have been expected. The exact opposite occurred, however. While Democrats tended to hold policy preferences that supported their previous views of an emerging rogue state, Republicans responded with retribution and intensely hostile actions, not always alluded to prior to the crisis. At a minimum, rehabilitative policy preference for the rogue state for some Republican policy makers might have been predicted, but not one Republican seriously considered diplomatic measures (ones that would provide flexibility and compromise), a reduction of sanctions (in an effort to promote better behavior), or economic assistance. Republicans tended to set forth policy preferences that supported a prototypical rogue state image, calling for a severe spanking for Iraq having gone against the parent's (in this case, the U.S.'s) wishes.

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[26] Not a new concern, as shown in the previous crisis (1973) when there was to be an active attempt to decrease the U.S.'s dependence on imported oil by 1980. Yet, by 1990, the dependency on Middle Eastern oil appears to have increased, making the area an even greater concern for U.S. security interests.

[27] On a personal note, just as the crisis in the Middle East in 1973 led to the development of the Alaskan oil pipeline, the crisis in 1990-1991 led to the development of off-shore drilling along the California coast, a significant change to the visual beauty of my new home-town, Huntington Beach, from when I left California 15 years ago. The question now is whether the new crisis today (2003-2004) will lead to the drilling of oil in the Alaskan wilderness, despite the awareness that said oil will not provide a real solution to the end of our oil reserves in the next 25 to 50 years.

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In response to critics, charges about the apparent change of face regarding Iraq and that that the Bush administration apparently had been caught unawares with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Bush responded that his administration tried to create good relations with Iraq, but that the administration had been "very, very wary all along of his – of his intentions" (Press Conference with President Bush, August 8, 1990). Consequently, when Iraq acted upon another state with uncalled for aggression, the U.S. could no longer act towards better relations and was forced to take action. Democrats, like Representative Peter DeFazio, believed that the overly speedy desire by Republicans to go to war signaled a cover-up mentality for past policies that supported Iraq and provided benefits to that country's leadership (Representative Peter DeFazio, Congressional Record, January 9, 1991). Both sides probably had some insight into the strong Republican reaction, but a consideration of what exactly the rogue state image implies suggests that the Republican response was exactly in-line with the rogue state image. Consider, for example, that the rogue state is the "naughty child" that needs to be forced back into line through corporal punishment. Prior to being naughty, Iraq was being nurtured along by the Republican administration to be an ally and asset for U.S. policy makers in the Middle East. Iraq was a "good" child, although potentially dangerous and disruptive, and should act with respect and appreciation towards the parent by behaving in a way that would not cause the parent embarrassment. Yet, Iraq did act against the international "norm" and caused U.S. policy makers who had supported Iraq embarrassment. There was no attempt to explain the behavior away as a unique and isolated event that could have been fixed through rehabilitative measures. This suggested that there was a lingering thought in the "parent's" mind that such negative behavior could occur, but that the parent was such a good parent that they could keep the bad behavior from happening. In response, the now angry parent lashed out at the child not only to change its

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behavior to fit with the international norm, but also because the parent was made to look bad in front of others and so must prove that it is a good parent by seeking harsh punishment towards the child. Thus, the response of the Bush administration exactly follows the movement of an image of dependent state (as Iraq had moved from being a dependent on the Soviet Union to seeking dependent status on U.S. beneficiary) to that of a rogue state. While other theories have failed to support this change in policy behavior by the Bush administration and Republican policy makers, image theory does. The radical change was not due to a conspiracy by the Bush administration to pull Saddam Hussein out and then slap at him simply to provide the opportunity to insert troops into the Middle East. Rather, it was the response of an embarrassed administration that violently took action against a state that had failed to live up to its imagined role in the hierarchical relationship between the two states.

On the Democratic side, along with those Republicans who had originally provided data supporting a rogue state image, policy makers voiced policy preferences that supported their already held view of an Iraqi rogue state. Policy preferences fell into the retribution category of a prototypical rogue state with only a very few considerations of rehabilitative measures that centered on diplomatic efforts and compromise. Policy preferences included sanctions, embargos, the use of force and coalition building. Thus, the predicted image of an emerging rogue state was supported in the analysis of the data. Indeed, for some policy makers, the exact moment of the emergence of the rogue state image was observed.

Developing the Prototypical Rogue State Image, 1997 to 1998

By the end of the 1990s, Iraq was observed as the "bad child" in the international community. Although the Clinton administration undertook efforts to eliminate the term "rogue state" from its diplomatic vocabulary (though the term was not non-existent), the conceptual

image was still prevalent in policy makers' minds and ultimately affected policy making decisions. The difficulty in the analysis for this section was that after the end of combat in March 1991, an ongoing sense of crisis emerged in the Gulf as the U.S. sought Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions and Iraq continued to dance around the fulfillment of agreed upon requirements for ending the war. At times, Iraq appeared to comply with requests to allow UNSCOM[28] weapons inspectors to enter facilities and visit locations, but events also supported a regime intent on hiding WMD capabilities. On the U.S. side, policy makers observed Iraqi non-compliance, which necessitated continued sanctions and increased threats towards the use force against questionable locations. On the Iraqi side, enough was enough, and unless the UN, led by the U.S., was able to show a schedule that offered some kind of finality in the search/sanction actions, Iraq was no longer going to comply. Some international community members, led by Russia, France and China, sought a middle ground, and asked for the lessening of sanctions—as these measures only hurt the poorer civilians—while they sought actions that would promote compliance on the part of the head of Iraq. Thus, in an attempt to observe the image perceived by U.S. policy makers that prevailed from 1997 to 1998, we enter into a continued conflict situation, one that topped the list of important security concerns for the United States at this time.

The offensive capability of Iraq centered on its WMD and the possibility that these weapons could either be used by Iraq against its neighbors if attained or given by it to terrorist groups to use against western states, specifically the U.S. Berger (December 13, 1998) lamented the point that Iraq still had the capability to produce and deliver WMD and sought to keep that capability. Furthermore, policy makers agreed that since Hussein had used such weapons in the

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[28] This was an acronym for the United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM) for searching out and destroying weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

past, he was likely to use them again in the future (Albright, February 11, 1997; Clinton, January 17, 1998; Berger, December 13, 1998; Ashcroft, September 2, 1998). Such a possibility could not be allowed to happen, from the policy makers' perspectives. CIA director George Tenant pointed out Hussein's continued efforts to hide WMD capabilities (January 28, 1998), while Congressmen agreed that Hussein continued to use obfuscation to counter UNSCOM actions that sought to locate and destroy WMD capability (Kyl, CR: April 27, 1997; McCain, CR: November 5, 1997; Gephardt, CR: February 12, 1998; Grams, CR: February 27, 1998). Even while inspections and sanctions were in place, Saddam Hussein still attempted to obtain technology that could have been used in weapons production (Torricelli, CR: November 13, 1997). If Saddam Hussein was not stopped during this action of weapons inspection and was allowed to rebuild his WMD arsenal, he would have the capability to threaten not only regional neighbors but the international community as well (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997). Thus, Iraq's capability centered on WMD and the likelihood of their use if obtained, placing Iraq squarely in the rogue state image category.

Cultural sophistication is a second category that elucidates whether the image held by policy makers of a state is that of a rogue or other category. Throughout policy makers' commentaries on Iraq, U.S. policy makers spoke of the "inhumane" and "uncivilized" actions of Hussein, his army, and Iraqi officials. As observed in 1988 to 1991, policy makers commented on the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and against Kurds in Northern Iraq (Gilman, CR: January 8, 1997; Berger, CR: February 13, 1998; Clinton, February 17, 1998; Albright, November 28, 1998). Such actions against his "own people" signified the base level of animality existent in Iraqi leaders. In addition, policy makers perceived Iraqi leaders as quite willing to use religion as a means of furthering their own goals as Iraqis stated that any action against an Arab

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state during religious observances was anti-Muslim (Clinton, April 22, 1997). Clinton observed that Hussein enforced policies domestically that "repressed" the population while he supported "aggressive" policies internationally that threatened regional neighbors (October 31, 1998). Hussein supported terrorism and would provide terrorists the capability to go "from airport to airport wreaking havoc in the world of the 21st century that our children will live in" (Clinton, November 13, 1997). Some labels given to Iraq during this time included "rogue" (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997; Weldon, CR: November 22, 1997), "pariah" (McCollum, CR: June 10, 1997) and "outlaw" (Berger, CR: February 13, 1998), the leadership were the "true terrorists" that were part of a "murderous, ruthless dictatorial regime" (Gilman, CR: November 13, 1997) that pursued "lawless policies" (Albright, February 11, 1997). The leadership in Iraq partook in "gross violations of human rights" that called for the leaders' prosecution for instigating international criminal acts (Gilman, CR: November 13, 1997), and had "pursued a policy of deception, lies, concealment, harassment, and intimidation in a deliberate effort to hamper the work of the inspectors" (Lantos, CR: January 12, 1997). Hussein knew "little about the Western World" and could not comprehend the United States (Torricelli, CR: November 13, 1997). Not only did Hussein fail to care about his own citizens and the anguish they were going through because of his non-compliance with UNSCOM efforts (Albright, February 11, 1997), but he also had no consideration for the environment (Spector, CR: March 12, 1998). U.S. policy makers perceived Hussein's mandatory compliance with international requests for Iraq to submit to weapons searches as a result of his own actions (Albright, November 14, 1997; Cohen, November 24, 1997). Thus, Iraq was conceptualized as a state that was less than civilized, took inhumane actions, and was forced to submit to international norms and requirements. In other words, it must "grow up" or be severely punished.

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Saddam Hussein crystallized as the focal point for all that was wrong in Iraq, a prominent aspect of the rogue state image. As in previous years, Hussein was a "dictator as evil as Hitler" whose "reign of terror [was] unmatched in the post-cold war era. . . a brutal dictator, a tyrant" (Ashcroft, February 27, 1998). His legacy was a "murderous, ruthless dictatorial regime" that oppressed domestically and threatened regionally (Gilman, CR: November 13, 1997). He was "despotic and cruel" (Gilman, CR: August 1, 1997), violated human rights (Gilman, CR: August 1, 1997; Hastings, CR: November 13, 1997), an "outlaw" (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997), and a danger to the community (Berger, February 13, 1998). Saddam Hussein was a "chronic problem" that just would not go away (Berger, February 13, 1998). He was "reckless" in his pursuit of WMD (Berger, February 13, 1998), "stupid" and "his own people's worst enemy" (Clinton, December 16, 1997 quoted by Bowers, CR: December 17, 1997), and bore close watching (Clinton, 1998). The only thing that Saddam Hussein understood was a good whooping (implied by Gingrich, CR: October 9, 1997). Furthermore, his "behavior has not improved" (Hamiliton, CR: August 3, 1998) and must be kept "on a short leash" (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997). If he was not stopped at this time, he would destroy the region and the world (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997), just as he had already destroyed the wonders of the fertile crescent (Kerry, CR: February 25, 1998). Policy makers loved to vilify Saddam Hussein, and the comments went on. Ultimately, Hussein was the only thing stopping peace in the Gulf: the policies of the state of Iraq were Hussein's policies; he was the one building WMD; the locations of possible WMD information and technology were his palaces; he was the one who had brought down such harsh actions upon his state as he refused to work with inspectors; he had been the cause of death and destruction in his own country; he was in control of the future of Iraq and only he could make it better. It was "Saddam Hussein's Iraq" (Clinton, 1998). This

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perception fits exactly with the image of the rogue state: there is a leader or group at the top of the government that is the real problem, and if the leader would just disappear, all would be well. Saddam Hussein was seen as an errant, aggressive, power seeking man, yet one who was clever and calculating. However, he was not mature enough to handle the responsibilities of an internationally-minded state, was more of an animal than human, and garnered aggressive treatment as that was all he knew and understood. Saddam Hussein was perceived as a rebellious teenager, a leader of a gang of thugs, bent on taking over the community through force, and must be stopped.

The goals and motives of Iraq also fit into the rogue state image as they supported the desires of the leadership in its acquisitions of power and were counter to the goals of the international community. The goal of the leadership of Iraq was to spread fear and terror throughout the region (Gilman, CR: August 1, 1997), to obtain and to provide terrorist groups with WMD (Berger, February 13, 1998), and to block weapons inspectors' access to areas that might expose WMD development and thus curtail said acquisition (McCain, CR: November 5, 1997; Lantos, CR: November 12, 1997; Tenet, January 28, 1998; Berger February 13, 1998; Clinton February 17, 1998; Leahy, CR: February 26, 1998; Hamiliton, CR: August 3, 1998; Kyle, CR: March 2, 1998; Albright, November 28, 1998). Saddam Hussein only cared about Saddam Hussein: "The only cause Saddam believes in is his own survival and ambition" (Berger 12/8/98). In his attempts to solidify his own position, Hussein sought to disrupt the unity of the international community through subterfuge and to limit UN authority by "dictating terms of compliance" (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997). If he was allowed to obtain WMD, he would use them or threaten to use them (Kyl, CR: August 31, 1998). Thus, policy makers perceived Saddam Hussein's intent and motives as having been based solely on selfish desires for power

without regard to his own people or the international community. It was not the same as the perceived evil intent of the enemy that sought to increase its role in the international community through the spread of its (comparable) military, social and political structures, but rather is the perceived immaturely driven desire for raw power in order to threaten and abuse others. There was no equality conceptualized in this perception of motive. Rather, U.S. policy makers perceived the power-seeking motive of a lesser-being that must be squashed.

Interestingly, the response alternatives for this period of time centered on the failure of containment policies[29] and the threat to use force in order to obtain Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions. After the end of the Gulf War in March, 1991, there was likely a reduction in the prototypical placement of Iraq in the rogue state category, or at least the hope that Iraq would comply with UN resolutions and allow weapons inspections. However, by the time 1997 rolls around, there was a definite feeling that diplomacy had reached its end, that "containment" was not working, and that some other means for enforcing compliance must be found. For the prototypical rogue state image, this entailed a retributive action meant to either whip the state into shape or eliminate the leadership altogether.

Clinton and administration advisors tended to support diplomatic efforts in determining solutions to Iraqi non-compliance with UNSCOM inspectors (Clinton, November 6, 1997; Cohen, November 14, 1997; Albright, 1998), but they also understood that strong support for

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[29] The type of "containment" as a policy against Iraq was not the same containment policy used against an enemy state. Iraq was not being contained at this time from spreading its political, economic and military strength to other states as it did not have this capability. The Clinton containment policy was different (Berger, 12/16/98): 1. economic sanctions, 2. UNSCOM detection and destruction of WMD, 3. threat to use force if threatening neighbors, 4. support from other regional actors. In application to the enemy, however, containment was meant only to keep military might from expanding, not necessarily to reduce its ability to develop weapons, as seen in the development of weapons technology by the Soviet Union allowed in arms treaties by the two superpowers. In addition, containment against the enemy is the best option as direct contact may lead to nuclear war. In the case of Iraq, containment was based on the threat to use force if Iraq's behavior did not improve—two very different intentions behind "containment."

more aggressive actions supported diplomatic efforts, and that the last step effort would be the use of military force (Cohen, November 14, 1997; Berger, February 13, 1998; Gore, CR: February 17, 1998; Cohen, 1998). The administration refused to back down, was inflexible in demanding access to locations by weapons inspectors, and would not accept limitations put on UNSCOM. If Iraq failed to comply with UN requests, it would signify the end of diplomatic measures and the use of force would prevail (Albright, February 11, 1997; Berger, February 13, 1998; Clinton, February 17, 1998). In the end, the use of force garnered support from the international community as all other measures to insure global and regional security had been exhausted (Clinton, November 15, 1998). In addition, while sanctions adversely affected Iraqi citizens, they obviously affected Iraqi leadership capabilities as well and must be sustained (Clinton, November 14, 1997; Berger, February 13, 1998; Clinton, October 31, 1998). As some states in the international system sought the reduction of sanctions, continued efforts to work with these states in promoting U.S. policies also appeared as a priority (Albright November 14, 1997). Furthermore, though many advisors and the President would have willingly accepted new leadership in Iraq (Albright, February 11, 1997), forced regime change would have cost too many American lives and may not have necessarily supported U.S. strategic interests (Berger, February 13, 1998; Albright, 1998). Administration members sought to continue working with opposition forces in promoting close ties to a successor regime, but would not pursue direct military action intended to eliminate the Iraqi leadership (Berger, February 13, 1998).

While some congressmen sought to sustain humanitarian efforts and voiced concern for Iraqi citizens (Abraham, CR: October 7, 1997), the response alternative most often suggested was the use of military force to compel compliance if diplomatic efforts failed. Democrats especially believed every diplomatic channel should be explored before using force, but agreed,

for the most part, that force may be necessary with the Iraqi state as it often failed to adhere to its agreements (Gephardt, CR: February 12, 1998; Leahy, CR: February 26, 1998; Cleland, CR: March 17, 1998; Levine, CR: November 10, 1998). The desire for diplomatic solutions above all else reflected the U.S.'s role as the only superpower, a role that, if the U.S. acted with unnecessary force, say some Democrats, would project an arrogance of authority to the international community (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997). If the U.S. exercised the use of force, then the UN must support such actions (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997; Lantos, CR: November 12, 1997). Furthermore, Democrats had not wanted to see U.S. servicemen and women unnecessary killed in the Gulf (Cleland, CR: March 17, 1998). Policy makers believed that if any use of force were to be taken in the Gulf, it must have both the diplomatic and military support of other states (Cleland, CR: March 17, 1998).

On the other hand, Republicans tended to support "any means necessary" to enforce UNSCOM inspections (Gingrich, 1997). Republicans tended to put the blame for Iraqi non-compliance not only on Saddam Hussein, but also on the weak and inadequate policies of the Clinton administration. Republicans believed that Hussein had observed a weakness in U.S. policy and used it to his advantage (Weldon, CR: November 22, 1997; Gilman, CR: October 1, 1998), and at the time of the analysis, the Clinton administration was trying to amend the situation. Furthermore, past Clinton policies had handed over authority to "functionaries" at the UN, which had limited the U.S.'s ability to take appropriate action (Ashcroft, CR: February 27, 1998). Both "containment" and promoting regime change had failed (Ashcroft, CR: September 2, 1998). Only a few Republicans called for other response alternatives before the use of force, one the support of opposition forces in and out of Iraq (Wexler, CR: February 26, 1998; Gilman, CR: October 1, 1998), and another being the exploration of a covert military operation to

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remove Saddam Hussein from power (Grams, CR: February 27, 1998). In addition, Republicans called for a U.S. strategic defense initiative (Weldon, CR: November 22, 1997) despite its irrelevance in regional conflicts. Another response alternative was the call to set up an international criminal tribunal to judge Saddam Hussein and other top Iraqi officials (Gilman, CR: August 1, 1997; Gilman, CR: November 13, 1997; Spector, CR: March 12, 1998).

Both Republicans and Democrats sought a single, unified strategy in the Middle East that was reasonable, supportable, and had an ultimate achievable goal, ideally one that enforced sanctions, promoted democracy, provided incentives for a democratic turnover in government in Iraq, and voiced these goals to international actors (Kerry, CR: November 9, 1997). Ultimately, U.S. policy makers called for all WMD and WMD technology in Iraq to be completely eliminated (Kerry, CR: February 25, 1998). No one supported reducing sanctions, and only a few suggested increasing humanitarian efforts.

For the most part, response alternatives also supported the image of the rogue state in policy makers' minds. While the Democrats supported diplomatic efforts, which could be observed as less supportive of the rogue state image, this possible policy response does fall into the rehabilitative side of policy options. While the prototypical rogue state calls for the use of force, diplomacy is a "New Age" alternative in diplomatic "parenting" of wayward children. Just as parents today seek measures that do not promote violence in the home (violence only begets violence—if you want to change the behavior a child who hits, you don't hit them to stop it), "enlightened"[30] international members will seek non-violent alternatives that attempt to coerce without the use of deadly force or destructive sanctions. However, in the international

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[30] An "enlightened" view of international relations is only one way of thinking according to this argument.

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community at this time, there existed still the threat of violence to back up diplomatic measures. Furthermore, Democrats observed that, as the U.S. retained the capability to force its will upon any rogue state (if accepting the costs associated with the action), the use of such force upon less militarily and economically capable states could have been seen as arrogant and an abuse of power. Yet, many U.S. policy makers supported the use of force if diplomatic measures failed to produce the desired results. Additionally, arguments existed on how "diplomatic" a process it was to enforce compliance with UN resolutions that sought to destroy WMD. There was no give and take, no middle ground, no desire to seek a compromise. It was, "you do this or else," period. Not really a diplomatic means of finding a solution to a crisis. Rather, it was a desire to coerce without having to use force, or pay the costs of enforcement. Thus, the rogue state image was supported in the response alternatives of U.S. policy makers and reflected the conceptual image held by policy makers of Iraq during 1997 and 1998.

All of the indicators for the years viewed supported a rogue state image. Capability levels showed a state desiring WMD, often considered a cheap means of obtaining a deterrent capability against the intrusion of larger states or other regional actors. The perceived level of cultural development firmly suggested a "belligerent child" that lacks self-control. The motive behind Iraqi actions was the desire for raw power, sought by a single leader, Saddam Hussein, who was incapable of understanding the international community and miscalculated at every turn, who had the intent to either harm others himself or to provide the same means to others (terrorists). Response alternatives centered on diplomatic and military force meant to coerce Iraq into complying with the demands of the international community, specifically those of the U.S. If compliance was not accepted, the single superpower regulator would have to force adherence

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to the rules. Iraq was the prototypical rogue state, an ideal image for conceptualizing such states in the international system.

Policy Preferences for the Desert Fox Operation: December 1998

Throughout 1997 and 1998, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership balked at complete compliance with UN weapons inspectors and requirements based on UN resolutions. While the U.S. saw this as a flagrant disregard for the international community and a threat to regional and world security, the Iraqis considered the level of intrusion against their sovereignty debasing and indefinite. What has often been called a "cat and mouse" game ensued. By November, 1998, the international community, led by the U.S., sought to militarily coerce Saddam Hussein into compliance. On November 14, 1998, Saddam Hussein sent a letter to the UN Security Council that stated Iraq's full compliance with UNSCOM measures, a last minute attempt to stop the bombing already agreed upon by UN members and supported by Arab states. Clinton decided not to bomb at that time, stipulating that if Iraq failed to comply, bombing would commence. On December 15, head weapon's inspector Richard Butler determined and reported to the U.S. that Iraq had failed to comply fully with UN requests: Iraq would not allow access to party headquarters, it often blocked inspectors who sought to take pictures of bombs by, kept inspectors from interviewing people, and refused to turn over documents (plus more). With this information in hand, the Clinton administration, along with British support, began a 4 day bombing operation designated *Desert Fox* (December 16 to December 19, 1998). While supported by past UN resolutions and Arab agreements, many states in the international community opposed the action by U.S. and British military forces (specifically, France, Russia, and China). After four days, the intense bombing stopped, weapons inspectors did not re-enter Iraq, containment proceeded, and the Iraqi state became the target of ongoing military measures

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meant to limit official activity in the northern and southern areas of the state and further reduce Iraqi capability.

Almost all policy makers, both administrative and congressional, supported the use of force against Iraq in response to the crisis situation. Policy makers tended to voice frustration about Iraq's actions, specifically those of Saddam Hussein's, and how this was all Hussein's fault, not theirs. There was even the consideration that adherence to UNSCOM requests at this late date may limit military action (Berger, December 16, 1998). President Clinton and his advisors centered their comments on the desired outcome of the bombing operation. As weapons inspections' success had been limited and effectively curtailed by the Iraqis, bombing sought to degrade existing WMD, halt and reduce development and proliferation capability, and eliminate the threat to regional states, (Albright, December 16, 1998; Clinton, December 16, 1998; Albright, December 17, 1998). Operation *Desert Fox* sought to address real security concerns of the United States, the Middle East, and the world (Clinton, December 16, 1998). Indeed, the administration asserted, the world and the UN were behind the U.S. efforts as countries continued to voice their support (Albright, December 16, 1998; Berger, December 16, 1998; Clinton, December 16, 1998; Albright, December 17, 1998). Dissent by some states (France, Russia, China) had done little to offer solutions to the problem (Albright, December 17, 1998), and calls to Russia to exert pressure and persuasion on Iraq had failed (Albright, December 16, 1998; Albright, December 17, 1998).

Extended sessions in Congress provided the opportunity for members to voice support for the men and women in the military, for the President, for the use of force, and to go over the history of events that had led up to the bombing (see Congressional Records, December 16 and 17, 1998). To list all the members of Congress who had taken advantage of this opportunity

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would take pages. Some qualifications did appear, as a few members of Congress reiterated that their support for military action depended on the continued support of the United Nations and the international community for the use of force (Biden, CR: December 16, 1998; Conyers, CR: December 17, 1998; John, CR: December 17, 1998).

The interesting aspect of this analysis centered on the dissenting views by a select minority of Congressmen. Some members of Congress questioned the timing of the bombing. Some supported the bombing, but believed that such actions should have been conducted months or years before (Weldon, CR: December 17, 1998). Sanders not only questioned the timing, but also the support from the UN, the international community, and the Pope, and the devastating effects on the Iraqi civilian population (Sanders, CR: December 17, 1998). Republican Representative Paul believed that the bombing was not only "annoying," but was likely illegal, an act of subterfuge by the President to avoid impeachment proceedings, and another straw to support impeachment (CR: December 16, 1998). Sanford believed that the bombings were little more that a pinprick that would have no real affect on Iraqi WMD capability (CR: December 17, 1998).

Considerable discussion revolved around whether the bombing was motivated by the political needs of the President. Debate on impeachment proceedings was set to commence a few days later, and members of Congress voiced questions, concerns and disgust that the President might put men and women in harm's way for his own political interests (Livingston, CR: December 16, 1998; Paul, CR: December 16, 1998; Gilchrest, CR: December 16, 1998; Sanford CR: December 17, 1998; Lott and "other Republicans" in Warner, CR: December 16, 1998). Berger and others reiterated that the timing was the result of Saddam Hussein's actions, not the President's, and that the need for a quick response was due to possible information

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leakage and the upcoming month of Ramadan for the Muslim community (Berger, December 16, 1998; Biden, CR: December 16, 1998; Nadler, CR: December 16, 1998; Albright, December 17, 1998). If the U.S had not acted at this time, no credibility would have existed in dealings with other states of interest (Biden, CR: December 16, 1998). National security concerns dictated the need for action at this time, not the impeachment proceedings (Albright, December 17, 1998). Furthermore, Clinton observed that the men and women on his advising committee would not have stood for supporting personal political aspirations for war (Clinton, December 17, 1998). In addition, only using U.S. and British forces had not signaled a lack of support for military action. Rather, it was the necessity for promptness and quick action that prevented the inclusion of other countries' military forces—the coalition behind the effort was strong in spirit (Berger, December 16, 1998; Cohen, December 16, 1998).

In response to those who questioned the effectiveness of such a limited strike, Presidential supporters responded by saying the strike effected real action against Iraq (Albright, December 16, 1998) and was not a "pinprick" or limited strike as it extended for days rather than hours (Biden, CR: December 16, 1998). To prove the power of the bombing, Cohen announced that the number of ship and air-launched cruise missiles in the operation exceeded the total number of the same launched in the entire Gulf War (Cohen, December 18, 1998). Furthermore, Clinton announced that any efforts by Iraq to develop WMD, threaten its neighbors, or take action against the Kurdish population would provoke additional military action by the U.S. (December 16, 1998).

Other policy alternatives suggested by a few policy makers were to reduce economic sanctions against Iraq and increase humanitarian efforts, as sanctions had only hurt the poorer populations in Iraq, mostly women and children (Conyers, CR: December 17, 1998; Kilpatrick,

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CR: December 17, 1998). Strategic interests of the U.S. could be better addressed through humanitarian efforts and a "tough stance" than through sanctions that caused more problems than solutions (Kilpatrick, CR: December 17, 1998). However, those that discussed sanctions generally believed they had worked and should be continued into the future, and that humanitarian needs were being met through the oil-for-food program (Albright, December 16, 1998; Clinton, December 16, 1998; Clinton December 19, 1998; Cohen, December 19, 1998).

Addressing reporter's questions on how the administration felt about direct actions to remove Saddam Hussein from power, as apparently suggested by a small number of Senators, Albright reiterated that forced regime change was not the intent of the bombing, but if such an occurrence developed, the administration would be ready and willing to work with new leaders (Albright, December 16, 1998). A number of policy makers also called for undermining the Iraqi leadership by supporting opposition forces either within Iraq or abroad (Albright, December 16, 1998; Berger, December 16, 1998; Clinton, December 16, 1998; Albright, December 17, 1998; Conyers, CR: December 17, 1998; Clinton, December 19, 1998), and by promoting Radio Free Iraq in the region (Clinton, December 19, 1998). However, other policy makers felt that democracy must be promoted in Iraq to provide for a stable Middle East (Gilchrest, CR: December 17, 1998), and if strong action for regime change were taken, then the U.S. should be at the forefront (Spence, CR: December 17, 1998; Lott and Helms by Warner, CR: December 16, 1998).

In regard to domestic policies, several Congressmen sought to affect future votes on funding for the military. The need for sending U.S. men and women abroad to fight for U.S. and world security must be translated into additional funding for military growth and development (Weldon, CR: December 17, 1998), retirement concerns, and capability (Gilchrest, CR:

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December 17, 1998). Always an issue in times of conflict and war, the ability of servicemen and women to act and protect themselves, and their subsequent morale, galvanized policy makers to seek additional funding for the military and supporting industries.

All in all, the policy preferences of policy makers during the *Desert Fox* operation supported the use of a conceptual category of the rogue state image for Iraq when processing information, as projected by the pre-crisis data analysis. The overwhelming support for the use of force to coerce Iraq, or really, punish Iraq for not complying, adhered to the rogue state image. The U.S.'s having to take forceful action was all Saddam Hussein's fault—the child must be punished or it would continue to act out. Furthermore, if the "parent" had not taken action, it would have suggested to other "children" that the "parent" was weak and that other child-like rogue state could act out as well. The only real dissent focused on timing and political interests of policy makers, not whether using force itself was the correct action or not. Once again, the use of a conceptual image to predict policy makers' policy preferences is supported.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the transformation from the dependent of the enemy image to that of the rogue state image was supported in the case of Iraq. For Iraq, there was an effort to retain its deterrent capability achieved through its relationship with the Soviet Union after Soviet influence began to wane. For Iraq to achieve deterrent capability it sought WMD. By seeking WMD and holding on to an anti-western stance as observed in its desire not to follow international norms, Iraq found itself perceived as a rogue state. If Iraq had sought WMD but supported western norms, the harsh treatment designated by being perceived as a rogue state may have been limited. Yet, powerful states in the international system continued to hold views that new nuclear and WMD states did not have the same constraints on irrational behavior that older nuclear states

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possessed, making any new development in WMD by smaller states (or Global South states) threatening. Thus, any development of WMD by Global South states, whether supporting western ideals or not, may provoke a threat-induced response by the U.S. However, it may be that those states that do not fit the prototypical rogue state image, ones that may be further along the line towards the complex image, may instigate responses more along the lines of rehabilitative than retributive. As North Korea has yet to be bombed, this case may offer some insight into the spectral positioning of rogue states in policy makers' perceptions and policy makers' subsequent varied responses.

CHAPTER SIX

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS: NORTH KOREA

Introduction

In this section, an analysis of North Korea seeks to uncover the movement of a perceived image from that of a dependent of the enemy to that of a rogue state. To assess the three hypotheses, I analyze data from three time periods—at a time when North Korea was thought to have been a dependent of the Soviet Union and China, a selection of time thought to show the developing rogue state image, and during the latter 1990s when the rogue state image should have been well developed in policy makers conceptualizations of North Korea. In each time period I first observed the image of North Korea perceived by policy makers and then viewed the policy preferences of U.S. policy makers in a subsequent crisis situation. Chapter seven discusses the results as they relate to the specific hypotheses.

The Dependent of the Enemy Image Development, 1965 to 1968

The difficulty of determining the image held by policy makers of North Korea in this time period centers on the lack of public data that reflected U.S. policy makers' perceived images of North Korea. While an extensive search of the *Congressional Records*, *Vital Speeches of the Day*, *Public Papers of the President*, and various memoirs ensued, only a limited number of policy makers' views on North Korea emerged prior to the crisis event. Nevertheless, there was enough data to suggest a generally held image of the North Korean state for this research agenda.

For the dependent of the enemy image, the variables focused on reflect the relationship of North Korea with the enemy as perceived by U.S. policy makers. In this case, the enemy is

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primarily the Soviet Union, but also China.[31] President Lyndon B. Johnson, who often reflected

on the situation in Vietnam but also brought in the example of North Korea, implied there was a

united communist agenda to overcome other states in Asia through aggressive action. Johnson

commented that "The Communist masters in the world tonight can get no comfort from what

they see in Malaysia, from where I have just come, from what they see here in Korea, and what

they see in other parts of Asia." Johnson's additional reflections on the Korean War compared

the "Communist aggression in Asia" and the need to combat it with the threat of Communism in

Europe (Public Papers: November 2, 1966). Johnson observed a group of "Communist

strategists" who sought to aggressively overtake weaker countries, Asian countries under the

"shadow of Communist China," and that a "peaceful mainland China [was] central to a peaceful

Asia" (Public Papers: November 2, 1966).   Thus, in Johnson's mind, a link to China through a

Communist alliance for expanding power and influence was at the heart of smaller state action

against the U.S. in Asia, including the possible actions on the part of North Korea.

Vice President Hubert Humphrey saw China as exerting its "sphere of influence" in Asia,

with the U.S. as the only guard against Communist expansion (Vital Speeches, July 15, 1966).

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara[32] perceived some differences between the internal

structure of Soviet Communism and Chinese Communism, but observed unity within each state's

desire to fight "modernization" through the spread of Communism to developing countries (Vital

Speeches, June 1, 1966).

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[31] Some may question China as part of the "enemy" image category. This would be another interesting research program as China was part of the perceived "Communist Monolith" (as mentioned later in the text) and was perceived comparably in some aspects of threat, but did not have an equal level of economic development.
[32] Robert McNamara was Secretary of Defense until February, 1968, after the onset of the *Pueblo* incident used in the policy preferences section of the analysis, and so was used in the formation of the image perceived by policy makers.

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Dean Rusk, Johnson's Secretary of State, made the most direct connection between North Korea and the Soviet Union and China in military policy making. In discussing the Korean War, Rusk believed that the only reason why South Korean forces were not completely pushed off the Korean peninsula was due to Korean solders stopping "presumably to consult with Pyongyang, Moscow and perhaps Peking on what to do next" when U.S. servicemen entered the war (As I Saw It, p. 163). In addition, Rusk connected Soviet influence to North Korea's decision to invade South Korea when he questions whether the North Korean leadership invaded because "they and the Soviets misinterpreted U.S. intentions" on Korea (p. 164). Not only was the military equipment for the invasion supplied by the Soviets, but the entire plan to invade South Korea was not simply the decision of the North Koreans to unify the peninsula, but was the plan of the Soviets and likely the Chinese:

> Nor do I believe that only the North Koreans and the Soviets conspired in the attack. While the Soviets clearly supported the North Koreans politically and supplied arms and equipment as well as observers in the field, the Chinese may have helped plan the original attack as well. (165)

In addition, Rusk perceived that Stalin "gave the green light for the North Koreans to go after South Korea" (364). While this data centers on the Korean War, 18 years prior to the *Pueblo* incident, it does show a perception by U.S. policy makers that both the Soviets and the Chinese wielded great influence over North Korea in its formative years.

Senator Thruston B. Morton,[33] a congressional member through 1968, saw a dynamic relationship between the Soviets and the North Koreans. In comparing the Vietnam War to the Korean War, with the intent of showing how the U.S. must get out of Vietnam, Morton revealed

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[33] Possibly a typographical error on the Congressional Members web page and was supposed to be Thurston B. Morton.

an understanding of how influential the Soviets were in North Korea: "In Korea, the Soviet Union ruled over a monolithic Communist empire, and had a common cause with China to blunt the efforts of the United States and the United Nations" (Congressional Records, May 22, 1967). Thus, this "monolithic" Communism united both the Soviet Union and China in an effort against the U.S. with smaller states as their pawns in the process. While Morton believed that this monolith no longer existed as a united effort by the Soviets and the Chinese, and that an opening to the end of Soviet influence in Vietnam could occur if the U.S. acted with similar "restraint," there was no lessening of the perception that the Soviet Union was influential in North Korea.

Thus, from the consideration of the data available prior to 1968, the perception of policy makers was that the Soviet Union and China influenced policy making in North Korea. There was a perception that, at a minimum, a past Communist monolith existed, and that Communist leaders still exerted influence in Asia. Some comment more on the influence of China, or of the Soviets, but it was likely that there was a mixture of both. Therefore, there was support for a perceived image of a North Korean state dependent upon an enemy.

In viewing the cultural level and intent of North Korea, policy makers perceive a state that does not equal the U.S. Johnson sees Communists as "ruthless invaders," "task masters," "aggressive" forces that would not let other states live in peace (Public Papers, October 31, 1966 & November 1, 1966). According to Johnson, North Koreans acted on the DMZ in ways to undermine the armistice between the U.S. and North Korea (Public Papers, November 4, 1966). McNamara saw the possibility Communists taking advantage of "underdeveloped" countries: "What is often misunderstood is that communists are capable of subverting, manipulating, and finally, directing for their own ends, the wholly legitimate grievances of a developing society" (Vital Speeches, June 1, 1966). Humphrey believed that the communist agenda was to infiltrate

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other countries, with the U.S. as the only guard against this force (Vital Speeches, July 15, 1966). North Koreans were underhanded (Dodd, Congressional Records: March 6, 1967), sought to create dissonance, violate agreements and assassinate the South Korean leadership (U.N. Representative of the U.S., Arthur Goldberg, cited in Department of State Bulletin, January, 1968). In the available data, it was apparent that policy makers did not perceive the cultural level of North Korea as equal to that of the U.S., and that the intent of the North Koreans was to disrupt regional peace, an act of a lesser state. A cultural level perceived as lower than that of the U.S., and an intent that did not equal the lofty intent behind U.S. policies, supported the image of a dependent of the enemy.

When viewing the types of response alternatives promoted by U.S. policy makers regarding North Korea, a general perception of having to stop aggressive action and the spread of communism appeared. Johnson believed that the U.S. must act as a "conciliation" force between Communist states and their neighbors and "prove" that aggression against neighboring states would not bring benefits (Vital Speeches, August 1, 1966). Only by insuring a "peaceful" China would a peaceful Asia become possible (Vital Speeches, August 1, 1966). McNamara cautioned against involving the U.S. in every altercation that included communists. He would rather have seen the U.S. only acting to support those regimes willing to act in their own behalf (Vital Speeches, June 1, 1966). Humphrey had a four point plan for combating Communism: 1. help states who would help themselves in fighting aggression by other states, 2. help in nation-building where states were actively seeking to advance themselves, 3. nurture regional cooperation, and 4. act to "build bridges" between the U.S. and Communist states. Ultimately, the outcome of said policies would illuminate the error of Communist ways (Vital Speeches, June 15, 1966). Thus, most policy makers observed at this time suggested policies that sought to

change the ways of perceived lesser states. The U.S. was to act as a parent who could nurture and help develop those states that desired to develop and grow. In addition, attention must be paid to the larger Communist states if the smaller Communist states or even developing "free" states in the region were to achieve peace. Therefore, response alternatives also suggested a perception of North Korea that, as a member of the smaller states, was under the control of other larger states and was to be addressed in this context.

While the above analysis was far from extensive and complete, it did provide some insight into policy makers' perceptions of North Korea. Fortunately, the data reflected the perceptions of some of the major policy makers of this time, the President and his advisors. The overall perception gleaned from the data was that policy makers had perceived North Korea as a dependent of the enemy state. This suggested policies by U.S. policy makers in the future that considered the extended deterrent capabilities of the enemy. It was unlikely that direct action would be taken by the U.S. against North Korea in a crisis situation as could have provoked conflict with the parent state(s): the Soviet Union and China. The next section will explore the policy preferences of policy makers during the *USS Pueblo* incident in 1968.

Policy Preferences for the *USS Pueblo* Incident, 1968

Throughout 1966 and 1967, North Korea increased its activities against South Korea in and around the demilitarized zone (DMZ), the no-man's-land separating North and South Korea along the 38th parallel. From testing the extent of the U.S. and South Korean forces to attempts on political leaders' lives, U.S. intelligence observed numerous occasions when North Korea acted against the terms of the 1953 armistice. On January 23, 1968, North Korea escalated the situation between the "Communists" and "The West" when North Korea seized the *USS Pueblo*, an United States intelligence gathering ship, and its crew, killing one crewmember.

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The *Pueblo* was a "state of the art" ship meant to eavesdrop on North Korean preparedness for a possible invasion of South Korea. As such, the *Pueblo*'s mission took it within miles of the North Korean coastline. Just how close the ship actually came to the mainland is still uncertain, as the ship was out of contact with U.S. military sources (supposedly) for more than two weeks and any documentation of the ship's activities during that time remain in North Korean hands if not destroyed prior to the *Pueblo*'s taking. North Korea stated that the *Pueblo* had entered North Korean waters (generally considered 12 miles beyond land, although some argue a three mile barrier), while the Commander of the ship announced that he was (at the time of the incident) in international waters. After circling the ship for an hour and waiting for additional warships to arrive, the North Koreans stopped and boarded the *Pueblo* with little resistance, taking custody of the crew and towing the ship to Wonson Harbor.

While the United States claimed that the ship was taken in international waters, policy makers and intelligence personnel couldn't verify that the *Pueblo* had never entered North Korean water "accidentally." Nevertheless, even if the intelligence gathering ship had entered North Korean waters, countries don't have the right to seize the ships of other countries. Furthermore, some policy makers voiced concern that events at that time suggested that the North Koreans might have acted with aggression against South Korea in the near future. While South Korea could defend itself in a ground war, the large extent of Soviet MiGs in North Korea appeared to contribute to a hesitancy in both the defensive actions of U.S. forces when the *Pueblo* was seized and in subsequent military actions.

Diplomatic talks ensued, with the Soviet Union the first country President Johnson contacted in trying to set up communications with the North Koreans. Eventually, diplomatic talks proceeded over several months at Pomonjon. The crew found itself part of the North

Korean propaganda promoting North Korean defiance over the great Imperialist America. Pictures taken of the sailors appeared world-wide, showing extended middle fingers to the cameramen. Having been told this was a symbol for peace, captors beat the men when North Korean embarrassment developed from the truth. Some sailors also signed documents stating that the *Pueblo* had been spying on North Korea and had entered North Korean waters, but policy makers and intelligence personnel considered these false statements as they had obviously been signed under duress.

The crisis came to and end when U.S. officials signed a document acknowledging that the ship had been on a spy mission and had entered North Korean waters, but the following line was added to the bottom of the statement: "We are instructed to inform you that there is not one truth in the above" (Rusk, 395). North Korea accepted the statement and released the crew by at the end of December 1968; yet the ship remains to this day a trophy in Wonson harbor.

In an attempt to place blame for the incident, U.S. military officials convicted the Commander of the *Pueblo*, Lloyd Bucher, of having given up his ship without a fight. Eventually, with the conviction overturned, the responsibility for the *Puebo's* seizure fell on several aspects of military unpreparedness for such situations. The Johnson administration investigated and determined that intelligence gathering ships collected important data for the U.S.'s understanding of North Korean capability and should continue their operations, but with added defensive capabilities and protections. Thus, destroyers developed into the intelligence gathering ship of choice, with adequate military support close by. Eventually, new technology

(satellites, etc.) made such missions obsolete and unnecessary, ending the crisis possibilities "intelligence gathering" ships risked in the execution of their missions.[34]

As a precursor to considering the policy preferences of the policy makers, it is insightful to consider why the crisis occurred and who was responsible for instigating the crisis. While Johnson saw North Korean belligerence as an attempt to "intimidate" South Korea (*Public Papers*, January 27, 1968), he also believed that there existed some connection between the North Korean incident and U.S. actions in Vietnam as a larger "Communist" agenda to "divert" U.S. and South Korean resources ("Address by President Johnson," January 26, 1968 in *Department of State Bulletin; Public Papers*, February 2, 1968).[35] The advisors to the President did not make directly the same connection, but did imply that the Soviets could have influenced the release of the ship and crew (*Department of State Bulletin*: January 23, 1968, "Statement by Department of State Spokesman," p. 190, and "Secretary Rusk News Briefing" January 24, 1968, p. 191).

Various Senators viewed the Communist connection in varying degrees of importance. While more Republicans tended to have strong feelings on a connection between North Korean actions and a larger Communist agenda, some Democrats also supported this view. Republican Senator Wallace Bennett believed that North Korean actions supported an act in "WWIII, Communist style" that sought to "win" the war through small conflicts in order to eventually eliminate all freedom in the world (CR: January 24, 1968). Senator Karl Mundt considered the act as part of an effort to reduce the status (soft power) of the United States world-wide (CR: January 29, 1968). The ever-present Strom Thurmond took a strong view, as he claimed that the Communists planned to take over the world and the U.S. was the only force that could stop them

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[34] The story of the *Pueblo* as told above derives from Dean Rusk's book, *As I Saw It.*
[35] South Korea had recently sent military personnel to the Vietnam conflict in support of the United States.

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(CR: January 23, 1968). British withdrawal from Asia, says Thurmond, suggested an opportunity for the Soviet and North Koreans to pressure a U.S. departure from Asia as well (CR: January 23, 1968). Democrat Senator Russell Long considered the actions of North Korea to be part of a larger agenda by the Communist bloc, especially the Soviet Union and China, and that the Soviets supported North Korean desires not to find a solution to the crisis (CR: January 29, 1968). Other Congressmen believed the Soviets to be an important influence on North Korea and an end to the crisis, while others sought to have U.S. policy makers consider Soviet reactions to acts against the North Koreans before taking action (Mansfield, January 29, 1968). On the other hand, some U.S. policy makers voiced their desire that any U.S. response be strong enough to send a message to the "Communist world" (Stennis, CR: January 24, 1968)

Congressional Representatives also supported the perception that the Soviets, and possibly the Chinese, influenced North Korean actions. Some House members believed that the crisis was the fault of the Soviets and that policy makers should not seek the assistance of the Soviet Union:

> It is surprising to me that the administration would attempt to have Communist Russia intercede in our behalf with the North Koreans. Everyone should realize and know that Communist Russia is not our friend. They are not going to do anything that would help resolve the situation as no doubt they are agitating and encouraging the North Koreans in their action if, in fact, they did not advise that it be done. (CR: January 25, 1968)

While some saw the demon aspect of the Soviets at fault, John Rarick considered that North Korea was in the hands of the Soviets due to deals made with the Soviet Union near the end of

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WWII, and now actions of "appeasement" by U.S. political leaders strengthen Soviet intentions to reduce U.S. influence abroad (CR: March 11, 1968). Other Representatives agreed that observed actions of the North Koreans suggested a larger plan to weaken U.S. influence in Asia, connecting North Korean actions to the Vietnam War (Abbitt, CR: January 25, 1968). The crisis suggested "Communist mischief making" (Kuykendall, CR: January 29, 1968), the progression of the Cold War (Findley, CR: January 29, 1968), and revealed the Soviet Union's intentions to extend the crisis when they declined to mediate the situation (Edwards, CR: February 1, 1968; Gurney, CR: January 25, 1968). While there failed to occur a unanimous perception that the Soviets and possibly the Chinese influenced North Korean decisions to take and hold U.S. property and personnel, the propensity for policy makers to link the crisis with the Soviet Union and Asia suggested that policy makers tended to perceive a dependent North Korea.

Policy makers' policy preferences ranged widely in determining the best possible solution to the crisis situation. While Johnson stated that "our military forces are prepared for any contingency that might arise" (Burk, CR: January 26, 1968), he publicly supported diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis (*Public Papers*, February 2, 1968). Both the executive branch and Congressional members who supported diplomacy looked to Soviet intervention and the United Nations for ending the crisis without resorting to military intervention (Johnson, *Department of State Bulletin*: "Address by President Johnson," January 26, 1968; McNamara, *Department of State Bulletin*: "Defense Department Statement," January 23, 1968; Rusk, *Department of State Bulletin*: "Statement by the Department of State," January 23, 1968; Rusk, *Department of State Bulletin*: "Secretary Rusk News Briefing," January 24, 1968; Pell, CR: January 25, 1968; Hart, CR: January 25, 1968; Kuchel, CR: January 25, 1968; Mansfield, CR: January 29, 1968). The reasoning for diplomatic solutions to the crisis ranged from the desire not to provoke a situation

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that would result in the deaths of the sailors (Tydings, CR: January 25, 1968), to the perceived responsibility of a superpower like the United States not to take "hasty" or unneeded action that could have intensified the already charged situation (Byrd, CR: January 26, 1968; McGee, CR: January 26, 1968).

However, for some policy makers, limitations on diplomacy existed. On the less aggressive end, policy makers called for "brief, firm diplomatic attempts" and threatened to take more forceful actions if diplomatic efforts failed (Kuchel, CR: January 25, 1968; Tower, CR: January 26, 1968; Findley, CR: January 29, 1968; Whitener, CR: January 29, 1968). In other words used, the U.S. should "walk softly and carry a big stick" (Stennis, CR: January 24, 1968). On the other extreme sat policy makers viewing North Korean actions as an affront to U.S. superiority, and the remedy to the problem was to incorporate "any means necessary," which included military action that penetrated into North Korea and forcefully recaptured the ship and men, with that priority (Stanton, CR: January 23, 1968; Bennett, CR: January 24, 1968; Talmadge, CR: January 24, 1968; Brinkely, CR: January 25, 1968; Gurney, CR: January 25, 1968). Not to take action would have hurt U.S. prestige (Long, CR: January 29, 1968) and may have reduced morale with solders in Vietnam (Dirksen, CR: January 29, 1968). The U.S. was not a "paper tiger" and would not allow such acts to go unchallenged (Stennis, CR: January 24, 1968). Therefore, some U.S. policy makers sought to send a message of strength (Edwards, CR: February 1, 1968) so that other states observing the crisis would not act in similar ways (Abbitt, CR: January 25, 1968). Some Congressmen extended the use of force to the Soviet Union as well if they wanted to "get in on it" as the U.S. wouldn't be "bullied" by "small or great powers" (Long, CR: January 29, 1968). Thus, plenty of sentiment existed towards forceful action that

upheld U.S. prestige and power internationally, without real consideration of what the outcome would have been for those sailors held by the North Korean authority.

A few interesting policy preferences emerged that suggested the extent to which U.S. policy makers perceived the influence of the Soviets over North Korea. Representative Kuykendall suggested forcing "free states" trading with North Korea to stop and that the U.S. would review its own trade policies with those states that continued to do business with North Korea as a focused attempt to limit burgeoning trade with the Soviet Union (CR: January 29, 1968). Others sought to arm third parties, either through the distribution of arms to other countries, such as South Korea and, for some reason, South Africa (Eastland, CR: February 28, 1968), or to increase the number of U.S. military personnel in South Korea. Representative Pelly considered a blockade of North Korea the best solution for the return of the *Pueblo* (CR: January 25, 1968). Domestically, many Congressional members questioned why the *Pueblo* had been on such a mission without backup in the first place (Talmadge, CR: January 24, 1968; Gruening, CR: January 26, 1968; Edwards, CR: February 1, 1968; Rarick, CR: March 11, 1968) and called for a review of U.S. policy in this matter (Mundt, CR: January 29, 1968). Some policy makers suggested that U.S. policies that promoted spy missions provoked crisis situations and should be reconsidered (Hart, CR: January 25 & 29, 1968; Mundt, CR: January 29, 1968). Along this same line, those that considered changing the policy of limited support for intelligence ships cautioned against increasing naval and air presence in the oceans as the Soviets would do the same, possibly increasing the degree of threat such actions would pose to the U.S. (CR: Young, April 29, 1968).

It is apparent that many policy makers at this time perceived Soviet influence on North Korean actions. Indeed, some Congressional members believed that the North Koreans would

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never have come up with such a plan on their own, and that the crisis was another act in the Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Thus, many policy makers perceived a dependent status of North Korea on the Soviet Union. In policy preferences considered by policy makers, the vast majority of policy makers sought diplomatic measures as their first priority. Whether they wanted to insure the safety of the crew or refrain from instigating a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, the desire not to use force was the policy preference most often considered by policy makers. However, policy makers did call for the threat to use force if North Korean non-compliance prevailed. On the one hand, some policy makers professed that under no circumstances should the U.S. use force to obtain the release of the ship and crew, while others demanded swift and decisive action.

The threat to use force as a back up to diplomacy does not necessarily fall counter to the policy preferences of a perceived dependent of the enemy under the extended deterrence of the enemy state, but calls to use force may. Yet, throughout the Cold War, some policy makers called for directly confronting the Soviet Union rather than seeking a containment policy. Others understood that the ultimate outcome of such confrontations was a nuclear war. Cries for action against the enemy reflected the emotional effect other states' actions had on U.S. policy makers, especially if the policy maker held a nationalistic fervor for U.S. power and might. On the other hand, such threats to use force may have forced states to question their own actions that may have provoked the U.S. if such irrational behavior appeared possible. Finally, policy makers that called for the immediate use of force could have been partaking in a bolstering and swaggering effort for his own constituents who may also have held a strong view of American nationalism and feared an attack if weakness was portrayed. Ultimately, some policy makers' comments

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reflected an independent or self-serving North Korea, but most policy makers called for actions that reflected a consideration of how the enemy may respond to acts against its dependent.

The Emerging Rogue State Image, 1992 to 1993

Policy makers in 1992 viewed security threats through the lens of emerging rogue states and the diminishing Soviet Union. Gorbachev had ended the Soviet Union the previous year, and actions to privatize industry and develop Democracy appeared in Russia. The major security threat relating to Russia surrounded the security of the nuclear weapons held in Russia and the other former Soviet states. The great Cold Warrior was gone, having imploded on its over-extension of assets towards the development of nuclear and conventional forces. The United States had won the Cold War by being able to outspend and obtain more credit than the Soviet empire. Now the focus moved towards economic expansion, environmental concerns, terrorism and rogue states.

The difficulty with determining the image of North Korea and whether policy makers perceived its placement as a prototypical rogue state centered on the lack of data available and the time frame prior to the crisis. As the crisis surrounding North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) began in March 1993, considering North Korea's image prior to the crisis situated the time frame between two different administrations. While this was not as important of a hurdle for obtaining the perceived image of Congressional members, there was very little data reflecting the perceptions of the Clinton administration prior to the crisis. Yet, there was enough data to obtain a good understanding of the image of North Korea as perceived by policy makers up to March 1993.

In determining whether a state was perceived as a rogue, how policy makers perceived that state's military capability as it pertains to the desire to obtain nuclear weapons was

important. For Congressional members, there was no doubt that North Korea sought to develop or acquire nuclear arms. Some members cited intelligence information that uncovered a North Korean nuclear program anywhere from "a few months to a couple of years away" from having nuclear weapons (D'Amato, CR: March 2, 1992). Others considered that North Korea worked covertly to develop "weapons of mass destruction (Cranston, Senate Hearing: January 14, 1992; Reid, CR: February 27, 1992). Yet, as Senator Cranston stated, the international community knew of North Korea's development aspirations: "Mr. Secretary, you know the North Koreans are building a bomb or intend to, I know it, the world knows it" (Senate Hearing, March 13, 1992). Even after diplomatic efforts with North Korea ensued, "uncertainties" and "concerns" lingered over North Korean nuclear intentions (Mr. Solomon relayed to Representative Lagomarsino in House Hearing, July 7, 1992; Solarz, House Hearing: July 22, 1992). Others simply failed to believe North Korean assurances that they were not seeking to acquiring nuclear weapons (Solarz, CR: February 2, 1992).

The threat of a nuclear North Korea also reflected the possible chain reaction of nuclear development in the region, another potential threat to the U.S. If North Korea continued its nuclear program despite outward actions to the contrary, South Korea and Japan may have determined it necessary to develop nuclear capabilities in their own countries (Solarz, House Hearing: July 22, 1992). Furthermore, with the end of the Soviet Union, U.S. policy makers believed that some scientists from that country may seek jobs in other countries, such as North Korea, where they could continue to develop nuclear weapons (Sims, CR: February 3, 1992). Policy makers also considered that Russian leaders may find financial benefit in selling nuclear technology to North Korea (Broomfield, CR: March 5, 1992)

As added support to the view of a North Korea closing in on nuclear capability, Robert Gates merits inclusion as CIA directors often cross party lines. Gates relayed intelligence showing that North Korea had its own natural uranium mines, two reactors that could produce plutonium, and a nearly completed reprocessing reactor, making nuclear weapons capability available within two years (Senate Hearing: March 12, 1992). Woolsey, Gate's predecessor, asserted that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons (Senate Hearing: February 2, 1992). Along with the fission material needed for nuclear weapons, policy makers believed that North Korea sought to develop a missile capable of delivering nuclear weapons to regional, if not other, countries (Mr. Clarke relayed intelligence information to Senator Bingaman during a Senate Hearing, March 13, 1992).

Interestingly, Representative Les Aspin used Iraq as a prototype to weigh the degree of threat North Korea posed to the U.S., and questioned whether North Korea was more or less of a threat (CR: January 6, 1992). Senator Cranston also compared North Korea to Iraq, and perceived the Asian country much more of a threat to nuclear development than Iraq as North Korea used "clandestine" activities to a larger degree (CR: February 6, 1992). Indeed, some policy makers considered North Korea "the greatest threat in Northeast Asia" (Biden, Senate Hearing: March 13, 1992). James Woolsey, CIA Director under Clinton the first two years of his administration, believed North Korea was "probably our most grave current concern" (Senate Hearing, February 24, 1993), while Secretary of State Warren Christopher perceived North Korea as a continuing threat to South Korea (CR: January 13, 1993). However, only Representative Solarz was willing to go as far as to say that North Korea could not be trusted with nuclear weapons as it had attempted to harm South Korean officials in the past, a reflected belief that North Korea would use nuclear weapons against South Korea (CR: February 4, 1992).

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Yet, not all policy makers equated North Korea to Iraq. In contemplating the necessary force for countering threats world-wide, Representative James delineated that while a nuclear North Korea would definitely threaten the security of the U.S., it was Iraq that was the "renegade state:" "Such cuts would profoundly limit our ability to respond to threats from a hard line Russian Government, a nuclear North Korea, renegade states like Iraq, or terrorists" (CR: March 4, 1992). Representative Solarz contemplated the threat of North Korea selling nuclear material or weapons to "rogue regimes" (House Hearing: July 22, 1992). Metzenbaum didn't observe much of a threat from any of the new security threats when he contemplated new military weaponry and wondered who would the U.S. use the weapons against, "Saddam Hussein? Castro? North Korea? Come on, who are you kidding? With the military might we currently have in our arsenal, we could whip all three of those countries at the same time with one arm tied behind our back" (Metzenbaum, CR: May 21, 1992). If rank order was important, North Korea concerned U.S. policy makers only after Iraq and Libya (Roth, CR: February 16, 1993).

U.S. policy makers perceived some linkage between the Soviet Union and North Korea, or even Russia and the North. Kyl asked that "Russia no longer provide assistance to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, or Afghanistan," which suggested that North Korea had still obtained economic and/or military benefits from Russia into the 1990s (CR: August 6, 1992). Representative Soloman considered that any relationship between Russia and North Korea was in its "last days," while closer ties to China might be forthcoming (House Hearing: July 8, 1992).

When looking at the relative cultural image of North Korea, a state that held values lower than that of the perceivers (U.S. policy makers) developed. In comparison to the U.S. or the international community, North Korea failed to support political trappings that reflected a "civilized" society. Representative Porter stated that countries existing under a "rule of law"

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supported freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, and freedom of movement, human rights that were "repressed" by North Korea (CR: March 31, 1992). Senator Orin Hatch supported this view: "This regime possesses the most egregious human rights record in Asia," (CR: September 8, 1992). North Korean leaders provided illusions to their citizens of what occurs internationally as a way to obfuscate North Korea's limited standing(CR: Bently, March 31, 1992). Furthermore, there was a "bamboo curtain" that kept North Koreans in this disillusioned state (Bently, CR: March 31, 1992). Power was held "tenaciously" by a "dictator" (Campbell, CR: March 31, 1992) who supported an "oppressive Communist system" that must be eliminated from the last remaining Communist countries (Campbell, CR: March 31, 1992). Only a change in government would bring stability in the region (Solarz, House Hearing: July 8, 1992). Against all this oppression and darkness, U.S. policy makers perceived the U.S. as a beacon of light that would "stand with the forces of liberty" in North Korea and other Communist countries (Helms, Senate Hearing: January 13, 1993) and bring democracy and freedom to the world.

U.S. policy makers also perceived that the North Koreans lacked reliability and virtue, which supported the image of a less than developed society. "Wary" politicians considered how far to trust "malevolent" North Korean leaders who acted with "malice" in their assurances that the North would abide by the NPT agreement while at the same time they "clandestinely" sought nuclear weapons (Cranston, CR: February 6, 1992; Cranston, CR: March 31, 1992;). U.S. policy makers perceived a sly North Korean leadership that had viewed the situation with Iraq and sought to use this knowledge to its own advantage, an act that made nuclear weapons monitoring in North Korea more difficult than it was in Iraq (Cranston, CR: January 14, 1992). U.S. policy makers considered that North Korean leaders furthered a dual plan of adhering to

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safeguard agreements, yet sought WMD, reflecting a North Korean belief that it has some kind of bargaining tool. Policy makers saw this belief as a reflection of how North Korea failed to understand the international community (Leach, CR: July 22, 1992).

U.S. policy makers also perceived a North Korea that rejected adherence to international norms. North Korea, along with China, partook in the "evil" business of selling arms to other countries (Cranston, CR: February 6, 1992).[36] Senator McCain suggested that North Korean leaders desired a conflictual international system: "The merchants of death, such as North Korea, must be stopped . . . The North Korean authorities are the last of a dying breed. They are contemptuous of the freedom of man and are contemptuous of international stability (CR: January 1, 1992). North Korean leaders acted with "aggression" that enforced their "repressive policies" (D'Amato, CR: March 3, 1992) through an "authoritarian rule at home" (Cranston, CR: January 14, 1992). North Koreans utilized "brutal repression" (Fascell, CR: February 6, 1992) through "secret police" that "[held] power by force and fear" (Wirth, CR: October 2, 1992). Thus, the North Korean government was perceived as authoritarian and brutal, and limited the freedoms of its people that the international community held dear.

The sophistication of the people in North Korea, as perceived by U.S. policy makers, was not at the same level as that of the United States. North Korean's were "famous tunnel diggers" (Cranston, CR: February 26, 1992), and were "one of the most burrowed and burrowing societies in the world" (Leach, House Hearing: July 22, 1992). Their economy was so poor that they rarely ate meat and only partook in one meal a day (Cranston, CR: January 14, 1992). The

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[36] As the senator stated that North Korea and China sold long range missiles and technology, this must be less of a killing tool than the multitude of weapons the U.S. sells daily, being the largest weapons dealer in the world today.

North Korean people failed to live up to the same standards of cultural development as that of the U.S., and the economic level of North Korea limited cultural growth in the future.

There were many short word combinations used to describe North Korea that placed it squarely in the rogue state image category. North Korean leaders were "Merchants of death" (McCain, CR: January 30, 1992), "dangerous" (Roth CR: February 16, 1993) "tightfisted totalitarians" (Helen Bently, CR: March 31, 1992), and "despotic" (Pell, CR: October 5, 1992). The state of North Korea epitomized a "hardline (sic) Communist state" (Kerry, CR: January 21, 1993), a "renegade" (Cranston, CR: February 26, 1992), "rogue" (Biden, CR: June 30, 1992; Solarz, CR: February 4, 1992), "captive nation" (Nowak, CR: July 22, 1992) suggestive of a "modern day hermit kingdom" (Hatch, CR: September 8, 1992) in the "Third World" (Fascell, CR: February 6, 1992).

Yet, not all sentiments reflected negative perceptions of North Korea. Some remarks suggested that some policy makers were open to the possibility that North Korea sought change and opportunity within the international community. Senator Nunn relayed that North and South Korea actively worked together "towards reducing tension on the peninsula" (CR: January 22, 1992). Representative Fascell expressed his hope that the peace agreement between the North and South would bring a successful lessening of tensions (CR: February 6, 1992). Gore, soon to be vice-president, suggested that while North Korea was one of the "last bastions of communism," there was hope as international events could influence such states to adopt aspects of democracy, reflected in North Korea's experiment with a successful free trade zone (CR: May 7, 1992).

Interestingly, there were few direct comments observed on Kim Il Sung. Senator Orin Hatch voiced his perception of a "paranoid" and "xenophobic" leader that used a "cult of

personality" to support his isolationist regime. Kim restricted radio stations to only three, yet sought nuclear weapons technology (CR: September 8, 1992). On the other hand, Representative Richardson cautiously considered that at least Kim was moving towards dialogue with the west, while others, such as Castro, were not. Even Representative Solarz who, after having met with Kim and related the huge gold statue in his image outside a prominent museum, discussed his "remarkably good condition" for someone "his age" (CR: February 4, 1992).

When viewing the perceived intent behind North Korean action, an image of a state with a hidden agenda emerged. North Koreans acted "clandestinely" to trick the international community, especially the U.S., into thinking that they were not pursuing nuclear weapons, while all the time they sought to develop their nuclear program (Cranston, CR: February 2, 1992). In addition, North Korea's observation of international failure to curb Iraq's WMD development encouraged North Korean leaders to act with a dual agenda (Cranston, House Hearing: February 6, 1992). Furthermore, North Korean leaders sought to keep their population uninformed and utilized domestic media for their own aggrandizement (Pressler, CR: January 30, 1992). In relation to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, North Korea appeared to often change its mind on what it was willing to concede to (Solarz, CR: February 4, 1992). Ultimately, North Korea's intent centered on the desire to obtain nuclear weapons and probably use these weapons for an economic advantage either through "diplomacy" or trade (Solarz, CR: February 4, 1992). However, not all comments on North Korea's intentions reflected a negative perception of the state. Fascell guardedly suggested that North Korea appeared to seek peace on the Korean peninsula (House Hearing: February 6, 1992). Representative Richardson also observed some intent of more open relationships with the west by Kim Il Sung, albeit very slow movement (News Conference: February 5, 1992). Gore suggested that North Korean leaders may have

sought to include capitalist structures in some areas of the country as a "free trade zone" showed some success (CR: May 7, 1992). Thus, while many policy makers perceived a deliberate effort by North Korea to obfuscate and manipulate international efforts in North Korea, other policy makers observed a possibility that North Korea sought improved relations with international actors. However, any such observation was guarded and reflected a continued distrust of North Korean intent.

The response alternatives suggested by U.S. policy makers for North Korea centered on promoting democracy, openness and peace. Several Congressional leaders perceived a success in the past employment of The Voice of America and sought the use of a Radio Free Asia to propagandize democracy and freedom. Some policy makers considered this action a means for providing information to closed societies and a better way to create connections with citizens of Communist countries than through direct approaches to leaders (Bently, CR: March 31, 1992; Campbell, CR: March 31, 1992; Hatch, CR: September 8, 1992). U.S. agencies were also counseled to find "other" means for developing relationships with the North Korean people that reduced Kim Il Sung's "stranglehold" on them (Hatch, CR: September 8, 1992). However, most Congressional members who voiced their response alternatives preferred diplomatic efforts to draw North Korea into the international community. The first step in diplomatic efforts centered on the use of safeguard and IAEA inspectors to monitor North Korean nuclear activities (Cranston, CR: February 6, 1992), which included "snap" or "challenge" inspections that would allow inspectors to go where they pleased in North Korea (Solarz, CR: February 4, 1992; Leach, House Hearing: July 7, 1992). Some questions arose on whether IAEA inspections were stringent enough to uncover all nuclear weapons programs and material in North Korea (Cranston, House Hearing: March 31, 1992), but no alternatives developed except the threat to

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use force if North Korea was found to be less than fully cooperative. In addition, policy makers believed that the U.S. must take actions that sought to limit the North Korean arms trade (Cranston, CR: February 6, 1992). Broad statements on containment occurred, which likely suggested the desire for coercive and invasive actions similar to those employed in Iraq (Cranston, House Hearing: January 14, 1992). On the flip side, Congressmen Biden and Pell agreed that the use of "pre-emptive military action if necessary" was an acceptable policy option to limit North Korean arms distribution, especially in relation to nuclear weapons, if containment failed (Biden, CR: June 30, 1992; Pell, CR: May 6, 1992). Finally, Woolsey suggested that the U.S. should act multilaterally with other states, and called for a combined intelligence effort to determine the best possible actions against North Korea (Senate Hearing: February 24, 1992).

Policy makers also suggested a variety of domestic issues to address when dealing with North Korea—from calls to support the military with increased defense funding (or at least not to cut extensively) in order that the U.S. could fulfill its role as the world's police force (Aspin, CR: January 6, 1992) to the development of an SDI program (James, CR: March 4, 1992; CR: Hamilton, January 22, 1992). Warren Christopher brought in Clinton's perspective on foreign policy stating that there were three "pillars" to the administration's position: 1. U.S. economic security, 2. military strength, and 3. the spread of democracy and free markets abroad. These three policy points were to further American security and promote freedom in countries like North Korea (Senate Hearing: January 13, 1993).

In viewing the results from 1992 to 1993 on the image perception of policy makers, a perceived state that threatened the U.S. was observed. Yet, at this time, the threat was limited. North Korea sought nuclear weapons, but it did not have them yet, and there was the possibility that North Korea might reverse its nuclear development if the right incentives and precautions

occurred. In addition, the perceived willingness of North Korea to use WMD largely failed to appear. While policy makers perceived an Iraq quite willing to use WMD on other states and on "its own people," the same perception was not prevalent in the minds of U.S. policy makers with North Korea. While Representative Solarz did delineate the danger of a North Korea with nuclear weapons, as it had used violence against the South in the past, and there were numerous remarks on the threat and danger a nuclear North Korea posed to the region, there were very few remarks on the likelihood of a North Korean use of nuclear weapons based on recent past history. Even when the intent of the North Korean leadership came under scrutiny, it was discussed in terms of a "dictatorship," a "despotic" or "totalitarian" regime, and other terms used to describe a closed society and one that kept apart from the western world. There was little that reflected a perception that North Korea intended to dominate the region or expand its position as an enemy would (except for possibly a reunification of the peninsula). In addition, and very important to the perceived threat from North Korea, there were no comments on a necessary natural resource for security purposes held within North Korea that the North Korean leaders sought to control, thus controlling the military and economic power of the U.S.

When policy makers discussed Kim Il Sung himself, he was described as "paranoid" and "xenophobic," and as promoting himself through cultural structures, but the animosity level was relatively low. In only one place in all the documents viewed was the word "evil" used in relation to North Korea, and that was towards the "evil" act of arms trade by North Korea and China. When the cultural level of the country was considered, North Korea was perceived as a state at a lower level of cultural development than the U.S. Yet, North Korea sought WMD, specifically nuclear weapons, which, when combined with its anti-western stance, was enough to put it in the rogue state image category. In addition, as an arms dealer, there was some degree of

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economic development; yet, as can be seen today, low level arms dealing that supported one's own more technologically advanced weapons development was (and is) a sign of the times for developing countries. Thus, while North Korea fell into the rogue state image category, and policy makers did perceive it as such, the image of it was not as prototypically stringent as that of Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Thus, it was likely that policy preferences in a crisis situation would not be as limited to retributive acts as the prototype suggests but also include rehabilitative policies promoted by an "enlightened" parent seeking to coerce its child into proper behavior.

Policy Preferences for the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, 1993 to 1994

The crisis situation between North Korea and the U.S. (in conjunction with the international community) involved a long-drawn out "cat and mouse" relationship typical of a rogue state and a dominating power. Reacting against intrusive IAEA inspections and the continuation of Team Spirit war games between the U.S. and South Korea, North Korea threatened to further block inspections and withdraw from the NPT agreement. The U.S. stated that if North Korea found itself in trouble, it was their own fault due to their failure to allow complete access to IAEA inspectors. On April 7, 1993, the UN Security Council passed a censure against North Korea for blocking access to questioned sites. On May 11, 1993, the UN Security Council requested access to seven designated sites to which North Korea refused.

On June 7, 1993, the U.S. began direct talks with North Korea that continued for many months. During this time, North Korea suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT (July 1993). Yet, contentions still arose. North Korea continued to block access to the seven designated sites and two new challenged sites possibly used for nuclear waste storage, while the U.S. and South Korea participated in Team Spirit games as a preparedness measure (November 1993). However, by January 1994, North Korea had announced that it would allow IAEA

inspections at some sites. Yet, the progress of the inspectors failed to advance according to U.S. and international desires, and in February 1994, the Clinton administration announced that it would seek UN economic sanctions against North Korea, an act that some regional actors feared would provoke a military response by North Korea. On February 16, 1994, one week prior to the IAEA board meeting where members were likely to have produced a statement for the UN Security Council asking for UN intervention, North Korea announced that it would allow inspectors access to the seven disputed nuclear sites but not to the two possible nuclear waste sites.

Yet, North Korea hesitated to allow full access to IAEA inspectors and by March 1994, the Clinton administration began to signal that it may take military or economic action against the North Korean threat. In addition, South Korea called for the resumption of Team Spirit war games halted in an effort to promote rapprochement between North Korea and regional actors. The above actions apparently had no affect on the North Korean government in coercing them to adhere to U.S. demands as North Korean leaders announced that they planned to expunge IAEA inspectors on June 13, 1994. Shortly thereafter, former President Carter met with Clinton and traveled to North Korea on a "personal" trip to the country, an unofficial diplomat that sought to negotiate an end to the standoff. On June 23, 1994, Carter succeeded in arranging a compromise solution that was subsequently taken up by the UN and developed into the Framework Agreement. Finally, on October 21, 1994, the agreement was signed.[37]

From early on, President Clinton and his advisors publicly supported diplomatic efforts to gain entry of IAEA inspectors to North Korea, but they also asserted that diplomacy was not

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[37] See chapter four for agreement results.

unlimited. On a trip to South Korea where Clinton walked out onto the DMZ bridge, he spoke of the futility North Korea faced by producing a nuclear weapon as it could never be used without the assured destruction of North Korea. Facing this, North Korea should allow inspections. Hopefully, relayed Clinton, those military men watching him with binoculars as he strolled in the DMZ would then cross over into South Korea in peace. The earlier change in U.S. policy towards North Korea was the result of past North Korean actions that sought to adhere to international norms, and if the U.S. was to continue its course of diplomacy, North Korea would continue to "thaw" (Q&A: July 11, 1993). Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, however, mentioned that while administration efforts focused on diplomacy, "our patience is not unlimited" (CBS News: November 4, 1993). CIA Director James Woolsey, who hesitated to offer any policy preferences as that was not within his job description, did suggest that an opening in working with North Korea occurred through the North's admitted desire to move to light water reactors. Yet, Woolsey qualified, negotiators continued to reiterate that negative results would likely develop if a different course was taken by the North Korea (House Hearing: July 28, 1993).

Even into November 1993 and beyond, executive branch members still promoted diplomacy as the means for solving the crisis situation. Christopher stated that diplomacy continued to be the administration's top policy preference and that North Korea must adhere to the NPT, but he did not suggest any alternatives should North Korea fail to follow the Clinton administration's demands (Speech at the University of Washington: November 17, 1993). In February 1994, Christopher continued his promotion of diplomacy, acknowledged that it may take time, and stated the importance of IAEA inspections throughout the ongoing negotiation efforts in order to insure that North Korea refrained from processing the questioned fuel rods

(NPR: February 16, 1994). Yet, Christopher reiterated that diplomacy and negotiations provided the best means for obtaining entry into North Korea (ABC News: November 21, 1993). Successful negotiations would result in inspectors' access to the seven original sites (ABC News: January 9, 1994). However, Clinton admonished North Korea and stated that if leaders failed to make efforts towards honoring the non-proliferations agreements, the international community would act against it (White House News Conference: November 23, 1993). At the same time, Clinton promoted a reconsideration of the demands made by the U.S. and South Korea if North Korea moved towards acceptance of IAEA inspections (White House News Conference: November 23, 1993). National Security Advisor Anthony Lake continued to hold out hope for negotiation efforts. He offered to reconsider issues related to North Korea's inclusion into the international community if North Korea allowed inspectors into the disputed sites and resumed talks with the South. The key to successful negotiations with concessions, however, was continued efforts on North Korea's part towards progress after the first agreements were made (CR: March 8, 1994—see Hamilton). Secretary of Defense Perry, looking back from November 1994, suggested that there had been three possible actions to take: 1. Do nothing—the U.S. didn't choose this option, as simply ignoring the situation would allow North Korea to grow in strength, 2. take pre-emptive strikes against the reactors—but this could possibly lead to a full-blown war,[38] and 3. promote diplomatic efforts—first preventive diplomacy to move North Korea into compliance with IAEA inspections and, if that failed, coercive diplomacy backed by the threat of military force (Defense Department Briefing: November 10, 1994).[39]

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[38] A preemptive strike on nuclear reactors could also have allowed nuclear material to spread throughout the region, including over South Korea and Japan, not a welcome possibility by the U.S., the South or Japan.

[39] On Lexus-Nexus this news briefing can be found on 11/10/93, but is obviously dated in error as it mentions acceptance and is in support of the Framework Agreement.

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At first, Congressional members limited their comments urging the U.S. to take forceful measures against North Korea. Senator Lugar laid out that while the U.S. could not allow North Korea to advance a nuclear program, peace must prevail on the peninsula. Fear of "confrontation" could not restrict U.S. actions, yet actions must not create a "catastrophic" result for other regional actors. When pressed by MacNeil of the PBS news program on whether the U.S. should take forceful action, Lugar felt compelled not to suggest such actions and to allow the President and negotiators to set the time table, but also suggests that the President reiterate that the U.S. would stand firm in its desire to achieve the relayed goals (The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: January 27, 1994). As Representative Hamilton suggested, isolating North Korea would only create problems for the future. The goal must include bringing North Korea into the international community (CR: July 22, 1993). Yet, policy makers also reiterated that if North Korean failed to make forward steps of its own accord, the U.S. response should promote "increasing isolation, pressure, and pain" (Mitchell, CR: November 7, 1993).

As the crisis progressed, the vast majority of Congressional members responded to the crisis with extended remarks that voicing frustration with North Korea and the apparent failure of Clinton's policies. Most of these remarks came from Republican members and questioned exactly how diplomatic efforts were to proceed. There were vague calls for "strong action" (Bond, CR: November 22, 1993) and the "unacceptability" of North Korea possibly hiding nuclear weapons and keeping inspectors out (Nunn, Senate Hearing: February 23, 1994). Senator Frank Murkowski questioned whether the U.S. should negotiate directly with North Korea at all, a state that had only recently come out of its isolation and yet desired equal status by directly talking with the U.S., and who used the threat of nuclear capability to direct and influence negotiations to boot (News Conference: December 9, 1993). In response to diplomatic

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efforts by Carter, some Republicans voiced agitated responses. D'Amato questioned the authority of such an act and called it unconstitutional and a threat to the foreign policy making process of the U.S. (CR: June 24, 1994). In addition, Senator John McCain brought up the metaphor of the carrot and the stick and called on negotiators to take a hard stance against the North in upcoming talks in Vienna. McCain suggested that negotiators continue to demand further concessions from North Korea and not just limit the success to agreements made by Carter (CR: June 7, 1994). In those observed, Republican members tended to disagree on the policy preferences put forth by the Democrat administration.

Diplomatic efforts also included bilateral and multilateral efforts with other regional actors. Clinton reaffirmed a U.S. presence in South Korea and sought an end to nuclear testing internationally (News Conference in Japan shown on the MacNeil/Lehrer News Hours: February 24, 1993). Representative Ira McCollum called on Japan to revisit its constitution, changing it to allow offensive forces in regional conflicts in order to fight for its own security (CR: June 14, 1994). Furthermore, some policy makers believed that any actions taken by the U.S. should include other regional actors, including China, Japan and Russia (Nunn, The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: January 27, 1994; McCain, CR: February 22, 1994; McInnis, CR: March 22, 1994). Yet, U.S. policy makers considered the U.S. to be the superpower of the world any multi-lateral action should have U.S. leadership (Hamilton, CR: July 22, 1993). In addition, U.S. efforts were to include the support of China and Russia for economic sanctions if they became necessary (Mitchell, CR: November 7, 1993; McInnis, CR: March 22, 1994). Indeed, Perry implied in retrospect that the Chinese were instrumental in persuading North Korea to eventually consent to U.S. offers (Defense Department Briefing: November 10, 1994).

Other rehabilitative measures included possible economic benefits to North Korea if it moved towards accepting U.S. goals of IAEA inspections and a halt to the North's nuclear program. CIA Director Woolsey suggested that any threat of sanctions should also include the offer of benefits (House Hearing: July 28, 1993). National Security Advisor Anthony Lake stated that if North Korea allowed inspection and resumed talks with the South on nuclear matters, the U.S. should respond with diplomatic and economic benefits (Speech inserted into the Congressional Record: March 8, 1994—see Hamilton). While Senator Dole believed that the Framework Agreement went too far in helping the North, he did support negotiation on economic benefits as long as any movement by the U.S. was precipitated by North Korean actions first (CR: September 12, 1994). Yet, Representative Bereuter saw this as giving in to blackmail, a pay off to an insurgent in order to make the problem "go away." He suggested that no real solution appeared; the Clinton administration simply acted as a "sucker" to North Korean scamming (CR: August 24, 1994).

Some policy makers considered the need to take military action in North Korea or, at least, an increased U.S. deterrent and defensive capability in the region. President Clinton, in response to a question on what would happen if North Korea attacked the South, reiterated his position that the U.S. and South Korea would win, and that the North would likely end up as non-existent (White House News Briefing: November 23, 1993). Christopher stated that no option was removed from the consideration of the administration, but, due to North Korea's isolation from the economic benefits of the international community and its large standing army, negotiations to bring it into the international realm offered the best solutions. A pre-emptive strike against nuclear reactors, such as that undertaken by Israel against Iraq in 1981, would have had limited effect in North Korea due to a variety of reasons (ABC News: November 21, 1993).

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Nunn agreed with this assessment and suggested that an "imminent" threat of military action against North Korea should not occur as it could result in South Korean losses (ABC News: November 21, 1993). Several policy makers stood behind offering benefits in response to positive actions by North Korea while threatening negative responses if the North failed to comply (Mitchell, CR: November 7, 1993). On the other hand, policy makers also believed that every effort should be taken to reinforce the military presence in South Korea and the continued unity between the U.S. and South Korea in order to deter North Korean military advances and coerce the leaders into adhering to international and U.S. requests (Lugar, The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: January 27, 1994). For some Congressional members, the use of military force stood as the basic tool necessary for North Korean compliance to laid out terms (Gilman, CR: November 15, 1993). In other words, some policy makers believed that the U.S. should take "whatever steps necessary" to insure compliance (Lazio, CR: March 26, 1993; Gingrich, CNN: November 27, 1993). Others only implied the use of force but neglected to delineate what form it should take (Hamilton, CR: March 16, 1994). Even those who, at the beginning, supported a stick and carrot policy preference though threatened North Korea with the use of military force while offering economic benefits (McCain, CR: March 3, 1993) got fed up with the waffling of the Clinton administration and admonished it to take a firmer stance (McCain, CR: January 25, 1994; McInnis, CR: March 22, 1994; McCain, CR: June 7, 1994; McCollum, CR: June 14, 1994). One policy maker even suggested that it may be necessary for U.S. citizens to countenance the use of nuclear weapons in response to North Korean actions (McCollum, CR: June 14, 1994).

Policy makers also considered several less threatening actions the administration could take in response to North Korean inaction. Several Congressional members called for the

deployment of Patriot missiles to South Korea in case of an attack and to increase the U.S.'s ability to negotiate with force. Policy makers believed that by showing North Korea the futility in responding militarily to retributive actions by the U.S. as North Korea would fail to seriously harm South Korean and U.S. forces, North Korea would acquiesce to U.S. demands (D'Amato, CR: January 25, 1994; McCain, CR: January 25, 1994; Dole, CR: February 22, 1994). Other Policy makers submitted that Team Spirit games should proceed as they increased the preparedness of the forces in the region and promoted a position of strength (Dole, CR: February 22, 1994; McCain, CR: February 22, 1994).

Economic sanctions also fall within the realm of retributive actions against a rogue state and often go hand in hand with the threat to use force. Several policy makers suggested the threat to enact economic sanctions and/or a blockade to enforce sanctions if diplomacy failed (Woolsey, House Hearing: July 28, 1993; Gilman, CR: November 15, 1993; Christopher, State Department Briefing: November 17, 1993; Cohen, Republican Response to President Clinton's Saturday Radio Address: January 22, 1994; Nunn, MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour: January 27, 1994). However, President Clinton stated that he and South Korean leader Kim determined that economic sanctions were not an "attractive" position and would seek diplomatic means of compliance (White House News Conference: November 23, 1993). Furthermore, a joint effort by the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea and Russia was imperative in order to gain the most benefit from economic sanctions (Bond, CR: November 22, 1993). After the beginning of 1994, Republican Congressional members voiced frustration with the lack of advancement and more strongly insisted on economic sanctions and a regionally supported blockade (McCain, CR: February 22, 1994; McCollum, CR: June 14, 1994).

Interestingly, in the documents viewed there was no direct call for the elimination of Kim Il Sung's rule or a change in government. Very little of the discussion focused on the leader himself, with comments directed mostly towards North Korea as a state. Voiced concerns revolved around the threat posed by the large conventional army close to the DMZ, the threat that nuclear weapons would have on regional nuclear development, and the possibility that North Korea would sell nuclear weapons or technology to other states or terrorists. The consideration that North Korea may use nuclear weapons on the South or on U.S. forces was usually waived aside as North Korean leaders were believed to understand that any such action meant their demise.

The fascinating aspect of policy preferences towards North Korea was policy makers' support for a less than prototypical rogue state view of the country. While the desire to coerce North Korea into following international and U.S. demands fell within the rogue state category, the hesitancy to use force and the desire to act with real diplomacy suggests a perceived high cost for aggressive actions when weighed against the possible benefits. The possible high cost of life for both the South and the U.S. made military action and rigid stance undesirable, while the economic damage to South Korea could affect the world's economy. Furthermore, while the threat of a nuclear North Korea would change the make up of nuclear capable states in the region, and concerned policy makers voiced the possibility of the trade in nuclear material and technology, the perceived threat was not as high as that of a nuclear Iraq which could then control the power of oil. Thus, it behooved the Clinton administration to have patience and continue its efforts on the diplomatic front for an extended period of time. In addition, if a "carrot and stick" opportunity is put forth, it wouldn't help to spank the child at the same time one hands it a cookie. That would only teach the child that rewards hurt. Considerable patience

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is necessary for a paradigm shift in handling wayward states, showing that their efforts toward interaction with the international community hold benefits unattainable without such interaction. Thus, as suggested by the image development in the prior section, North Korea did fall into the rogue state category, but was not perceived as prototypically rogue as Iraq.

Determining the Image: Rogue or Not So Rogue, 1997 to 1998

The data on North Korea for the period leading up to the missile crisis, beginning in August 1998, uncovered a perceived rogue state image, but one where the leaders desired entry into the international community and appear to act towards that goal. The capability of North Korea centered on its conventional capability, possible nuclear material, missile development and arms trade. North Korea employed "the world's fourth largest army," amassed along the DMZ (Inouye, CR: April 11, 1997; Goss, CR: September 3, 1997; Thurmond, CR: March 3, 1998[40]). Representative Thomas suggested that this army was the largest in the world relative to the size of North Korea, although it lacked current technological advancement (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997). As for North Korea's nuclear capability, at a minimum, policy makers perceived North Korea as possessing "some rough crude nuclear capability" (Baucus, CR: June 5, 1997). North Korea had hidden its nuclear development program in the past and appeared to possess enough material for at least one or two bombs (CR: March 4, 1998). Yet, Clinton suggested that through U.S. and Chinese efforts North Korea's nuclear program was frozen (October 24, 1997).

In addition, North Korea also possessed chemical and biological weapons capability (Helms, CR: April 24, 1997; Gregg, CR: March 31, 1998; Thurmond, CR: March 3, 1998;

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[40] Strom Thurmond suggested, however, that North Korea's military was the fifth largest in the world.

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Skelton, CR: April 30, 1998), which could allow North Korea to compel a military withdrawal of U.S. forces (Helms, CR: April 24, 1997). Policy makers also voiced a concern about North Korea's potential to strike distant targets through its missile development program. North Korea could already target Japan and other regional actors (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997; Hunter, CR: June 18, 1997; Thurmond, CR: March 3, 1998) and may have procured the ability to strike with chemical laden weapons (Helms, CR: April 24, 1997; Cochran, Senate Hearing: October 21, 1997). Policy makers perceived that North Korea could produce long range nuclear weapons "sooner than we expect" (Spence, CR: February 12, 1998) or as early as 2000 (Gibbons, CR: July 29, 1998). Indeed, to Senator Inhofe, North Korea sat with China and Russia as a threat to the U.S. through an accidental or renegade launch (CR: June 19, 1997).

Furthermore, North Korea traded its missile technology and "exports terrorism," which supported a perceived threat of terrorists obtaining nuclear, chemical or biological weapons capability through trade with North Korea (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997). The ability of "rogue states" to obtain WMD and missile technology developed as a major concern for policy makers (Inouye, CR: April 11, 1997; Goss, CR: September 3, 1997; Thurmond, CR: March 3, 1998; Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998; Cochran, Senate Hearing: October 21, 1997). U.S. policy makers perceived a North Korean membership to the list of those who partake in state sponsored terrorism (Skelton, CR: April 30, 1998). Furthermore, North Korea acted with impunity and was involved in limited acts against South Korea (Gingrich, CR: April 10, 1997), despite international efforts to bring North Korea into the world community. As North Korean leaders sometimes acted against the South, more advanced technology in North Korean hands could escalate their opportunistic advances. On the other hand, Senator Baucus relayed that the North Koreans had held up their side of the Agreed Framework (CR: June 5, 1997), possibly

implying that he perceived some ability in the North Korean leadership to adhere to international accords.

During this period, policy makers perceived that North Korea's domestic capability was deteriorating rapidly due to North Korea's leadership and observed through their need for food aid. Representative Bereuter considered the internal breakdown a security threat to the region as "North Korea's unstable domestic situation—the threat of starvation, implosion, or external belligerence" could provide the opportunity for even more radical groups within North Korea to take power or a last gasp act by those currently in office (CR: February 26, 1997). Policy makers perceived an unstable situation of which they had no understanding could not predict the outcome (Dingell, CR: April 10, 1997). The "infrastructure is crumbling; power shortages are routine, propaganda is rampant. . .The North Korean regime is dying" and the U.S. policy makers perceived that they must protect the security of the region or allies would be threatened (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). At the same time, the leadership was "unpredictable" (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997), and, although the U.S. had studied North Korea for forty years, the U.S. still did "not know very much about this dictatorship" (Gingrich, CR: April 10, 1997).

Policy makers perceived the failure of the North Korean state as the leadership's inability to advance good domestic policy while the North Koreans, as per U.S. policy makers, considered the famine and dire situation to be a product of external and environmental factors (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). When North Korea sought to accept nuclear waste from Taiwan, U.S. policy makers cringed, claiming that North Korea had "no ability to manage its nuclear waste. . .so God knows what they are going to do with it. Perhaps they might contaminate our [South Korea's] groundwater system" (Representative Kim, CR: April 10, 1997). Some policy makers

still perceived a North Korean reliance on China for domestic policy formation but considered that such close relations may no longer exist (Baucus, CR: June 5, 1997).

North Korea's economy, as understood by policy makers, appeared almost non-existent. Congressional members visiting North Korea described a country where the agricultural regions seemed in need of development and basic technology, and which appeared deserted, city streets that were empty and unwelcoming, and a people that failed to exhibit any energy (Baucus, CR: June 5, 1997; Baucus, CR: October 22, 1997). A vast number of the North Korean people faced starvation (Biden, CR: July 31, 1997; Hall, CR: March 30, 1998), and by 1998, estimates showed that possibly as many as one million people had already died (Hall, CR: March 30, 1998). The agricultural technology in place lacked high yield capability (Stevens, News Conference: April 11, 1997). The imminent demise of the North Korean economy and government presented a security dilemma for the South which the U.S. must address (Berger, CR: April 22, 1997; Leahy, CR: September 19, 1997; Cohen, Defense Department Briefing: July 9, 1998). However, the situation could have been worse had North Korea's nuclear program not been frozen since 1994 (Clinton, CNNFN: October 24, 1997). On the other hand, North Korea's economic capability relied to some extent on missile and arms trade in the past (Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998), and the economic instability observed by policy makers could have produced an increased need to trade in missile and WMD technology and material, resulting in an increased threat to U.S. interests (Levine, Senate Hearing: October 21, 1997).

The cultural level of North Korea as perceived by policy makers placed it lower than that of the U.S., who often portrayed a society living in a period of ancient standards. Due to the famine, people lived in sub-standard conditions without electricity and the ability to travel and with a dying agriculture and a government that failed to address the needs of the people (Hall,

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CR: April 9, 1997; Goss, CR: September 3, 1997; Baucus, CR: October 22, 1997). Congressional members visiting North Korea relayed the horrible conditions, especially those of children who were mal-nutritioned and near death (Hall, CR: April 9, 1997; Biden, CR: July 31, 1997). Many people collected grass and bark to eat (Hall, CR: April 9, 1997). Yet, though North Korean people were dying, the military appeared to have plenty to eat (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997). After returning from North Korea, Representative Goss imparted his experience as having "felt after our 48 hours there that I had really been away from Earth for 48 hours" (CR: August 12, 1997). No life or happiness appeared in the faces of the North Korean people, while road blocks and road checks limited travel (Goss, CR: August 12, 1997). Representative Gibbons observed on his evening walk through the city that "we would often see street after street of people walking in the dark. Their only entertainment was to get outside of their homes or whatever apartments that they had and stroll down a dark street" (CR: August 12, 1997). Representative Jan Harman perceived the people as zombies: "What I came away from that job feeling was that no eye contact; no ability to relate to anyone around us. They were looking down, they were walking quickly. Even the kids didn't connect. And it was as though they were in a trance" (CR: August 12, 1997). These policy makers perceived that the life led by North Koreans was so bad that they lived like zombies, not enjoying any aspect of their world.

Additional comments reflected the perceived development level of government itself. North Korea existed behind a "veil of secrecy" (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997), was run by an "elite band of leaders" (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997), existed in "another era," and was "not the friend of Western democracy" (Goss, CR: October 7, 1997). Furthermore, Representative Pitts relayed the experiences of two defectors and their ordeal in a North Korean prison. Their torture was extreme and lengthy, and one victim had been only a child at the time, collected by

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the North Korean authorities based on the law that not only were anti-government perpetrators taken, but their family for three generations as well, including children (CR: May 6, 1998). The level of North Korean agriculture technology failed to produce the high yield found in "developed countries," and Koreans appeared to lack computers, modern machinery, fertilizer, etc. The North Koreans couldn't even figure out how to remove a large crane from atop a building once the job was completed. Furthermore, children resided in a community home from age 9 months to six years with little family contact (CR: Stevens, April 11, 1997). U.S. policy makers perceived a government that controlled every aspect of people's lives, yet couldn't figure out the simplest solutions for economic advancement.

On the other hand, some policy makers also perceived a country that held values that could be looked up to. North Korea, a "proud" country that attempted to actualize the philosophy of juche, or self-reliance, still acted to find food for its people (Senators, News Conference: April 11, 1997; Baucus, CR: June 5, 1997). Also, the "veil" was lifting and North Korea appeared to desire more open relationships (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). Senate members visiting in April 1997, described civilian officials willing to talk and find solutions to the barriers keeping North Korea from accessing needed aid and trade (Stevens, CR: April 11, 1997). These Senators also observed beautifully dressed participants preparing for the birthday celebration of Kim Jong Il (News Conference: April 11, 1997). Others described their experience at events in North Korea as based on "fine hospitality" (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). Thus, many policy makers also perceived hope and beauty in North Korea.

The perceived intentions of the North Korean leadership relayed a divided perception of what motivates and what goals were held by officials. North Koreans had acted "clandestinely" in the past (Hamilton, CR: June 18, 1998) while North Korean officials continued to hold

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suspicious views of the U.S. and demanded benefits without offering anything in return (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). North Korea persisted as a threat to South Korea and the region, and U.S. policy makers lacked the information needed to really know what the North Korean leadership really wanted (Gingrich, CR: April 10, 1997). Ultimately, based on past history, U.S. policy makers perceived that North Korea does in public what is necessary to gain economic benefits, while at the same time, acting privately to continue its efforts towards self-reliance economically and militarily (Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998). Due to the end of the Cold War and the elimination of constraints imposed on smaller states by superpower conflicts, rogue states perceived an opportunity to emerge as important regional actors (Spence, CR: February 12, 1998). Representative Traficant, a Democrat, seemed to imply that the North Koreans perceived a weakness in the Clinton administration's efforts, stating, "North Korea would never say in-your-face threats to Ronald Reagan" (CR: June 17, 1998).

On the other hand, National Security Advisor Samuel Berger believed that North Korea sought to enter the international community and, although "reluctant" in the past, he hoped that the Koreans would fully participate in current talks that advanced this desire (National Public Radio: April 22, 1997). North Korea continued to move with progressive efforts towards lessening tensions in the region and sought direct interaction with the U.S. (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997). Representative Hamilton viewed the current situation as promising as North Korea's nuclear program had been frozen by past negotiations and future agreements could eliminate completely the security threat on the Korean peninsula (CR: June 18, 1998). Other Congressional Members believed that, at a minimum, civilian officials sought a genuine opportunity to overcome the restrictions placed on North Korea's ability to access needed economic enhancement (Stevens, CR: April 7, 1997).

The names and phrases used to describe North Korea depicted both the perceived cultural level and the possible intent of the leadership. North Korea was the "Hermit Kingdom" (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997), "secretive" (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997), "isolated" (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997), and "desperate" (Foley, CR: April 10, 1997), an "outlaw" (Berger, National Public Radio: April 22, 1997), and a "renegade" (Gregg, CR: March 31, 1998), and an "enigma" (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997), a "third world" eccentric country (Thomas, House Hearing: June 8, 1997), the "last Stalinist regime" (Royce, CR: April 10, 1997) that was "reclusive and anachronistic" (CR: Goss, September 3, 1997), and of course, a "rogue" (Helms, CR: April 24, 1997; Spence, CR: February 12, 1998; Thomas, CR: June 14, 1998). The state "remains perhaps the most volatile, belligerent, and dangerously unstable nation in Asia, and perhaps the world" (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997). North Korea was "an accident. . .happening today" (Goss, CR: October 7, 1997). Yet, National Security Advisor Samuel Berger did not list North Korea with the rogue states, instead, calling it "isolated" (Berger, National Public Radio: April 22, 1997).

Congressional Members tended to perceive Kim Jong Il himself in a less than equal way. Commenting on his attempt to obtain a meeting with Kim, Senator Baucus related how, believing Kim to be a movie buff, Baucus sent Kim a movie on Wyatt Earp. They all had a good laugh about it, but the act failed to bring the desired results (CR: June 5, 1997). Kim was perceived as "erratic and irrational" (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997) and a leader lacking complete control over the country (Bereuter, CR: February 26, 1997). Yet, while not directly saying so himself, President Clinton agreed with "President Kim's [South Korea] assessment of the leadership in North Korea" after Kim stated that "it's very difficult to say you can trust a communist," but that

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the regime appeared stable and must be nurtured into moving towards cooperating with regional and international actors (White House Briefing, June 9, 1998).

Finally, in viewing the response alternatives offered by policy makers, a variety of possible actions developed. While most policy makers considered necessary humanitarian aid to North Korea for the famine problem (Hall, CR: April 9, 1997; Stevens, CR: April 11, 1997; Biden, CR: July 31, 1997), additional economic benefits would first have to be met with North Korean efforts towards eliminating security threats in the region and promoting the four-party talks as a good starting point (Baucus, CR: June 5, 1997). Policy makers also sought to consult with regional actors so U.S. policies did not conflict with other states' goals, another advantage to the four-party talks (Baucus, CR: October 22, 1997; Clinton, White House News Briefing, October 24, 1997). Furthermore, aid provided to North Korea should come with strict inspection and insurance measures that insured the aid reached needy populations (Goss, CR: September 3, 1997). In addition, the some policy makers observed limited adherence by the U.S. to the Framework Agreement and reiterated that the U.S. must take action to abide by the agreement and provide North Korea with heavy fuel oil (Clinton, White House News Briefing, June 9, 1998).[41] More generally, policy makers felt that U.S. policy in Asia must include the spread of American ideals reflecting "the rule of law, a democracy, free and fair elections, and human rights, as well as . . .economic freedom" (Bereuter, CR: April 10, 1997). Other policy alternatives promoted included more money for the military (Gingrich, CR: April 10, 1997), and, of course, advancement on a strategic defense initiative (Gingrich, CR: April 10, 1997; Spence,

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[41] Interestingly, in the debate on whether the U.S. or North Korea failed first in holding up its end of the bargain of the Framework Agreement, ultimately causing its demise, a Senate Hearing on June 14, 1998, headed by Republican Craig Thomas, appeared to concede that the U.S. had not provided heavy oil fuel to North Korea in the amount promised, blaming the lack of international support and administrative mishandling in creating the problem.

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CR: March 30, 1998; Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998). Some policy makers sought to reduce Agreed Framework assistance due to North Korean incursions against the South and not to allow the administration to eliminate any sanctions against the North (Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998). Indeed, the Agreed Framework effectively made some of these sanctions unenforceable (Murkowski, CR: June 25, 1998). Others would have liked to have opened trade to North Korea to provide an opportunity to American growers, especially the wheat farmers (Moran, CR: May 19, 1998). Continued support for South Korea, especially in the form of a U.S. military presence was a must (Clinton, White House Briefing: June 9, 1998).

Thus, the image collection data suggests the perception of a rogue state, but one that may not last and, to some, a state that sought international interaction. The military capability provided insight into a perceived high cost if military interaction occurred. The desire and possible possession of nuclear material placed North Korea squarely in the rogue state category. The large conventional army located in the DMZ suggested high costs. In addition, the perception that North Korea may provide rogue states or terrorists with WMD or missile technology supported the rogue state requirements. The economic and domestic capabilities perceived by policy makers suggest a dying regime. Policy makers questioned the hold on power by Kim Jong Il and the ability of the regime to survive economically. This lessened the strictness of the perception of the country as a rogue as the leader of a rogue state typically controls the state with an iron fist. The cultural level perceived by policy makers supported a state less developed; indeed, North Korea was not even in this century, or even on this earth, based on some policy makers' remarks. In addition, comments on the state itself portrayed a wayward state, isolated from the world community. Here again, there was some relaxing of the rogue state image. While many remarks did place North Korea in the rogue state category, some implied

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that it was simply backward or isolated and had just not yet grown up enough. The perception by some policy makers was that North Korea, while untrustworthy, should be rewarded for positive behavior. In addition, while North Korea was a threat to regional actors, the level of animosity was not as high as that towards Iraq. Therefore, based on the perceived image of a rogue state that was somewhat less than the prototype, policy preferences in a crisis situation would likely include the flexibility of rehabilitative measures with the threat to use further force if desired goals were not met.

Policy Preferences During the North Korean Missile Crisis, 1998 to 2000

From 1994 to 1998, the United States and North Korea each sought to support its side of the Agreed Framework. At the same time, internal events within both states caused lapses in judgment, desires to assert national pride and strength, and acts not within the "spirit" of the agreement. Officials within the U.S. and North Korean governments pointed at each other and claimed the other was the problem. By mid-1998, very little progress on the two light water reactors had occurred and heavy oil fuel shipments to North Korea did not fulfill promised amounts. Nevertheless, the framework held, while the policy of diplomacy and dialogue continued.

In a surprise move, on August 31, 1998, North Korea tested its Taepo Dong II Missile over Japan, with parts landing in the ocean in a trajectory close to Alaska. While North Korea claimed they were only placing a satellite in space, the U.S. and other regional actors saw this as a threat by North Korea and an act counter to the spirit of the agreement (although missile technology was not covered in the agreement itself). Japan threatened to withdraw funding for KEDO, the organization set up to facilitate the heavy oil procurement and the development of the 2 light water reactors promised in the agreement. In addition, U.S. officials sought assurances

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that an underground facility in North Korea was not a secret nuclear weapons development site. The Clinton administration sought and maintained diplomatic talks with North Korea, reaching an agreement on September 12, 1999 for North Korea to abstain from further testing and to allow inspections of the underground facility in exchange for a reduction of the sanctions against food and medicine imports.

Throughout the talks, North Korea, the U.S., and regional actors experienced tense moments. In June 1999, North Korea and South Korea exchanged fire in the sea off the coast of the peninsula. Information hinting at continued missile testing by the North reached policy makers in the summer of 1999. In an apparent response, the U.S. and South Korea resumed Team Spirit war games in August 1999, ratcheting up North Korea's rhetoric on the threat posed by U.S. and South Korean forces to North Korea's security. Despite the agreement in September 1999, the Clinton administration waited almost a year before actualizing the sanction reductions to see if North Korea would comply with U.S. demands. In June 2000, South Korean President Kim successfully promoted his "Sunshine Agreement" –for which he later received a Nobel Peace Prize—that sought closer ties with North Korea through relationship building efforts. President Clinton supported this policy, and removed the sanctions against North Korea June 19, 2000. In October 2000, Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited North Korea to shore up the relationship and announced that both sides would seek to formally end hostilities with a peace agreement.

Policy preferences considered by policy makers during the crisis centered on diplomatic efforts and changes in domestic policy. Mostly Democrats, based on those viewed, tended to support rehabilitative measures that sought to promote the positive aspects of dialogue and relationship building. Within the administration, Madeline Albright considered diplomatic

measures that supported the agreed framework, brought North Korea into four-party talks with the U.S., South Korea and China, and addressed the humanitarian needs of the North, productive means for insuring U.S. security (Media Opportunity: September 11, 1998). National Security Advisor Sandy Berger asserted the necessity to deal with the security threat posed by North Korea and set out three paths: 1. continued efforts towards holding the four-party talks, 2. access to the disputed underground sites, and 3. continued talks on North Korea's missile technology (White House Briefing: November 21, 1998). Defense Secretary Cohen believed another important aspect of diplomacy included cooperation with regional actors, especially Japan (Defense Department Briefing: September 14, 1998), and that Japan was the "cornerstone" in regional security (Defense Department Briefing: November 23, 1998). Furthermore, South Korea stood as part of the deterrent capability in the region and the support behind diplomatic efforts (Defense Department Briefing: November 23, 1998). Cohen stated in a January 1999 briefing that policies towards North Korea centered on "deterrence…defense…dialogue…[and] determination" to "contain" WMD (Defense Department Briefing: January 14, 1999).

Some (Democrat) members of Congress supported the administration's policies towards North Korea. Representative Hall believed that the Korean officials were "committed" to the four-party talks and continued diplomatic efforts (News Conference: November 17, 1998), and he suggested the U.S. go a step further and follow through with the Perry Commission[42] recommendation for placing a diplomatic representative in Pyongyang to create a more stable atmosphere (CR: September 21, 1999). Hall also believed that the administration could find new opportunities for building relationships with the Korean people (CR: June 15, 2000).

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[42] A commission mandated to gain access to the disputed underground facility and to promote further missile talks, led by former Secretary of Defense, Perry.

Senator Akaka saw the diplomatic efforts of the administration as supportive of U.S. security interests by limiting the development of missile technology, not as a bribe to North Korean demands as perceived by other policy makers (CR: October 1, 1999). Senator Biden considered diplomacy necessary to further the three points for regional security: the preservation of "peace and stability," continued efforts towards non-proliferation, and the promotion of "international norms in the areas of human rights and the environment" (CR: June 22, 2000). Biden reflected that diplomacy had brought successful relationship building between the U.S. and North Korea with successful talks and the imminent trip of Secretary Albright to North Korea. By creating relationships and dialogue with the North, new information about the world would provide opportunities for change, just as it did in the former Soviet Union (CR: October 19, 2000). Furthermore, the Clinton administration had proven diplomacy can be successful in reducing tensions in the region (Robert Kerrey, CR: February 24, 2000). Senator Bingaman perceived the opportunities for successful diplomatic efforts "brighter than ever before" as represented by Secretary Albright's visit (October 25, 2000).

The Clinton administration's approach to resolving the crisis through diplomacy prompted calls of foreign policy mismanagement. Clinton's accusers perceived the administration's strategy towards North Korea as incoherent and lacking a comprehensive view (Bereuter, CR: June 22, 1999). Representative Gilman saw a need for stronger efforts: "Only hard-nosed, well-considered diplomacy and US military superiority will ensure continued peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula" (House Hearing: September 24, 1998). North Korean officials' signatures on agreements were worthless, and other means for addressing the North Korean problem must be found as "present methods seem . . .highly questionable" (Thomas, CR: September 10, 1998). Representative Pitts would have liked to have seen more discussion on

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human rights issues and reminded fellow members of the horrendous prisons in North Korea (CR: May 18, 1999). Once success appeared in hand for the Clinton administration and a possible visit by the President to North Korea was voiced, Senator Murkowski relayed his concern that such a visit may undermine North-South relationship building, was only a "legacy" building effort by the President due to failed policies in the Middle East, and would give too much legitimacy to a lying, deceitful, double-talking regime (CR: October 27, 2000).

Diplomatic efforts often called for the acquiescence of North Korea to inspections that could insure adherence to U.S. demands. Secretary of State Albright hailed an agreement to talks, but asserted that all North Korean claims must be verifiable (Media Opportunity: September 11, 1998). National Security Advisor Berger explained the necessity for U.S. inspections of the underground site (White House News Briefing: November 21, 1998) and was supported by Defense Secretary Cohen (National Public Radio: January 14, 1999). In addition, humanitarian and economic aid required adequate monitoring to insure it was not diverted to the military (Gilman, CR: May 19, 1999).

Other rehabilitative policy preferences included the lessening of sanctions against North Korea in exchange for efforts towards adherence to U.S. objectives. If the U.S. removed some sanctions put in place by the Trading With The Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Department of Commerce's Export Administration regulations, offered further reductions once goals were met, and promoted the subsequent normalization of relations, North Korea would have the incentive to stop all missile testing and end (not just freeze) its nuclear program (Senator Akaka, CR: October 1, 1999). Berger implied that the "carrot" of easing sanctions could induce North Korean compliance for halting missile testing and "unequivocally" end its nuclear program (White House News Briefing: November 21, 1998). Representative Hall

believed that lifting sanctions could help the regular people in North Korea who were suffering and dying (November 17, 1998). Furthermore, Clinton acknowledged North Korea's adherence to the agreement of not partaking in missile testing while talks continued and offered the carrot of future sanction reductions (Messages from the President: November 10, 1999). Senator Dorgan believed any sanctions limiting the import of food or medicine into needful countries, including North Korea, immoral and desired all such sanctions to be removed (CR: June 12, 2000). The one, lone Republican observed that called for the elimination of sanctions on food and medicine on all states under sanctions, Representative George Nethercutt, based his view on the benefits possible for American farmers if these markets were opened up (CR: May 5, 1999).[43]

Some Congressional Members perceived positive steps by North Korea in response to Clinton lifting sanctions (Biden, CR: June 22, 2000). The lifting of sanctions created an "opportunity" in the region that could lead to "lasting peace" (Hall, CR: September 21, 1999; June 15, 2000). Other members of Congress, mostly Republican, perceived the reduction of sanctions improper policy or not reasonable until the U.S. was sure North Korea sought positive actions towards compliance. Only once "convincing evidence" was obtained showing North Korean adherence to the Agreed Framework should sanctions be lifted or economic aid offered (Knollenberg, CR: June 9 1999). To some, the North had simply been successful in "wearing down" the negotiators who gave in to North Korean demands (Gilman, CR: July 19, 2000).

Policy makers also tended to follow party lines voicing their opinions on whether or not economic assistance should develop as a negotiating carrot. As some Republicans observed,

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[43] George Nethercutt was a Representative from the Palouse region of Eastern Washington known for its wheat and lentil fields.

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North Korea already stood at the top of the list of those who received U.S. aid in Asia, and any further increases lacked warrant (Gilman, CR: September 24, 1998). North Korean requests for economic benefits in exchange for "concessions" were really only blackmail (Murkowski, CR: October 27, 2000). Others that perceived the needs of the Korean people suggested greater means of insurance that the aid reached needy populations (Hall, CR: November 3, 1999).

Interestingly, domestic policy preferences offered the most comprehensive and radical change in foreign policy direction. Due in large part to the missile testing of North Korea, as well as events in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, China and Russia, Congressional Members took considerable time to debate and pass the National Missile Defense Bill. Developed from Ronald Reagan's SDI and George Bush's Brilliant Pebbles programs, the National Missile Defense Bill called for the development of a missile defense system and its earliest possible deployment to protect the United States from rogue or accidental ICBM missile launches. Funding for an NMD system was not non-existent in 1998, just not funded to the satisfaction of some Congressional members, and deployment was based on determining a threat and then deploying on a three year system. At first, the discussion and vote ran mostly along party lines, falling short in the Senate by one vote in September, 1998. However, by March 17, 1999, the bill garnered bi-partisan support and passed 97 to 3. The House passed a slightly different version of the bill, but voted to support the Senate bill on May 21, 1999 by a 345 to 71 vote. The support for the bill changed in part based on the perceived possible capability by rogue states, including that of North Korea. Once the National Missile Defense bill passed, the ABM treaty, considered the cornerstone of nuclear arms agreements, came under fire as limiting security measures, non-effective, and in need of revision or elimination.

Comments made by policy makers revealed that North Korean actions of missile testing and nuclear weapons development made the NMD bill a necessity (not every comment by all Congressional members was provided here as they were too numerous; therefore, examples were provided only). Congressional members cite the threat of a missile attack by a rogue or terrorist state as necessitating the need for a NMD system (Burns, CR: February 22, 1999; Kerrey, CR: February 24, 2000). North Korea also prevailed as one of those states who threatened the U.S. with a possible nuclear missile strike (Gilman, CR: September 24, 1998; Thurmond, CR: October 2, 1998; Burns, CR: February 22, 1999; Chabot, CR: March 3, 1999; Schaffer, CR: May 12, 1999; Gilman, CR: May 19, 1999; Chabot, CR: September 15, 1999) as signified by the Taepo Dong missile test (Allard, CR: September 9, 1998; Gibbons, CR: October 20, 1998; Bereuter, CR: March 2, 1999; Cochran, CR: March 15, 1999; Royce, CR: March 18, 1999). Indeed, the lack of such a system allowed North Korean generals to perceive a U.S. weakness and seek nuclear and missile development as the only means to "beat" the U.S. (Hunter, CR: September 24, 1998). Even Clinton acceded to the missile defense system and called for a "system to defend against new missile threats while working to preserve our ABM missile treaty with Russia" (State of the Union Address: January 27, 2000).

Secretary of Defense Cohen suggested that the inclusion of Japan in research and development of a theatre-based missile protection system would benefit any anti-ballistic missile system program meant for regional protection (News Conference: November 23, 1998). Additionally, policy makers called for increased funding for the military (Weldon, CR: October 6, 1998; Hunter, CR: February 2, 1999; Weldon, CR: September 15, 1999), as well as a review and reconsideration of the current spending and military focus at that time (Cohen, Defense Department Briefing: September 23, 1998). As nuclear development information was stolen

from the U.S. by China and subsequently sold to North Korea, a review of who stood as friends or foes must be reconsidered (Hayworth, CR: June 15, 1999).

Very few policy makers considered retributive actions toward the North Korean missile crisis. Policy preferences incorporating military use tended to center on defensive or deterrent capabilities. National Security Advisor Berger reiterated that the U.S. would meet any offensive action by North Korea towards the South with force (White House Briefing: November 21, 1998). Secretary of Defense Cohen insured listeners that the U.S. continued a dual approach to North Korea: economic stability and military deterrence (Defense Department Briefing: November 23, 1998). Two months later, Cohen continued to support military enforcement of policies towards North Korea with a policy of 1. deterrence based on a large U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, 2. defense through theater missile defense systems, 3. dialogue based on four party talks and South Korean engagement, and 4. a determination to contain WMD (National Public Radio: January 14, 1999). Furthermore, General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserted that any engagement of forces must first go through a thorough cost-benefit analysis and then obtain the necessary funding (Senate Hearing: October 6, 1998). Congressional members also supported continued cooperation with regional actors and a military presence for deterrent capabilities (Gilman, CR: May 19, 1999) and to prove American military dominance (CR: Gilman, September 24, 1998).

Policy preferences of policy makers supported a perceived rogue state image, but not one "bad" enough to necessitate retributive actions. For the most part, North Korea appeared to desire the economic benefits available to states seeking to adhere to the norms of the international system. Yet, North Korea still struggled with its national identity, attempting to limit the amount of pushing around it received from the U.S. Policy makers did not trust North

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Korea, but some sought to draw the state out from its isolation to become a member of the world community. The President, administration advisors, and some Congressional members supported diplomatic efforts, while others considered such efforts useless and unlikely to bring real change as North Korea lied and was deceitful. Some members of Congress sought to lessen economic sanctions while others sought to keep them in place. No one observed in this analysis called for direct military intervention or a pre-emptive strike. Military use only came under consideration if North Korea was found to have taken aggressive action first. However, intrusive inspections, coercive diplomacy, and extensive containment measures were called for by policy makers, supporting the view of a state that was untrustworthy and in need of close watching. In no way was North Korea going to be allowed free reign to develop nuclear weapons, and the United States was there to insure it didn't happen. Yet, good behavior by the North Korean government was to be rewarded as well. Thus, those in charge of determining immediate foreign policy action, members of the Executive, proceed with diplomatic measures supported by the threat to take more forceful action, while those in charge of long-term foreign policy sought their own means for insuring the security of the state by passing the National Missile Defense Bill. The policy preferences of the policy makers supported a perceived image of a rogue state, but one located to the right of the prototype.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the transition of North Korea from the dependent of the enemy to the rogue state image, as perceived by U.S. policy makers, was observed. North Korea was perceived as being influenced by the Soviet Union in the late 1960s, and secured the extended deterrence of the perceived enemy. Policy preferences in a crisis situation reflected this image. After the end of the cold war, a more independent North Korea emerged, one that sought WMD

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and often appeared to go against the wishes of the western states and the international community. Yet, the perceived image portrayed by the words of policy makers did not fit the prototype rogue state image. Instead, there was some opportunity for change observed in North Korea, and the threat was not as high as the prototype rogue, Iraq. However, many policy makers still considered North Korea to be untrustworthy, totalitarian, backwards and conniving. Policies towards this state supported a rogue image that fell to the right of the prototype, rewarding good behavior that appeared to show a North Korean desire to enter into the international community. While some policy preferences fell into the rehabilitation category, retributive policies supported rehabilitative acts, while containment, intrusive inspections and coercive diplomacy really set the agenda for U.S.-North Korean interactions. While good behavior was rewarded, retribution was still within the arsenal for use against North Korean bad behavior.

The next chapter will further explain the results as they relate to the hypotheses and the location of both Iraq and North Korea in their image categories.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

Support for the Hypothesis

From the Dependent of the Enemy to the Rogue State Image

The first hypothesis proposed that *a change from the dependent of enemy image to the rogue state image will produce a change in policy preferences towards the perceived state.* In considering the images perceived by policy makers of Iraq before the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, policy makers indeed perceived a state dependent in many ways on the Soviet Union. The perception by policy makers of Iraq was that military and economic benefits derived from the enemy state, and while the Soviets may not have controlled Iraqi domestic and foreign policy making, actions taken by Iraq fell in line with the perceived desires of the Soviets. In addition, U.S. policy makers perceived the culture and intent of Iraq at this time as following below that of the U.S., placing it in a dependent position. Iraq was not strong enough nor perceived as socially or politically developed enough to stand as an equal to the Soviet Union, and so was not perceived as an ally of the enemy. The deterrent capabilities of the Soviet Union extended over its satellite state, making the use of force by the U.S. directly upon Iraq unlikely as the threat of a possible nuclear exchange between the two superpowers existed in the minds of policy makers. The U.S. instead would likely seek other means of influencing Iraq, most likely through the U.S.'s own dependents or satellites, or through diplomacy. The policy preferences sought by policy makers during the 1973-1974 Arab-Israeli War supported the perception of a dependent state as the U.S. preferred to send military aid to Israel rather than attack contributing Arab states themselves. In addition, once oil, through the embargo, became a weapon to be used against the U.S. and the unity of the international community, the U.S. looked inward at how it could outlast

the embargo and outward towards diplomatic efforts. Furthermore, U.S. efforts focused on the Soviet influence in the crisis, first seeking to offset the military support of the Soviet Union towards the Arab states and then through diplomatic efforts to force a cease fire. The high point of the crisis centered on the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviets rather than the war between the Middle Eastern states. Thus, the perceived dependent of the enemy image for Iraq was supported.

During the pre-Gulf War years, there was a mix of perceptions on Iraq. While most policy makers promoted caution when dealing with Iraq, some (mostly Republican) policy makers saw an opportunity within the state for U.S. influence. Both the Bush administration and Congressional members understood the negative aspects of the Hussein regime, but some perceived that, through U.S. guidance and economic and military opportunity, Iraq could stand as a force for peace in the Middle East. On the other hand, many other Congressional members, both Republican and Democrat, voiced intense dislike for Hussein and his regime, citing human rights abuses of the past. Cultural, political and economic levels ranked lower than that of the U.S., and many policy makers perceived a less than righteous intent on the part of the Iraqi leadership. The state garnered emotionally laden epithets, such as a "terrorist" or "gangster" state and "the darkest place in hell." Saddam Hussein himself was a "madman," "murderer," "butcher of Baghdad," and the "Mad Dog of the Middle East." Furthermore, supporting the hallmark of a rogue state, Iraq sought weapons of mass destruction. Thus, while some policy makers hoped for the opportunity to influence change in Iraq and gain access to this important oil producing state, others perceived a rogue state whose leadership must end. In a crisis situation, those perceiving opportunity may take more rehabilitative actions towards the state, while those holding more extreme views would take retributive action. As a result of the Gulf crisis, policy

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makers tended to seek retributive actions, calling for economic sanctions and a blockade and/or the use of military force. Those who had once sought opportunity in Iraq stood on the side of those voicing the most retributive policies, while many who had originally held rogue state images tended to support the less deadly policy choices of economic sanctions combined with deterrent military positioning. Yet, the extreme change of view from opportunity to retribution is consistent with a forced dramatic change in image produced by an intense, emotional event. Those policy makers calling for military action felt betrayed by Iraq as the U.S. had sought to nurture Iraq into acceptance into the international community, and so some U.S. policy makers desired to strike back with actions supporting an embarrassed "parent" who must put an unruly child in its place. Obviously, in the back of the minds of these policy makers was the view that Iraq was not an ally or a dependent of the U.S., despite hopes to the contrary, otherwise actions to rationalize Iraq's actions to the world community would have occurred with real diplomatic efforts to cajole Iraq into leaving Kuwait. Instead, Iraq failed to be civilized by U.S. efforts, suggesting a failed U.S. effort in the region, which provoked retributive actions to prove U.S. dominance in the world. In addition, Iraq was not perceived as a dependent of the enemy and very little attention was given to allowing Soviet involvement in the crisis situation. Not only is the perceived image of a rogue state upheld as are the policy preferences as a response, but the rogue state image prototype emerges through Iraq.

The hypothesis promotes that a change in the image from the dependent of the enemy to the rogue state would show a change in policy preferences. Indeed, policy preferences during the Arab-Israeli war focused on the U.S. arming its own satellite or ally, diplomacy that included the enemy, and domestic policy changes towards oil production and consumption. On the other hand, policy preferences during the Gulf War sought direct action against Iraq. No longer was

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there a concern over the possible intervention by the enemy state. Iraq was open to direct and severe acts to coerce it into leaving Kuwait. Even less harsh retributive actions, such as sanctions and a blockade, were only given limited time for success before some policy makers sought the use of force. Extended deterrence from the enemy no longer existed, and direct deterrence of Iraq failed to halt direct actions against the state. Thus, the first hypothesis is supported in the case of Iraq.

For North Korea, during the years prior to the *Pueblo* crisis, most policy makers perceived a state very much a part of the Communist Monolith led by the Soviet Union. In addition, China, to some degree, was also perceived as an influence on North Korea. Smaller Communist states like North Korea were pawns in the Cold War games between the superpowers. The cultural, political and economic levels of North Korea were perceived as lower than those of the U.S. and influenced by the Soviets, while the North obtained its military capability from the U.S.S.R. Response alternatives ranged from attempts to help those emerging states battling Communism to building bridges through cultural exchange that would eventually cause the destruction of Communism as people perceived the wrongness of their beliefs. The actual policy preferences of policy makers in response to the taking of the *Pueblo* and the crew in 1968 ranged widely. The Johnson administration, which would make the primary decisions over what immediate actions to take, sought diplomatic avenues for the ship and crew's return. Furthermore, the first action of the administration was to contact the Soviet Union and request they force North Korea to return the crew and ship. Many Congressional Members supported the decision to act through diplomatic channels, fearing that an invasion would cause the death of the crew or instigate a larger Communist altercation. Others wanted to take military action, go into Wonson harbor, take or sink the ship, and hopefully find the crew; and if the Soviets wanted in

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on the fight, well "bring it on." Some perceived the *Pueblo* incident as an act in a much larger East Asian game, believing the Soviets had orchestrated the incident in retribution for South Korean forces entering the Vietnam War and to force the U.S. to start a withdrawal. Policy preferences reflect this sentiment as policy makers called not only to continue efforts in Vietnam, but to insure South Korea's capability to defend against and to deter North Korean actions. While some policy makers did call for the use of military force, an act not supporting a dependent of the enemy image, many of theses same policy makers voiced the desire to not be pushed around by the Communists and taking strong action, even if it meant direct conflict with the Soviet Union. This call for action in the waning months of the Johnson administration, during the Vietnam War, likely suggests more of a blustering and swaggering effort by mostly Republican Congressional Members seeking to influence the upcoming elections by calling to task the foreign policy failures of the administration and displaying a strong stance against the enemy through nationalistic pride. With little other than words by discontent policy makers, as the actual policies undertaken by the administration focused on diplomatic efforts to insure the return of the men, the image of a dependent of the enemy state is supported.

Jumping forward to the years prior to the 1993-1994 NPT crisis with North Korea, the influence of the Soviets, now Russia, really no longer existed. North Korea controlled a large conventional force and sought nuclear weapons. The perceived cultural level of the people in North Korea by U.S. policy makers suggested a view of a less advanced society, while the seeming political and economic systems relayed values unacceptable to the international community. Policy makers were wary of North Korean intent and perceived a government that acted clandestinely to achieve its goals and whose officials may say one thing and do another in this process. North Korea was the Hermit Kingdom, lived in isolation, and one of the last

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Stalinist states. Very few comments discuss Kim Il Sung himself at this time, except that he's paranoid, xenophobic and seeks to promote his own worth. Response alternatives suggested a focus on rehabilitative efforts through inspections, backed by the threat of force. The image of North Korea as perceived by policy makers supports a rogue state image, but one that is not as prototypically "bad" as Iraq. While North Korea failed to adhere completely to international norms, the leadership apparently sought more open relationships with other countries. Thus, policy preferences in a crisis situation would likely fall on the side of rehabilitative measures with the threat to use force a support in order to coerce proper behavior. Indeed, in the crisis situation stemming from North Korea's threat to remove itself from the NPT, policy preferences suggested by policy makers tended to focus on diplomacy, with the threat of economic sanctions if North Korea continued with non-compliance. The use of the military only came up as a response if North Korea took action first. Calls for increasing the military support and defensive capabilities of South Korea emerged, a containment strategy, as well as increased funding domestically for the U.S. military. While some policy makers demanded the administration act with strength and power, calls tended to fall short of taking preemptive action against nuclear sites in North Korea, although policy makers did voice the threat to take more forceful action if North Korea failed to comply. Policy makers did tend to agree that a nuclear North Korea threatened the security and safety of the U.S. and the region and must not be allowed. One way or another, North Korea's nuclear program must be stopped. Thus, policy preferences support the perception of a rogue state that falls short of the prototypical image, a state that may change its course through rehabilitative measures but backed up with the threat of retributive force.

The focus on diplomacy for both the dependent of the enemy and the rogue state image may appear as a failure to support the hypothesis that a change in image will produce a change in

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policy. Yet, the diplomatic efforts of the U.S. during the NPT crisis centered on enforcing the acceptance of IAEA inspections within the country to insure that North Korea did not develop nuclear weapons. In addition, threats of economic sanctions or more forceful measures supported the diplomatic efforts of the U.S. The U.S. government decided that it could not allow a nuclear North Korea, and would take action to stop said development with direct action if necessary. Furthermore, the U.S. had the support of Russia and China in this instance as both states could also find themselves threatened by North Korea's nuclear development. Thus, for a state perceived as a rogue, yet not as far along the spectrum to sit with the prototypical Iraq, rehabilitative measures with the threat of retributive acts, combined with containment measures and invasive inspections, do support the hypothesis.

Strengthening the Rogue State Image

Hypothesis two proposes that *the closer the held image of a state moves over time towards the prototypical rogue state image, the more policy preferences of decision makers move towards expected rogue state policies.* This hypothesis suggests that, as time progresses and the perception of a state as a rogue strengthens, then policy preferences of the perceiving state will fall even more along the lines of those towards a rogue state. For Iraq, in the years prior to the *Desert Fox* in action in 1998, the perceived image of a rogue state strengthened. Focusing mostly on the actions and intent of Saddam Hussein, policy makers perceived a state continuing to seek WMD development despite international efforts to the contrary. It was viewed that if weapons of mass destruction ever fell into the hands of Hussein, he would either use them or provide them to terrorists to use against the U.S. Iraqi leaders were inhumane and uncivilized, with Iraq a pariah, outlaw, rogue state. Hussein failed to understand the international world and its complexities, cared little about the people within his borders, and even less about the

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environment. He was as evil as Hitler, murderous, stupid, needed constant watching and would destroy the Gulf region if allowed. There was no one worse in the post-cold war era than Saddam Hussein. While many of these terms and implications appeared prior to the Gulf war, their universal use by policy makers on both sides of the isle and the venomness and vehemence of their use increased. Saddam Hussein knew only one thing: the raw use of power, and that was how he should be treated. The prototypical image of Iraq as a rogue state only strengthened by the end of 1998, making retributive policy preferences the most likely choice of action for policy makers.

By the time the Clinton administration approached the 1998 crisis, they'd had it with Saddam Hussein. As he appeared not to comply with UN resolutions and international requirements, policy makers tended to support the use of military force to compel compliance. The few policy makers against military use saw political interests of the President involved, stemming from the impeachment process underway, and were vehemently against using the military to further the personal political gains of the President. Others wondered why the use of force hadn't come sooner, and whether the few days of bombing would really do the job. Numerous law makers took the opportunity to rise in support of Clinton's use of force against Iraq. Only a few considered the detrimental effects the bombing would have on the civilian population as well as the devastating effects already felt through sanctions. Ultimately, the goal emerged to eliminate Hussein as the leader of Iraq either through bombing, undermining the government, supporting oppositional groups, or implosion.

Incredible as it may seem, the perceived image of Iraq as a rogue state did increase from pre-Gulf War to pre-Desert Fox. The policy preferences of policy makers support the hypothesis that such an image strengthening promotes stronger adherence to policies fitting that image. For

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Iraq, the prototype rogue state, immediate and retributive action must occur. Little discussion occurred over whether or not to use force, just whether or not it was going to be enough to do the job. Therefore, support exists for the hypothesis that as policy makers' perceptions of a rogue state strengthen, their policy preferences increasingly move toward actions that reflect that image.

North Korea, in the years prior to the missile crisis in 1998 still retained its rogue state image, but the degree to which policy makers perceive it as a rogue state varies, often with Republicans holding stronger views than Democrats. While some policy makers perceived a state just as untrustworthy and as threatening as Iraq, others perceived an opportunity for change within the state. North Korea appeared to adhere to the Agreed Framework and sought economic inclusion in the international system. Yet, policy makers perceived North Korea as a state that continued to seek nuclear weapons, continued its missile development, and continued its belligerence towards South Korea. North Korea also exported missile and arms technology to rogue states and terrorists, perceived as a direct threat to U.S. interests and security. Policy makers perceived that only the eminent failure of North Korea's political and economic systems had forced its leaders to seek outside help, yet they neglected to understand that the source of their country's demise rested on the Communist system they employed. Some U.S. policy makers' comments reflected the view that the people in North Korea didn't live in the 20th century, or even on earth for that matter. The elite leadership continued, however, to support a large military contingency, and, according to many Congressional Members, to have a dual intent of appearing to comply with Agreed Framework requirements while clandestinely furthering its nuclear weapons program. Ultimately, Congressional Members found it difficult to understand the motives and intents of North Korea as little information escaped the country. While North Korea was a rogue, an outlaw and a Stalinist State, it was equally viewed as a Hermit country,

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isolated, and desperate, and Kim Jong Il as a paranoid and eccentric man; negative terms certainly, but without the same venom as those applied to Saddam Hussein and Iraq. However, intelligence suggested that North Korea retained enough plutonium for one or more weapons and the missile technology to threaten the region, with continued advancement in technology likely to produce an ability for North Korea to strike portions of the U.S. within years. Thus, although policy makers perceived North Korea as a rogue state, the degree to which it had increased its position as a rogue state varies between policy makers, often along party lines.

The policy preferences of policy makers during the missile crisis, beginning in August 1998, tended to support the use of rehabilitative measures that sought less violent means for compliance. Not only did the missile capability of North Korea develop as a concern, but also the possibility of a secret, underground nuclear weapons program. In seeking access to the questioned site and continued talks on missile technology and export, the Clinton administration offered reduced sanctions on one hand and the threat to take stronger action on the other. This approach tended to garner support from the Democrats in Congress, while Republicans tended to criticize a failing and weak regional policy. The administration, so say some members of Congress, must take a firmer stance against North Korea. Yet, as General Shelton suggests, any consideration of the use of force must first undergo a cost-benefit analysis of the situation. A 1 million man army and the possibility of a couple of nukes is enough to put a halt on anyone's parade. Ultimately, the best option for Congressional Members was to pass the Missile Defense System Bill, forcing the Clinton administration to develop and deploy as soon as possible a national anti-ballistic missile system to protect the country from rogue or accidental launches. While North Korea was not the only cause for this bill, it certainly ranked high on the list of reasons for putting the system in place and changing the basis of U.S. foreign policy.

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In addressing the hypothesis asserting that a perceived strengthening of a rogue state image will produce policies increasingly supportive of that view, the outcome is vague for North Korea. First, it is difficult to ascertain if the rogue state image did indeed strengthen during this time. For some policy makers, it appears that they may have considered North Korea as adhering to the Agreed Framework requirements. After all, missile development was not covered by the agreement, nor uranium mining and enrichment, although both could have been seen as going against the "spirit" of the agreement. On the other hand, many policy makers perceived a state just as untrustworthy as Iraq, undergoing the same cat and mouse game with a state that had observed the ineffectiveness of the U.S. in Iraq and was employing similar strategies at home. So the strengthening of the image varies, at least until after the missile testing, when policy makers considered what the threat of a nuclear tipped North Korean missile might mean for U.S. security. Yet, the costs of taking military action in North Korea were so high as to make diplomacy a worthwhile effort to pursue. Thus, based on the costs associated with military action, the increased use of rehabilitative measures is understandable, especially when supported with invasive inspections and containment strategies. Diplomatic talks that offered reduced sanctions on one hand, and the threat to take harsher actions on the other, appeared to offer the best solution to a state in desperate need of economic and humanitarian aid. After all, a starving, unruly child, living in isolation will, with patience, care, food, and warmth, develop into a strong friend ready to come to your aid when needed.[44] In addition, the U.S. took measures to increase its protection at home, an act meant to take responsibility for the country's security and not allow rogue states to directly threaten the U.S. Rather than only punishing the child, the adult removes

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[44] This is not meant in a derogatory way towards North Korea, but rather, to support the rationale for how policy makers tend to perceive states in the rogue state image category.

the perceived weakness that the child may act against. Not only acting to show the child the benefits associated with not attempting to hit the adult, but also showing how the child will be unable to make contact if he/she indeed tries, the adult eliminates both the intent and the motive for violence. Therefore, if consideration is given for an "enlightened" approach to child rearing, then increased efforts towards the use of rehabilitative measures emerge, supporting the hypothesis.

Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Measures for a Rogue State

The final hypothesis seeks to understand why the difference in policy preferences between Iraq and North Korea by asserting that *a rogue state image observed as less threatening will result in rehabilitative policy preferences while a rogue state image observed as more threatening will result in retributive policy preferences.* As shown in the discussions of the prior two hypotheses, the perception of Iraq as a rogue state placed that state in the prototype position. Indeed, Iraq is the prototype often used in the minds of policy makers when they subconsciously consider the placement of other states. As time went by, that image appeared to strengthen. When taking action against the Iraq, diplomacy wasn't really offered. Iraq was told to comply or else face sanctions and/or military action. When Iraq failed to go along with U.S. and international demands, it was bombed into submission and contained through coercive means.

On the other hand, the above discussions on North Korea unveil a perception of a state placed at a point less than that of the prototype. While not a consensus, policy makers tended to perceive some opportunity for change and compliance in the state, or at least the belief that "good" action should be rewarded. The invectives against North Korea never reached the magnitude of those used against Iraq. North Korea appeared to many policy makers as more of an isolated, backwards child that didn't know any better, but could be cajoled into changing its

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behavior or, at least, watched constantly to insure compliance. Other policy makers perceived a North Korea that took a dual stance, adhering to international norms when benefits were possible while secretly furthering its own policy agenda. In addition, as part of the capability node for the independent image variable, North Korea's military strength and possible nuclear capability made it more costly to take against it military action. That level of capability, however, is not enough to place it in the enemy image, as the political, economic, and cultural levels perceived by policy makers place it at a much lower level of development. It's just that this wayward child has found a gun. Now how do you deal with her. It doesn't mean that the child is any more or less wayward, just that the gun exists in the hands of the child. A more destructive child could create devastating harm with a knife, while the child with the gun simply needs time and understanding for him to put the gun down. Yet, U.S. policy makers perceived both Iraq and North Korea similarly on several points. Both states sought nuclear weapons, were anti-western, were economically, militarily and culturally inferior to the U.S., supported a leadership with unclear intent, that was untrustworthy, and that was likely to take "bad" actions if an opening was allowed. It is only that policy makers tended not to view North Korea quite as prototypically "rogue" as Iraq. Thus, with North Korea, the perceived placement of the state within the rogue state category fell to the right of the prototype.

The perceived differences between Iraq and North Korea in their placement as rogue states led to different policy preferences, supporting the third hypothesis. Iraq was bombed with impunity while diplomatic efforts were used to engage North Korea. Yet, there were similarities between the two states as well. Policy makers threatened both states with the use of force in cases of non-compliance, enacted containment strategies, demanded invasive inspections, and sought treaties or regulations that limited the sovereignty of each state. Only, in the case of

North Korea, the perception of a state moving towards compliance suggested a carrot offering along with the stick. Furthermore, much of the perceived differences were the result of the threat offered by each state. Iraq, although less of a military threat than North Korea due to its location, did have WMD capability and a large, capable army at the time of the Gulf War, yet bombing still occurred. It also sat on billions of barrels of oil and threatened billions more. This threat to control the flow of oil, a source of economic and military power throughout the world, dominated the perception of the Iraqi threat. On the other hand, although North Korea might have had one or two nuclear weapons and had a large military contingent close to the DMZ and only miles from U.S. and South Korean forces, there was no direct threat to U.S. global dominance, only to U.S. prestige. Thus, North Korea was not as much of a threat, not as insolent and not as evil as Hussein and Iraq, and offered greater costs in the use of force, resulting in different policy preferences: retribution for Iraq and rehabilitation for North Korea.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

In this dissertation I have presented the literature on image theory in order to show the importance of images to foreign policy. This study provides insight into the images held by policy makers and how images affect policy decisions. By viewing how policy makers respond to a rogue state, a greater understanding of image theory and how policy makers make decisions occurs. Important for the future, the development of image theory is an attempt to predict policy decisions of policy makers and could lead to points of positive remediation.

The literature on image theory left open the development of the rogue state. By viewing the transition from the dependent of the enemy to the rogue state, why such states act against international norms appears. Rogue states, once covered under the deterrent capabilities of their parent state, seek to obtain deterrent capabilities no longer offered by the enemy. Such acts often threaten the security of neighboring states. In the case of Iraq, a state in control of vast amounts of oil and located near other oil producing states, moves to obtain desired deterrent capabilities was perceived as a threat to the entire world. Yet, Iraq sought it own security, having lived under British and French rule, as well as the Ottoman Empire, for centuries. First through the acquisition of military and economic aid that aligning with the enemy provided, and then on its own, Iraq sought deterrent capabilities. The research data supported the change in perception of Iraq from that of a dependent of the enemy to a rogue state, a perception that only increased over time.

For North Korea, a more regionally based threat emerges, although continued missile development and the exportation of weapons increased the direct threat of this state toward the

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U.S. North Korea, first invaded and controlled by the Chinese, then colonized by the Japanese, and finally occupied and divided by the Soviets and Americans, felt that it must attain its own independence and self-reliability. Thus, North Korea sought deterrent capabilities. The U.S. stands as a threat as it continues its presence in the region; yet, the U.S. won't leave until North Korea ceases its actions that threaten American allies and satellites. The research supported a perceived change in image from the dependent of the enemy image to that of a rogue state image.

Yet, not all states perceived in the rogue state category incur the same policy responses. This is where this study adds to the theory by suggesting that rogue states can be placed on a spectrum, resulting in different policy preferences based on the placement. Iraq, the prototypical rogue state image, demanded retributive actions to beat it into shape. Very little in the way of real diplomacy occurred; rather, policy makers demanded compliance or Iraq would face harsh action, and followed through when Iraq failed to adhere to demands. For Iraq, deterrence failed. On the other hand, give and take diplomacy occurred with North Korea, with benefits offered in exchange for compliance. The opportunity for North Korea to enter into the world community continued over time as patience, with the threat of retributive actions, produced movement towards North Korea acceptance of international norms. Thus, retributive policy preferences developed from the perceived rogue state image of Iraq, while North Korea incurred less restrictive policies that included rehabilitation efforts. North Korea successfully deterred the U.S. from attacking and forcing compliance.

Implications

Currently, rogue states are at the forefront of threats to U.S. security. An understanding of the cognitive processes decision makers employ make it easier to determine what choices policy makers prefer when responding to rogue states. The recent events in Iraq, Iran, Syria,

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Libya, and North Korea emphasize the importance of the rogue state image in policy making. The greater the understanding of how images affect decision making, the greater the predictive power of image theory. Ultimately, an understanding of image theory will lead to a greater understanding of policy makers and how they make decisions. Hopefully, insight into policy makers' perceptions of other states will offer points of access for overcoming misperception and less than perfect policy making.

Suggestions For Future Research

Ideally, the ability to conduct research in both Iraq and North Korea in order to develop the images held by these states would enlighten us as to their perspectives on policy decisions. Having both sides of a conflict included in a discussion on deterrence and the psychological influences therein benefits research (Jervis, 1985). Furthermore, including other former dependent or colonial states and their transition into other categories, both from the U.S. foreign policy perspective and from the countering view of these states, would provide additional information on access points for overcoming misperception and gaining greater opportunities for positive policy outcomes.

Throughout this study, the effect of emotions on image perception appears. The inclusion of affect to the study of images takes shape in Cottam and Cottam (2000) but is only included as a possible explanation of the strength of connection to an image in this research. The study of how emotions color perception may provide interesting answers to unanswered questions of why certain actions take place. Strong emotions play a role in the level of adherence to a perceived image as well as to the degree of change from one image category to another. Exploring the powers of emotion on perception will again offer points of access for overcoming misperception, leading to better policy making. Finally, the interaction between personality, operational code,

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and image perception offers a dynamic view of policy makers' psychologies and the decisions they make. An interactive research program, either researched separately and then fit together, or undertaken as a single effort, may offer a leap towards that Grand Theory desired by political theorists.

Conclusion: The Future World (Without WMD?)

While image theory relied on a realist view of international relations in the past, idealist views of human nature may prevail in the future. An idealist take on image theory presents new ways of viewing power relationships, centering on a world community led by the United Nations. From this perspective, images of other states take on new meaning, better representing the future relationships between states, with the rise of terrorism as the main security threat. Since nuclear weapons fail to deter terrorists who rely on innovative means of violence (planes, snipers, suitcase bombs, etc.), a reduction of nuclear weapons and WMD becomes possible. From a truly international perspective, the enemy disappears and a unification of world powers develops. The rogue state becomes the main state level threat, a placement supported by recent events. Yet, policies towards rogue states must employ a united effort by the international community centering on the motive behind WMD development: deterrence. If states feel threatened by other states based on the development of military capability or a perceived intention to dominate and control, that is where international policy should focus. The dis-ease will continue if only the symptoms find redress.

Eastern philosophy considers both the external view of the world and the internal view of the self. Western international efforts often only consider what's going on "out there." When viewing only the international system, a jungle appears, based on the greedy, power-hungry interests of "states." Policy makers view the environment only and the interactions within it.

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When a view of the self enters the equation, better understanding of the interrelationship of life and its environment occurs. What's "out there" reflects the internal self and how the self contributes and adds to the environment. If the world is a jungle full of greedy, self-interested amorphous states, then that reflects our own inner turmoil. Only by first seeking to change the self, does the environment change. Thus, if we seek to change the world into a peaceful planet of coexisting populations, an internal reflection, both on one's state and individual self, must first occur. If the U.S. desires a world without the threat of nuclear weapons and other WMD, of terrorists and those wishing to do this country harm, then people within the U.S. must first act to eliminate the destructive forces within our own state and the exportation of such forces first. To call others who produce and trade arms evil, yet partake in that activity ourselves, is simply hypocritical and evil to a larger extent. To call those monsters who seek comparative deterrence based on the threat produced by U.S. nuclear capability, only points out the monster within ourselves. To continue to develop tactical nuclear weapons, increasing the likelihood of their use in theatre based conflict, undermines international efforts towards world peace and is truly evil.

From the inception of the U.S., there was a desire to secure liberty and freedom for the people, yet leaders always limited who could have freedom and liberty and supported these limitations with academic, political and cultural tools. Over time, marginalized voices pushed the conception of freedom, liberty and equality to become more inclusive. This becoming is not yet complete. The inclusiveness of those who deserve or qualify for freedom, liberty and equality, and what these terms mean, must undergo another paradigm shift to encompass not only the world community but an understanding based on the resulting disparate views. True liberty, freedom and equality will include the freedom and liberty not to exist in a world threatened by

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annihilation, the freedom and liberty to exist in peace, with an equal opportunity to seek happiness.

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APPENDIX

Name_____

Title_____

Party Affiliation_____

IMAGE INDICATORS

Capability (highlighted in yellow)

1. Military strength and capability

    a. The country's offensive and defensive military potential

    b. The government's control over the military

    c. The likelihood that the country would resort to the use of military force to achieve its goals

    d. Whether the country's military force was superior, equal, or inferior to the U.S. military force

    e. The country's capability of using, and willingness to use, military force

    f. The country's reliance on another country's extended military capability (deterrence)

    g. Military assets obtained from a "parent" state

    h. Superpower conflict part of state's military capability

    i. Military policy dictated by "parent" state

2. Domestic policy

    a. The country's government structure (open or closed)

    b. The government's effectiveness and efficiency in implementing policy

    c. The organization, size and strength of the government's opposition

    d. The government's ability to carry out a policy, achieve a goal, or abide by a agreement

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     e.   Whether the decision structure was multitiered or monolithic (monolithic countries are assumed to be more capable since they do not have to please their publics, interest groups, or bureaucratic interests)

     f.   Domestic policy that relies on or originates with another state

3. Economic characteristics

     a.   The capacity and stability of the country's economy (industrial potential, agricultural self-sufficiency, growth rate, potential for growth and development)

     b.   The interaction between the U.S. economy and the other country's economy (permeability of other economy; threat to or opportunity for the United States)

     c.   The country as recipient or provider of international aid

     d.   The reliance on another country for economic stability

Culture (highlighted in orange)

1. Comparison of culture to U.S. and/or international culture

     (perception of similarity implies a positive affect with low or not threat)

2. Cultural sophistication

     (includes social norms, literacy, religion, standard of living, scientific and technological capabilities, racial composition, nationalism and the public-mindedness of citizens)

Intentions (highlighted in pink)

1. Goals and motives

     a.   Leaders pursuance of their goals

     b.   Leaders' and citizens' motives

     c.   Compatibility of goals with U.S. goals

2. Flexibility

     a.   Leader's willingness to bargain, change tactics, and shift policy in response to U.S. initiatives

     b.   The country's flexibility

        c.   The linking of flexibility with cause (nationalism, imperialism, etc.)

   3. Supportiveness of U.S. goals and policies

   4. Supportive of another state's goals and policies

   5. Whether decision structure is multi-tiered or monolithic (those seen as multi-tiered are seen as less threatening)

   6. State's goals and policies influenced by "parent" state

Event scripts (highlighted in blue)

   1. Lessons from history

        a.   Historical incident used as analogy to explain current conflict

        b.   Historical incident used as lesson regarding appropriateness of techniques for dealing with conflict or issue at hand

   2. Predictions about country's behavior or the outcome of conflicts

Response alternatives (highlighted in purple)

   1. Instruments deemed appropriate for use in a conflict with the country (includes military threat or actual force, economic incentives to economic sanctions, diplomatic protests, bilateral and multilateral negotiations, or simply doing nothing; those perceived as weaker are dealt with in a more coercive fashion; sale or gift of military assets)

   2. Bargaining (those considered equal are dealt with as equals; inferiors are not bargained with)

   3. Past policies

        a. successes

        b. failures

   4. Call to superpower to intervene in crisis

   5. Domestic policy changes

MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT B

Name_____

Title_____

Party Affiliation_____

POLICY PREFERENCES

Towards the Dependent of the Enemy (highlighted in purple)

1. Diplomatic exchanges

2. Covert actions

3. Economic sanctions

4. Calls to the "enemy" to intercede

5. Moves to arm a third party

Towards the Rogue State

1. Retributive Actions (highlighted in green)

   a. Economic sanctions

   b. Military actions

   c. Blockades

   d. Coalition building

2. Rehabilitative Actions (highlighted in blue)

   a. Diplomatic measures

   b. Reduction of sanctions

   c. Economic assistance

3. Dual Actions (highlighted in pink)

   a. Create instability within government structure

   b. Restrictive treaties

   c. Containment strategies

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POLICY MAKERS: RANK & PARTY AFFILITATION

Iraq: 1969 to 1973

Abzug, Bella	Representative	Democrat
Annunzio, Frank	Representative	Democrat
Barrett, William	Representative	Democrat
Bayh, Birch	Senator	Democrat
Biaggi, Mario	Representative	Democrat
Boland, Edward	Representative	Democrat
Brasco, Frank	Representative	Democrat
Brooke, Edward	Senator	Republican
Case, Clifford	Senator	Republican
Celler, Emanuel	Representative	Democrat
Cohen, William	Representative	Republican
Cooper, John	Senator	Republican
Cramer, Wiliam	Representative	Republican
Cranston, Alan	Senator	Democrat
Dodd, Thomas	Senator	Democrat
Dole, Robert	Senator	Republican
Dorn, Jennings	Representative	Democrat
Eilberg, Joshua	Representative	Democrat
Farbstein, Leonard	Representative	Democrat
Fascell, Dante	Representative	Democrat

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Findley, Paul	Representative	Republican
Fong, Hiram	Senator	Republican
Frenzel, Bill	Representative	Republican
Friedel, Samuel	Representative	Democrat
Fulbright, James	Senator	Democrat
Goodell, Charles	Senator	Republican
Halpern, Seymour	Representative	Republican
Hamilton, Lee	Representative	Democrat
Harrington, Michael	Representative	Democrat
Hartke, Rupert	Senator	Democrat
Holtzman, Elizabeth	Representative	Democrat
Javits, Jacob	Senator	Republican
Jackson, Henry	Senator	Democrat
Johnson, James	Representative	Republican
Keating, Wiliam	Representative	Republican
Kennedy, Edward	Senator	Democrat
Kissinger, Henry	Vice President, NSA Advisor	Republican
Koch, Edward	Representative	Democrat
Kuykendall, Dan	Representative	Republican
Long, Clarence	Senator	Democrat
Lujan, Manuel	Representative	Republican
Mansfield, Mike	Senator	Democrat
Maraziti, Joseph	Representative	Republican

McClure, James	Senator	Republican
McCormack, Mike	Representative	Democrat
McGovern, George	Senator	Democrat
Mikva, Abner	Representative	Democrat
Mizell, Wilmer	Representative	Republican
Mollohan, Robert	Representative	Democrat
Mondale, Walter	Senator	Democrat
Montoya, Joseph	Senator	Democrat
Nixon, Richard	President	Republican
Owens, Wayne	Representative	Democrat
Pepper, Claude	Representative	Democrat
Podell, Bertram	Representative	Democrat
Pucinski, Roman	Representative	Democrat
Price, Robert	Representative	Republican
Rarick, John	Representative	Democrat
Ribicoff, Abraham	Senator	Democrat
Rogers, William	Secretary of State	Republican
Roncallo, Angelo	Representative	Republican
Roth, William	Senator	Republican
Ruppe, Philip	Representative	Republican
Ryan, William	Representative	Democrat
Scott, Hugh	Senator	Republican
Scott, William	Senator	Republican

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Schweiker, Richard	Senator	Republican
Sikes, Robert	Representative	Democrat
Stevens, Ted	Senator	Republican
Symington, Stuart	Senator	Democrat
Talmadge, Herman	Senator	Democrat
Thompson, Frank	Representative	Democrat
Tunney, John	Senator	Democrat
Vanik, Charles	Representative	Democrat
Williams, Harrison	Senator	Democrat
Wolff, Lester	Representative	Democrat
Zion, Roger	Representative	Republican

Iraq: 1989 to 1991

Anderson, Glenn	Representative	Democrat
Aspin, Les	Representative	Democrat
Baker, James	Secretary of State	Republican
Baucus, Max	Senator	Democrat
Bentsen, Lloyd	Senator	Democrat
Bingaman, Jessie	Senator	Democrat
Bond, Christopher	Senator	Republican
Boren, David	Senator	Democrat
Broomfield, William	Representative	Republican
Brown, Hank	Representative	Republican

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Bryan, Richard	Senator	Democrat
Bush, George	President	Republican
Byrd, Robert	Senator	Democrat
Cheney, Richard	Secretary of Defense	Republican
Cochran, William.	Senator	Republican
Cohen, William	Senator	Republican
D'Amato, Alfonse	Senator	Republican
DeFazio, Peter	Representative	Democrat
Dixon, Alan	Senator	Democrat
Dole, Robert	Senator	Republican
Dornan, Robert	Representative	Republican
Fascell, Dante	Representative	Democrat
Gejdenson, Samuel	Representative	Democrat
Gephardt, Richard	Representative	Democrat
Gilchrest, Wayne	Representative	Republican
Gilman, Benjamin	Representative	Republican
Gingrich, Newton	Representative	Republican
Glickman, Daniel	Representative	Democrat
Glenn, John	Senator	Democrat
Gorton, Slade	Senator	Republican
Hamilton, Lee	Representative	Democrat
Heinz, John	Senator	Republican
Helms, Jessie	Senator	Republican

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Hoyer, Steny	Representative	Democrat
Hubbard, Carroll	Representative	Democrat
Hyde, Henry	Representative	Republican
Inouye, Daniel	Senator	Democrat
Kasten, Robert	Senator	Republican
Kaptur, Marcy	Representative	Democrat
Kasich, John	Representative	Republican
Kennedy, Edward	Senator	Democrat
Kerry, Robert	Senator	Republican
Kohl, Herbert	Senator	Democrat
Kostmayer, Peter	Representative	Democrat
Kyl, Jon	Representative	Republican
Lagomarsino, Robert	Representative	Republican
Lantos, Tom	Representative	Democrat
Lautenberg, Frank	Senator	Democrat
Leach, James	Representative	Republican
Leahy, Patrick	Senator	Democrat
Levine, Meldon	Representative	Democrat
Lieberman, Joseph	Senator	Democrat
Lugar, Richard	Senator	Republican
Montgomery, Sonny	Representative	Democrat
McCain, John	Senator	Republican
Metzenbaum, Howard	Senator	Democrat

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Mikulski, Barbara	Senator	Democrat
Miller, George	Representative	Democrat
Mitchell, George	Senator	Democrat
Murkowski, Frank	Senator	Republican
Owens, Douglas	Representative	Democrat
Pell, Claiborne	Senator	Democrat
Pressler, Larry	Senator	Republican
Quayle, Dan	Vice President	Democrat
Reid, Harry	Senator	Democrat
Robb, Charles	Senator	Democrat
Roberts, Charles	Representative	Republican
Rodriguez, Ciro	Representative	Democrat
Rogers, Harold	Representative	Republican
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana	Representative	Republican
Sarbanes, Paul	Senator	Democrat
Schumer, Charles	Representative	Democrat
Schroeder, Pat	Representative	Democrat
Scowcroft, Brent	NSA	Republican
Shelby, Richard	Senator	Democrat
Simon, Paul	Senator	Democrat
Solarez, Stephen	Representative	Democrat
Solomon, Gerald	Representative	Republican
Specter, Arlen	Senator	Republican

Spratt, John	Representative	Democrat
Visclosky, Peter	Representative	Democrat
Warner, John	Senator	Republican
Webster, William	CIA Director	Republican
Wilson, Pete	Senator	Republican
Yatron, Gus	Representative	Democrat

Iraq: 1997 to 1998

Abercrombie, Neil	Representative	Democrat
Abraham, Spencer	Senator	Republican
Albright, Madeleine	Secretary of State	Democrat
Ashcroft, John	Senator	Republican
Bateman, Herbert	Representative	Republican
Berger, Samuel	NSA Advisor	Democrat
Biden, Joseph	Senator	Democrat
Bonier, David	Representative	Democrat
Brown, Corrine	Representative	Democrat
Buyer, Stephen	Representative	Republican
Chabot, Steve	Representative	Republican
Cleland, Joseph	Senator	Democrat
Clement, Robert	Representative	Democrat
Clinton, William	President	Democrat
Cohen, William	Secretary of Defense	Democrat

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Conyers, John	Representative	Democrat
Dicks, Norman	Representative	Democrat
Edwards, Chet	Representative	Democrat
Engel, Eliot	Representative	Democrat
Enzi, Michael	Senator	Republican
Filner, Robert	Representative	Democrat
Fowler, Tillie	Representative	Republican
Frost, Martin	Representative	Democrat
Gephardt, Richard	Representative	Democrat
Gibbons, James	Representative	Republican
Gilman, Benjamin	Representative	Republican
Gingrich, Newton	Representative	Republican
Glenn, John	Senator	Democrat
Gore, Al	Vice President	Democrat
Goss, Porter	Representative	Republican
Grams, Rod	Senator	Republican
Gregg, Judd	Senator	Republican
Hamilton, Lee	Representative	Republican
Hastings, Alcee Lamar	Representative	Democrat
Hefley, Joel	Representative	Republican
Inhofe, James	Senator	Republican
John, Christopher	Representative	Democrat
Kerry, John	Senator	Democrat

Kyl, John	Senator	Republican
Lantos, Thomas	Representative	Democrat
Leahy, Patrick	Senator	Democrat
Levin, Carl	Senator	Democrat
Lieberman, Joseph	Senator	Democrat
Livingston, Robert	Representative	Republican
McCain, John	Senator	Republican
McCollum, Bill	Representative	Republican
McHale, Paul	Representative	Democrat
Murkowski, Frank	Senator	Republican
Nadler, Jerrold	Representative	Democrat
Ortiz, Solomon	Representative	Democrat
Paul, Ronald	Representative	Republican
Porter, John	Representative	Republican
Reyes, Silverstre	Representative	Democrat
Rohrabacher, Dana	Representative	Republican
Roybal-Allard, Lucille	Representative	Democrat
Sanders, Bernard	Representative	Independent
Sanford, Marshall	Representative	Republican
Saxton, Jim	Representative	Republican
Sessions, Pete	Representative	Republican
Shelton, Hugh (General)	Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff	Won't Say
Sherman, Brad	Representative	Democrat

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Skaggs, David	Representative	Democrat
Skelton, Ike	Representative	Democrat
Specter, Arlen	Senator	Republican
Spence, Floyd	Representative	Republican
Tenet, George	CIA Director	Democrat
Thurmond, Strom	Senator	Republican
Torricelli, Robert	Senator	Democrat
Warner, John	Senator	Republican
Waxman, Henry	Representative	Democrat
Weldon, Curt	Representative	Republican
Wexler, Robert	Representative	Democrat

North Korea, 1966 to 1968

Abbitt, Watkins	Representative	Democrat
Adair, Edwin	Representative	Republican
Anderson, John	Representative	Republican
Ashbrook, John	Representative	Republican
Bennett, Wallace	Senator	Republican
Brinkley, Jack	Representative	Democrat
Bundy, McGeorge	Assistant Secretary of the State Dept.	Democrat
Byrd, Robert	Senator	Democrat
Cohelan, Jeffery	Representative	Democrat
Curtis, Carl	Senator	Republican

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Dirksen, Everett	Senator	Republican
Dodd, Thomas	Senator	Democrat
Eastland, James	Senator	Democrat
Edwards, William	Representative	Republican
Findley, Paul	Representative	Republican
Gibbons, Sam	Representative	Democrat
Goldberg, Arthur	Ambassador to UN	Unknown
Griffin, Robert	Senator	Republican
Gruening, Ernest	Senator	Democrat
Gurney, Edward	Representative	Republican
Hall, Durward	Representative	Republican
Hanna, Richard	Representative	Democrat
Hart, Philip	Senator	Democrat
Humphrey, Hubert	Vice President	Democrat
Javits, Jacob	Senator	Republican
Johnson, Lyndon	President	Democrat
Kuchel, Thomas	Senator	Democrat
Kuykendall, Dan	Representative	Republican
Long, Russell	Senator	Democrat
Mansfield, Michael	Senator	Democrat
McGee, Gale William	Senator	Democrat
McNamara, Robert	Secretary of Defense	Democrat
Morton, Thruston	Senator	Republican

Mundt, Karl	Senator	Republican
Pell, Claiborne	Senator	Democrat
Pelly, Thomas	Representative	Republican
Percy, Charles	Senator	Republican
Rarick, John	Representative	Democrat
Rusk, Dean	Secretary of State	Democrat
Scherle, William	Representative	Republican
Scott, Hugh	Senator	Republican
Shriver, Garner	Representative	Republican
Stanton, John	Representative	Republican
Stennis, John	Senator	Democrat
Stratton, Samuel	Representative	Democrat
Talmadge, Herman	Senator	Democrat
Thurmond, Strom	Senator	Republican
Tower, John	Senator	Republican
Tydings, Joseph	Senator	Democrat
VanderJagt, Guy	Representative	Republican
Waggonner, Joseph (Jr.)	Representative	Democrat
Whitener, Basil	Representative	Democrat
Wilson, Bob	Representative	Republican
Wyman, Louis	Representative	Republican
Young, Stephen	Senator	Democrat

North Korea, 1992 to 1994

Akerman, Gary	Representative	Democrat
Aspin, Les	Representative (1992-1993) and Secretary of Defense (1993-1994)	Democrat
Bently, Helen	Representative	Republican
Bereuter, Douglas	Representative	Republican
Biden, Joseph	Senator	Democrat
Bingaman, Jesse	Senator	Democrat
Bond, Christopher	Senator	Republican
Boomfield, William	Representative	Republican
Brown, George	Senator	Republican
Campbell, Thomas	Representative	Republican
Christopher, Warren	Secretary of State	Democrat
Cohen, William	Senator	Republican
Cranston, Alan	Senator	Democrat
D'Amato, Alfonse	Senator	Republican
Deconcini, Dennis	Senator	Democrat
Dole, Robert	Senator	Republican
Durenberger, David	Senator	Republican
Fascell, Dante	Representative	Democrat
Gates, Robert	CIA Director	Republican
Gingrich, Newton	Representative	Republican
Glickman, Daniel	Representative	Democrat

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Gore, Al	Senator	Democrat
Gregg, Judd	Senator	Republican
Hamilton, Lee	Representative	Democrat
Hatch, Orin	Senator	Republican
James, Craig	Representative	Republican
Kassebaum, Nancy	Senator	Republican
Kerrey, Robert	Senator	Democrat
Kyl, Jon	Representative	Republican
Lagomarsino, Robert	Representative	Republican
Lake, Anthony	NSA Advisor	Democrat
Lazio, Enrico	Representative	Republican
Leach, Jim	Representative	Republican
Lugar, Richard	Senator	Republican
Metzenbaum, Howard	Senator	Democrat
McCain, John	Senator	Republican
McCollum, Ira (Bill)	Representative	Republican
McInnis, Scott	Representative	Republican
Mitchell, George	Senator	Democrat
Murkowski, Frank	Senator	Republican
Nowak, Henry	Representative	Democrat
Nunn, Samuel	Senator	Democrat
Pell, Claiborne	Senator	Democrat
Perry, William	Secretary of Defense (1994-1997)	Democrat

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Powell, Colin (General)	Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff	Republican
Pressler, Larry	Senator	Republican
Reid, Harry	Senator	Democrat
Richardson, Bill	Representative	Democrat
Robb, Charles	Senator	Democrat
Roth, William	Senator	Republican
Simms, Steve	Senator	Republican
Simon, Paul	Senator	Democrat
Smith, Robert	Senator	Republican
Solarz, Stephen	Representative	Democrat
Solomon, Gerald	Representative	Republican
Wirth, Timothy	Senator	Democrat
Wolpe, Howard	Representative	Democrat
Woolsey, James	CIA Director	Democrat

North Korea, 1997 to 2000

Albright, Madeleine	Secretary of State	Democrat
Akaka, Daniel	Senator	Democrat
Allard, Wayne	Senator	Republican
Baucus, Max	Senator	Democrat
Bereuter, Doug	Representative	Republican
Berger, Samuel	NSA Advisor	Democrat
Biden, Joseph	Senator	Democrat

Bingaman, Jesse	Senator	Democrat
Burns, Conrad	Senator	Republican
Chabot, Steve	Representative	Republican
Clinton, William	President	Democrat
Cochran, William Thad	Senator	Republican
Cohen, William	Secretary of Defense	Democrat
Cunningham, Randall	Representative	Republican
Domenici, Pete	Senator	Republican
Dorgan, Byron	Senator	Democrat
Faleomavaega, Eni Fa'aua'a	Delegate	Democrat
Gibbons, James	Representative	Republican
Gilman, Benjamin	Representative	Republican
Goss, Porter	Representative	Republican
Grams, Rod	Senator	Republican
Gregg, Judd	Senator	Republican
Hall, Tony	Representative	Democrat
Hamilton, Lee	Representative	Democrat
Hayworth, John	Representative	Republican
Helms, Jesse	Senator	Republican
Hunter, Duncan	Representative	Republican
Hutchinson, Tim	Senator	Republican
Inhofe, James	Senator	Republican
Inouye, Daniel	Senator	Democrat

Kerrey, Robert	Senator	Democrat
Knollenberg, Joseph	Representative	Republican
Kyl, Jon	Senator	Republican
Leahy, Patrick	Senator	Democrat
McCollum, Ira (Bill)	Representative	Republican
McConnell, Addison	Senator	Republican
Menendez, Robert	Representative	Democrat
Moran, Jerry	Representative	Republican
Murkowski, Frank	Senator	Republican
Nethercutt, George	Representative	Republican
Pitts, Joseph	Representative	Republican
Royce, Edward	Representative	Republican
Schaffer, Robert	Representative	Republican
Shelton, Hugh (General)	Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff	Won't Say
Skelton, Isaac	Representative	Democrat
Spence, Floyd	Representative	Republican
Stark, Fortney	Representative	Democrat
Thomas, Craig	Senator	Republican
Thurmond, Strom	Senator	Republican
Traficant, James	Representative	Democrat
Weldon, Wayne	Representative	Republican